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PREFACE
My aim has been to provide both a record of the 
development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and 
an evaluation of its performance during the first decade of 
its existence, from its formation in August 1967 to the Bali 
summit of 1976 and the Kuala Lumpur summit of 1977. The thesis 
describes the interaction over time of the aspirations that 
ASEAN’s participants held for their Association with the 
environmental influences that shaped those aspirations.
ASEAN's activities were the product of that interaction. My 
main focus has been, therefore, on the views and objectives of 
those in the ASEAN countries, especially the elites, who have 
been responsible for the growth and evolution of ASEAN’s 
activities. I believe there is considerable merit in the 
argument that any meaningful evaluation of the success or 
failure of ASEAN must be based on the views of these elites 
and of others who are members of the ASEAN countries 
themselves, and not upon preconceived criteria imposed by 
Western or other outside observers. ASEAN must stand or fall 
on the degree to which it is able to fulfill the needs that 
its members perceive it to serve and on their evaluations of 
its performance. A shortcoming of many previous attempts to 
evaluate ASEAN's contribution to the region has been the lack 
of such a regional perspective.
It might be considered that to rely on the evaluations 
of ASEAN members themselves would permit a too indulgent or 
lenient appraisal. I am conscious of the fact that the views
expressed publicly by ASEAN's participants are, inevitably, 
often coloured by rhetoric and by presentational gloss.
Against this, however, it is important to note that ASEAN's 
history has been characterized by considerable diversity of 
opinion amongst its members about what should be the 
objectives of the organization. This diversity has on 
different occasions both impeded and stimulated ASEAN's 
progress. There has usually been a broad consensus amongst 
ASEAN's members about its principal objectives, but ASEAN has 
never been a monolith. There has never been total unanimity 
about these objectives. As a consequence, while some, perhaps 
even a majority, of ASEAN's participants may often appear to 
have been complacent and even apathetic about the pace of 
ASEAN's development and the scope of its achievements and to 
have set only cautious and minimal goals, there have always 
been many who have been more restless and on some occasions 
sharply critical of ASEAN’s performance. Some have continued 
to hold such ambitious aspirations for the Association that 
even the most exacting of observers would conclude that 
realistically there was little prospect of those aspirations 
being realized. ASEAN's members have frequently been 
commendably frank in discussing publicly the organization's 
shortcomings. There is therefore no great danger of too low a 
standard of achievement being set by focussing on evaluations 
of the Association that have been made by ASEAN's own members, 
providing the full diversity of their views is taken into
account.
This analysis has been limited to a ten-year time span 
for mainly practical reasons. A study of ASEAN's history from 
1967 to the present would have been too lengthy if an adequate 
coverage were to have been given to the subject. I have 
attempted while exporing my main theme - the evolution of the 
thinking of ASEAN's participants about the most appropriate 
objectives and activities for the Association - to provide 
also, as a background, a brief record of the major events and 
vicissitudes in the history of ASEAN during its first decade, 
not in exhaustive detail but touching at least on the major 
developments and the way that ASEAN's members responded to 
those developments. Such a record has not been provided 
previously by other researchers.
Furthermore, the first ten years of ASEAN does not 
represent a totally arbitrary division of the Association's 
history. The choice of any narrow timeframe of historical 
research will inevitably leave some trends and developments in 
awkward suspension, but the choice of this particular 
timeframe is we 11-supported by the fact that ASEAN's tenth 
anniversary was marked by the holding of its second summit in 
Kuala Lumpur. The August 1977 Kuala Lumpur summit, and the 
February 1976 summit in Bali, have frequently been described 
by ASEAN members as providing major watersheds or turning 
points in the Association's history. They mark the end of 
ASEAN's formative period in which it struggled, at times
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feebly but with perseverence, to overcome teething problems 
and to develop consensus on concrete steps that would enhance 
the benefits of regional cooperation and raise ASEAN's 
international stature in a way that would put it on the path 
to long-term viability. ASEAN's first two summits were, more 
than has generally been recognised, in reality more like 
highpoints in a steady continuum than an awakening from total 
stagnation; but they do provide a convenient point at which to 
pause and to assess the early history of the organization. 
ASEAN's participants saw the end of this first decade as a 
time to reassess their Association and to chart a course for 
the future. A study of ASEAN's first decade provides a 
necessary background to an understanding of its subsequent 
development. New trends emerged and new strategies were 
adopted by ASEAN to meet the needs of its second decade of 
development, but there was also a great deal of continuity in 
its approach to its major areas of activity.
The lessons of ASEAN's development may not be easily 
transferable to other regions of the world. In some respects 
ASEAN's experience may prove unique. Nevertheless, this study 
may provide some insights for the members of regional 
organizations elsewhere that would be helpful in their own 
search for appropriate and achievable cooperative goals.
* * *
VThis thesis has been the result of a protracted period 
of part-time study. I would like to express my gratitude to my 
supervisors during this period - John Girling, Milton Osborne 
and Astri Suhrke - for their assistance and encouragement.
CHAPTER 1
FORMATION
In early August 1967 the foreign ministers of Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, met in Thailand to discuss the formation 
of a new Southeast Asian regional organization. After three 
days of talks at the seaside resort of Bangsaen and in 
Bangkok, they signed on 8 August 1967 a Declaration 
establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The Association was declared to represent "the 
collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to bind 
themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through 
joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for 
posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity". The 
Declaration also contained a list of seven aims and purposes. 
The first of these, and the one subsequently given most 
emphasis, was "to accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development" of member countries. These 
aims appear both laudable and uncontroversia1. They do not 
fully reflect, however, the complex motivations that gave rise 
to the Association and the breadth of the aspirations and 
objectives of its founding members.
Antecedents
ASEAN was not the first regional cooperative venture in
2which Southeast Asian nations had participated. Previous 
attempts at regional cooperation can be dated from the 
beginning of the post-World War II period, when a number of
1Asian countries secured their independence. Generally, 
however. Southeast Asian attempts at regional cooperation 
prior to the 1960s were hindered by the preoccupation of most 
countries in the region with the pressing post-independence 
tasks of adapting to the severence of colonial links, 
establishing and consolidating indigenous political and 
economic institutions and achieving national integration.
Where the countries of the region did come into contact these 
preoccupations, in combination with the heterogeneity of their 
socio-political systems and of their past experiences, seemed 
to lead as often to disputation as to cooperation.
The early 1960s saw the emergence of two regional 
groupings that, for the first time, were confined to Southeast 
Asian countries and that on all available evidence were 
created entirely at regional initiative. ASEAN's origins 
cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation of the 
very important precedents that they provided. In fact, rather 
than a totally new beginning ASEAN was in some respects merely 
a continuation of the cooperative efforts initiated by these 
two previous groupings. The first of these regional groupings 
to be established was the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), 
formed at a meeting in Bangkok on 31 July 1961 and comprising 
Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand as founding members.
ASA suffered, especially in its early years, from 
confusion as to its principal aims and from the apparently
3justified suspicion that it was created at least in part to 
serve the purposes of the Cold War as a potential 
anti-communist security alliance.2- Another early problem 
faced by ASA arose from the inadequate steps its founders took 
to attract the interest, support and potential membership of 
other Southeast Asian countries.2. However, through a series 
of meetings in 1962 ASA appears to have impressed contemporary 
observers with its vigour and enthusiasm. The practical and 
modest approach that it adopted led its members to regard it 
as a valuable beginning to regional cooperative efforts, as 
much for its intangible results as for its concrete 
achievements.
These promising beginnings were soon interrupted. In 
June 1962 Diosdado Macapagal, who had won office in the 
Philippine Presidential elections in November 1961, initiated 
his country's formal claim to North Borneo, which Malayan and 
British authorities envisaged would shortly become part of the 
proposed federation of Malaysia. Malaya's objections to the 
Philippine claim led to the steady deterioration of relations 
between the two countries. ASA meetings were disrupted by the 
severance of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the 
Philippines following the declaration of the Federation of 
Malaysia on 16 September 1963.
The second Southeast Asian regional grouping to emerge 
in the early 1960s was Maphilindo. Maphilindo had its origins 
in President Macapagal's proposal for the formation of a 
"Greater Malayan Confederation", made shortly after he stated 
the Philippines' claim to North Borneo in June 1962. In
4contrast to Macapagal's extravagent hopes, Maphilindo's 
achievements were destined to be very modest indeed. Perhaps 
the best that can be said of Maphilindo is that it probably 
helped temporarily to moderate the level of animosity between 
its members as a consequence of Indonesia's Confrontation 
policy and the Philippines' claim to North Borneo - which with 
the formation of Malaysia was renamed "Sabah". However, 
Maphilindo had greater importance than it would otherwise 
merit due to the fact that it was the first Southeast Asian 
regional grouping in which Indonesia participated, even if at 
times half-heartedly.
ASEAN's indebtedness to both ASA and Maphilindo is 
illustrated by the contest that ensued from the latter part of 
1965 to decide which of the two, or what particular 
combination, should provide the basis for an expanded regional 
grouping. The event that made it possible for this debate to 
develop was the abortive coup of 1 October 1965 in Indonesia 
that led by stages to the political demise of President 
Sukarno, whose encouragement of Confrontation had so seriously 
affected relations with neighbouring countries. The new 
architects of Indonesia's foreign policy. General Suharto and 
especially Foreign Minister Adam Malik, were keen to bring 
Confrontation to an end and evinced a greater interest than 
had Sukarno in playing a constructive role in regional 
cooperation.
With regard to ASA, Indonesia's new leaders evidently 
considered that it would be dangerous politically to endorse 
an organization that under the Sukarno regime had been grouped
5in the same neo-colonialist category as SEATO. Indonesia 
therefore looked to the ideals and principles outlined in 
Maphilindo documents as a means to offset ASA's 
neo-colonialist image.Considerations of prestige are 
likely to have been an additional factor causing Indonesia to 
be reluctant to join an existing organization rather than play 
a leading role in the formation of a new organization. The 
eventual acquiescence of ASA members to Indonesia's wishes was 
no doubt due to the reason stated by Malaysia's Minister of 
Home Affairs, Tun Ismail, that: "It would be idle to pretend 
that in the long run Southeast Asian countries could gather 
together their strength and pool their resources, in order to 
defeat the encroachment of hostile forces, in whatever form, 
without the cooperation of the Republic of Indonesia."^- 
With Indonesia's inclusion in a new regional grouping taking 
elements from both ASA and Maphilindo, prospects for regional 
cooperation were significantly enhanced.
The ASEAN Declaration
The Indonesian proposal for a new regional organization 
in Southeast Asia was first presented publicly in June 1966, 
following discussions between Indonesia and Malaysia that 
would lead two months later to. the end of Confrontation.^- 
Late in 1966, following meetings with Malik and Indonesian 
officials, Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman 
reportedly circulated a "Draft Declaration" to Manila, Jakarta 
and Kuala Lumpur proposing the establishment of a "Southeast 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC)".?•
During the first half of 1967 Malik visited Bangkok, Kuala
6Lumpur and Manila to discuss the proposal. He also visited 
Rangoon and Phnom Penh in an unsuccessful attempt to secure 
the participation of Burma and Cambodia.8- Malik made it 
clear that "theoretically, there will be a place for every 
Southeast Asian country".9- Singapore's announcement in 
early May that it would support the new association prepared 
the way for ASEAN's formation three months later.10-
Given ASEAN's subsequent prominence there may be a 
tendency to assume that its original program of objectives and 
activities was more carefully conceived than was in fact the 
case. It was some time before ASEAN played a significant part 
in the foreign policies of its members or commanded much 
attention and comment in the media or in academic literature. 
Even the birth of the new grouping attracted little attention 
at the time. It was probably assumed that its prospects would 
be little different to those of any of its ill-fated 
predecessors. It is instructive to note a comment made by 
Singapore's Foreign Minister Rajaratnam in his closing 
statement to the Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in May 1974 
when he remarked somewhat flippantly: "You might recollect at
the first meeting in 1967, when we had to draft our 
communique, it was a very difficult problem of trying to say 
nothing in about ten pages, which we did. Because at the time 
we ourselves, having launched ASEAN, were not quite sure 
whether it was going anywhere at all."H* Though Rajaratnam 
may have overstated the case, his comments confirm that 
member-countries did not at this early stage have an entirely 
clear or unified conception of ASEAN's future role, in spite 
of the fact that the Bangkok meeting was preceded by an
7intensive exchange of views over a period of several months 
concerning the form of the new organization.
In these circumstances, and given ASEAN's indebtedness 
to both ASA and Maphilindo, it was not surprising that the 
ASEAN Declaration drew heavily on the founding documents of 
these two organizations. The Declaration, signed in Bangkok on 
8 August 1967 at the conclusion of ASEAN's inaugural meeting, 
followed closely the "Draft Declaration" circulated in late 
1966 by Thanat Khoman.l^. a large extent it is based
word-for-word on ASA and Maphilindo documents.
Thanat’s draft was not accepted without question, 
however. The lengthy debate which took place at the inaugural 
meeting over the contents of the Declaration provides 
important clues to the motivations of ASEAN's founders. A 
number of differences emerged in negotiations over the text. 
They are worth examining in detail as they illustrate some 
important divergences amongst ASEAN members about the most 
appropriate objectives and goals for the new body.
The negotiations over the Declaration's preamble proved 
to be the most difficult, particularly two portions adapted 
from the Maphilindo documents that referred to security and to 
foreign military bases within the region. The principal 
dissenter was the Philippines, which provided an alternative 
draft that omitted these references.13• The first preambular 
reference to which the Philippines objected noted that the 
countries of Southeast Asia "share a primary responsibility 
for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the
8area from subversion in any form or manifestation." The 
Philippines' delegation apparently believed that the reference 
to a shared responsibility for the security of the area went 
beyond its preferred definition of the new organization as a 
social, economic and cultural association and suggested 
instead that it might become a military alliance. It was 
successful, presumably against Indonesian objections, in 
having the wording altered so that security no longer was 
referred to directly as a shared responsibi1ity.14. Qn his 
return to the Philippines, Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos 
emphasized that the new association was "neither a political 
power bloc nor a military or security aggrupation".15.
It was probably a second preambular reference, however, 
that most concerned the Philippines. President Marcos 
reportedly instructed the Philippine delegation to work for 
its deletion.16. it stated that the members were in 
agreement that foreign bases were "temporary in nature and 
should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to 
subvert the independence of their countries" and that 
collective defence arrangements "should not be used to serve 
the particular interest of any of the big powers."I?- This 
was seen by the Philippines as a critical reflection on the 
presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines under the 1947 
Military Bases Agreement and on the Philippines' membership of 
SEATO and its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S. It was 
probably the negotiations over this issue that prompted Ramos 
to refer in his public address at the conclusion of the 
meeting to "long and tedious negotiations which truly taxed 
the goodwill, the imagination, the patience and the
9understanding of the five participating Ministers."
Adam Malik reportedly insisted that a reference to 
foreign bases should be included in the Declaration. The 
proposed passage had been taken without any substantive 
alteration from a Maphilindo document. The reference to 
abstention from the use of collective defence arrangements 
that served big power interests was in turn taken from one of 
the ten principles enunciated at the 1955 Bandung Conference. 
The Philippines was successful in having this reference 
removed, but Malik apparently argued that some reference to 
the bases was essential for domestic purposes in 
Indonesia. •  Opposition to the presence of foreign bases in 
the region was one of the hallmarks of Sukarno's policies, the 
elimination of such bases being seen as a major goal of 
Confrontation. Though by the time of ASEAN's formation 
Sukarno's influence had been eclipsed, Malik evidently 
believed that many Indonesians would have reacted critically 
if no attempt had been made to press the Indonesian view on 
this matter. Moreover, without some such reference there would 
have been little to distinguish ASEAN from ASA or to dissuade 
critics from the view that ASEAN was likely to be equally as 
pro-Western as ASA. Indeed, in an interview shortly after 
ASEAN’s formation Malik reportedly stressed that ASEAN's stand 
on foreign bases was the principle difference between ASEAN 
and ASA.19•
Malik eased the problem by conceding that the timing of 
the dismantling of foreign bases was up to the countries 
concerned "in accordance with their own interests and
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situation."20• An Indonesian spokesman reportedly stated 
that the principal consideration was that the security
arrangements of ASEAN member-countries should not be directed
91against other members.“ Such arguments appear to have 
eventually persuaded the Philippines to relent in its 
insistance on deletion. Malaysia and Singapore were reported 
to have taken the attitude that in view of Britain's pending 
withdrawal from east of Suez, the issue was not vital to 
them.22. The final wording of the passage was modified a 
little to remove the somewhat accusative tone of the original. 
It affirmed that "all foreign bases are temporary and remain 
only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned 
and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to 
subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the 
area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national 
development." Ramos later commented that this reference was 
"not directed against American bases in the Philippines 
because such bases are of temporary duration, exist with our 
express consent and are maintained for the mutually beneficial 
interest of the two states invo1ved."23•
Despite the problems that were experienced in 
negotiating the Declaration, the atmosphere of ASEAN’s 
inaugural meeting does not appear overall to have been one of 
acrimony. Most other points in the Declaration had been 
discussed and agreed upon in broad terms before the meeting 
commenced. Much of the negotiating was left to officials and 
the foreign ministers found time for rounds of golf and 
relaxation. Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak lauded 
the informality of the discussions, which Thanat Khoman had
11
described as an example of "sports-shirt diplomacy". Thanat, 
when asked if the meeting had been exhausting, described it 
rather as "exhilerating", adding that the ministers had met 
"in an extremely friendly a t m o s p h e r e ^4• Unlike the 
preamble, the Declaration's list of seven aims and purposes, 
concentrating on economic, social and cultural cooperation and 
modelled closely on the aims and purposes of ASA, apparently 
found ready agreement. An organizational framework modelled on 
ASA was also agreed upon and described in the Declaration as 
foilows:
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be 
by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be 
convened as required.
(b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the 
Foreign Minister of the host country or his 
representative and having as its members' the accredited 
Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on 
the work of the Association in between Meetings of 
Foreign Ministers.
(c) Ad Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of 
specialists and officials on specific subjects.
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to 
carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that 
country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of 
Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other 
committees as may be established.
The Ministerial Meetings were to rotate in alphabetical order.
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which had the advantage of conferring precedence upon 
Indonesia without any need to justify this on other grounds.
ASEAN's potential membership was defined by the 
provision in the Declaration that the Association was "open 
for participation to all states in the Southeast Asian region 
subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and 
purposes." Matters were complicated by the fact that the 
definition of "Southeast Asia" was not entirely clear. At the 
inaugural meeting the prospect of Ceylon's membership was 
mentioned on several occasions.25 . Ceylon later indicated 
its reluctance to join ASEAN allegedly because this would 
antagonize China.26. Even Australia and New Zealand appeared 
not to be ruled out by some members, although attitudes on 
this hardened later.27. Asked in November 1967 about U.S. 
and Australian membership, Malik reportedly replied 
emphatically that "ASEAN remains the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations."28. Both North and South Vietnam were 
considered eligible, though Malaysia's Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman believed that a peace settlement would first be 
required.29.
According to Thanat Khoman a name for the new 
organization was one of the most debated points at the 
inaugural meeting. Thanat told reporters that the Philippines 
considered that SEAARC, the most frequently mentioned name up 
to the time of the meeting, sounded too much like 
"shark"!20- The choice of "ASEAN" was made at the eleventh 
hour, and is attributed to Adam Malik.21.
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ASEAN's formal alms and purposes emphasized cooperation 
in the economic, social and cultural fields. Cooperation in 
technical, scientific, administrative, educational and 
professional spheres was also mentioned. Agriculture, 
industries, trade, transportation and communications were 
listed as specific areas of economic cooperation in which the 
members would collaborate. Cooperation in other areas was not, 
however, specifically excluded. The final statement of the 
Declaration, as cited earlier, was that the Association 
represented "the collective will of the nations of Southeast 
Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and 
cooperation, and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure 
for their peoples and for posterity, the blessings of peace, 
freedom and prosperity." This implied a potentially 
wide-ranging and multi-functional role for the Association in 
the affairs of the region. While the Bangkok Declaration which 
established ASA specifically described that organization as 
"an association for economic and cultural cooperation", the 
corresponding part of the ASEAN Declaration described ASEAN 
simply as "an association for regional cooperation".
Similarly, the preamble to the ASEAN Declaration suggested a 
broad potential scope for the organization. It commenced by 
stating that the ministers were "mindful of the existence of 
mutual interests and common problems among the countries of 
Southeast Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further 
the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation." 
Comments made publicly by ASEAN leaders also indicated a broad 
conception of the Association's role.
Economics
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The first of the alms and purposes of the ASEAN 
Declaration, and the one subsequently most emphasized, was:
'To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in 
the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen 
the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of 
Southeast Asian nations.” Although it will be shown later that 
other objectives had a major place in the preoccupations of 
ASEAN's founders, the importance that they attached to 
economic cooperation, in particular, should not be 
underestimated. There were several reasons for this.
Firstly, in the scale of expressed national priorities 
economic development had long held the highest place in most 
ASEAN countries. It is not surprising therefore that it should 
have been emphasized in ASEAN. Under Sukarno, Indonesians 
frequently had asserted that the identification and 
preservation of national identity was more important than 
economic development. Given the extent of subsequent 
deterioration in the economy, however, the New Order, as noted 
earlier, assigned top priority to economic reconstruction and 
development. Adam Malik asserted in January 1968 that: "The 
primary reason for regional cooperation is the necessity for 
modernization."32- In the post-war period the other ASEAN 
countries had all pursued basically-pragmatic economic 
policies and had paid at least lip-service to the notion that 
national efforts should concentrate on economic development 
and the improvement of living standards.
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Furthermore, ASA and ASEAN members had before them the 
example of, and the experience of participating in, a number 
of other regional economic bodies to encourage them in the 
belief that economic cooperation was a viable and desirable 
basis for cooperation in any new regional grouping, and that 
such cooperation could provide valuable assistance to national 
economic efforts. In particular, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the Colombo 
Plan, in which all ASA and ASEAN countries were members, 
provided important precedents. Just prior to ASEAN's 
formation, moreover, two new bodies for the promotion of 
regional economic cooperation had been initiated; namely, the 
Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast 
Asia, which held its first meeting in Toyko in April 1966, and 
the Asian Development Bank, which commenced operations in 
Manila in December 1966. Asian economists were at this time 
enthusiastic about the potential gains from multilateral 
economic cooperation amongst countries in the area.33.
ASEAN's interest in economic cooperation was also a natural 
consequence of its being the successor to ASA, from which it 
inherited a long list of project proposals.
The founders of ASA and ASEAN had made frequent 
reference to the necessity for. greater cooperation in the 
economic field. Tunku Abdul Rahman drew attention at ASA's 
inaugural meeting to common economic and social problems 
facing members. He concluded that the need to tackle these 
problems was urgent because: "In this world of interdependence
and intense competition, individually we are in a 
comparatively weak position vis-a-vis the more industrialized
16
countries." At ASEAN’s Inaugural meeting the shortcomings of 
concentration on national rather than regional economic 
efforts were pressed by Narciso Ramos, who asserted that: "The
fragmented economics of Southeast Asia, each country pursuing 
its own limited objectives and dissipating its meager 
resources in the overlapping or even conflicting endeavours of 
sister states, carry the seeds of weakness in their incapacity 
for growth and their self-perpetuating dependence on the 
advancing industrial nations." In an address to Singapore’s 
parliament in September 1967, Rajaratnam also stressed the 
notion of economic interdependence when he remarked that at a 
time when most countries of the world were "welding themselves 
into bigger and bigger economic units, the countries of 
Southeast Asia cannot go on believing that economic 
nationalism and self-sufficiency are the sure roads to 
modernisation and progress." He noted that ASEAN was "the 
first substantive step we have taken with other Southeast 
Asian countries towards regional economy."34. similar views 
were expressed by other ASEAN leaders, and with special 
fervour by President Marcos in January 1968 when he declared 
that: "Common problems of development that face the small 
nations of this region, each virtually helpless in the face of 
the terrible odds, render traditional divisions obsolete, and 
call for heroic measures from each of us to banish 
isolationism and commence a new era of total 
cooperation.”35.
There appeared to be particularly strong interest in 
cooperation in the coordination of economic relations with 
third countries. The ASEAN Declaration referred to
17
collaboration in "the study of the problems of international 
commodity trade". Just prior to the inaugural meeting Thai 
officials were reported to feel that as the five countries 
produced much of the world's rice, rubber, tin, timber, oil, 
tapioca, copra, maize and other products, they were in a 
position to bargain in the world market for these 
commodities.36• Malik also stressed the potential benefits 
for ASEAN members of coordinated efforts to maintain price 
levels for their commodities in Western markets.37. And in 
an address to the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club in early 
1968 Tunku Abdul Rahman observed that the small countries of 
Southeast Asia were being individually exploited by the 
industrial powers. He advocated price stabilisation measures 
"in order to safeguard our collective interest and not to 
allow ourselves to be victimised by the big powers, who not 
only buy our products cheaply but also dictate the price. This 
is where ASEAN can help."38-
Apart from the intrinsic benefits of economic 
cooperation, it was frequently argued by ASEAN's founders that 
the Association's efforts should be concentrated in this field 
because economic cooperation was a fundamental and essential 
precondition for the maintenance of political stability and 
security. Tun Ismail stated in June 1966 that "it is axiomatic 
that economic cooperation is often the most durable foundation 
upon which political and cultural cooperation can be 
built."39. At ASEAN's inaugural meeting Tun Razak urged that 
ASEAN should concentrate on economic cooperation because: "The 
key to peace and stability of our respective countries and of 
our region and the success of our resistance to external
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forces of Intervention or interference lie in our ability to 
surmount the backwardness of our people and to promote their 
welfare and their wellbeing." He emphasized therefore that 
"our joint efforts to eradicate poverty, hunger, disease and 
ignorance should be our main preoccupation."
This argument was sometimes reversed, however. In an 
interview in mid-1966 when negotiations on the ending of 
Confrontation were underway, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie stated 
that Malaysia believed "that the massive task of economic 
reconstruction of Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot really 
get underway until aggressor states stop resorting to the gun 
to gain their objective. For peace is the first prerequisite 
for rapid economic deve1opment."40. Similarly, in 
introducing his proposal for a Vietnam peace initiative at the 
Third ASA Ministerial Meeting Thanat Khoman had described it 
as an effort aimed at "first securing the conditions of peace 
which are so desired and at the same time so essential before 
long-lasting social and economic well-being may be insured for 
our peoples." The joint communique of ASEAN's Second 
Ministerial Meeting contained a reaffirmation of members' 
faith in the ASEAN Declaration "as the expression of their 
collective will to attain stability and peace in their region 
as a prerequisite for the well-being and prosperity of the 
ASEAN peoples."
The chicken-and-egg nature of this debate was pointed 
out in remarks by Malaysia's delegate, Tengku Ngah Mohamed, to 
an ASA Standing Committee meeting in March 1966. He stated 
Malaysia's view that "economic progress is the foundation of
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political stability which is the best guarantee of political 
independence." He acknowledged, however, that "to attain 
economic progress there must be political stability in the 
region in which we live. Without peace and stability there can 
be no progress. Hence peace and prosperity within our region 
is the concern of all of us." Such thinking provides an 
explanation why on a number of occasions it was in fact stated 
publicly that ASEAN would pursue the goals of economic 
development and of political stability and security 
simultaneously. Thanat Khoman spoke at ASEAN's inaugural 
meeting of a "two pronged task" for the nations of Southeast 
Asia to "free themselves from the material impediments of 
ignorance, disease and hunger" and to "prevent attempts to 
deprive them of the right to lead a free and sovereign 
national existence." A joint communique marking President 
Marcos' visit to Malaysia in January 1968 stated that the two 
heads of governments expressed the hope that ASEAN would serve 
"as the region's best vehicle to accelerate not only the 
economic development of the area through self-help regional 
cooperation, industrial harmonization and other means, but 
also the achievement of a lasting and honourable peace, 
stability and friendlier relations among and between all 
States of the region."41. President Suharto, in his opening 
speech to ASEAN's Second Ministerial Meeting, stressed ASEAN's 
political and security role as well as its stated economic 
role. He noted that in Bangkok the previous year members had 
pledged to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation 
"in order to achieve peace and stability in our area." He 
advocated, however, that economic reconstruction and stability 
were two separate problems whose progress should be
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harmonized. "Economic development", he observed, "fosters 
stability in this region whereas, reversely, increased 
stability will facilitate cooperation in economic development. 
We should be able to show our peoples and the world that the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a reality and an 
effective instrument for the advancement of economic progress 
and the creation of stability in this region."
The most important reason why ASEAN chose initially to 
emphasize cooperation in the economic, social and cultural 
fields was probably mainly because such cooperation was 
relatively uncontroversia1 - amongst member-countries as well 
as from the viewpoint of other countries. Member-countries 
were in broad agreement about the desirability of cooperation 
in the economic, social and cultural fields. If there was 
disagreement about particular aspects of such cooperation, it 
was not likely to generate too much heat. In the political and 
security fields disagreements were both more likely to arise 
and likely to be more damaging. Moreover, almost any 
substantial cooperation in these fields was likely to add fuel 
to criticism of ASEAN from countries such as China, the USSR 
and North Vietnam.
This consideration probably explains why ASEAN members 
followed the example of ASA in being content to establish a 
framework of cooperation in which initial ambitions were 
modest so that relatively minor successes in uncontroversial 
areas would encourage the extension of cooperative efforts to 
more ambitious projects and into other areas. This approach is 
well illustrated in the case of ASA by a speech by Narciso
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Ramos in May 1966 when he suggested that efforts at regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia should be seen against a 
backdrop in which progress in technical and economic 
cooperation had faced the barrier of conflicting political 
beliefs. This situation dictated that cooperation "shall be 
modest in scope and shall have, in so far as this is possible, 
no political overtone whatsoever." He considered that the 
Colombo Plan and ECAFE - "the two most successful regional 
endeavours in Asia" - had these characteristics and that their 
success was "almost directly proportional to the lack of overt 
political implication in their projects." In regard to ASA, he 
stated that from its inception: "Although everyone entertained
high hopes for its eventual success, it was tacitly accepted 
that there would be no grandiose plans .... There is probably 
no better augury for its future success."42. Avoidance of 
controversy was obviously in Tun Ismail's mind also in June 
1966. He asserted in reference to the possible formation of a 
new regional association that: "What is important is that the
organisation should be based on the principles of economic, 
social and cultural cooperation. I cannot think of a single 
country in Southeast Asia which would repudiate those 
principles."43. Adam Malik appeared to agree. In a statement 
to the Indonesian parliament on 24 June 1967, Malik stated 
that the proposed new grouping was intended to become "strong 
and powerful in economic affairs as the basis and source for 
developments in other fields." He felt that it should not 
encompass cooperation in fields such as politics, security or 
military affairs because of the differences in political 
outlook amongst potential members.44.
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At the time of ASEAN's inaugural meeting the Philippines 
and Singapore were reported to be particularly concerned to 
have it spelt out that ASEAN's primary aim was economic 
cooperation.^ 5• The Philippines appeared to take this 
viewpoent mainly because of its difficulties with the 
political and security references in the draft declaration. 
Singapore's reasons were indicated by Rajaratnam in an 
interview in July 1967. He noted: "If you start with a small 
number of economic projects - even one a year - as the number 
expands the investment of the countries participating enlarges 
and political accommodation follows. If the idea of regional 
cooperation really works, if it really gets off the ground - 
and this process will take 10 to 15 years - it is inevitable 
that once regional organisations are functioning, then defence 
and political institutions will develop naturally." He warned 
of the danger of reversing this order, asserting that: "Where 
political and security threats form the basis for cooperation, 
then the thing breaks up."46.
Politics
If it were not for their controversial nature, political 
and perhaps also security cooperation would probably have been 
given from the beginning much greater prominence in ASEAN's 
official pronouncements. There are indeed good grounds for the 
view that political and security considerations played an 
equal if not more important role in ASEAN's formation than 
economic factors. Whereas political discussions were conducted 
privately and "informally", and decisions remained 
confidential, ASEAN's economic, social and cultural activities
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were to be conducted in the full gaze of the public eye, 
providing the institutional basis for what was in reality a 
broad range of cooperative interests. Private discussions were 
facilitated by the fact that ASEAN members developed from the 
beginning a tradition of confidentiality. At the inaugural 
meeting Tun Razak urged: "I would like to regard this as an
established ASEAN tradition, that we speak little in public, 
but do much quietly."
Though spoken several years after the event, Adam 
Malik's observations regarding the basic motivations that led 
to the establishment of ASEAN are of interest in this context. 
He commented that: "Although from the outset ASEAN was 
conceived as an organisation for economic, social and cultural 
cooperation, and although considerations in these fields were 
no doubt central, it was the fact that there was a convergence 
in the political outlook of the five prospective 
member-nations, both with regard to national priority 
objectives as on the question of how best to secure these 
objectives in the emergent strategic configuration of East 
Asia, which provided the main stimulus to join together in 
ASEAN." Malik stated that there was "early recognition that 
meaningful progress could only be achieved by giving first 
priority to the task of overall and rapid economic 
development", and that "policies should be consciously geared 
towards safeguarding this priority objective." This objective, 
however, was conceived not only in purely economic terms but 
members simultaneously also saw the need "to secure the 
essential conditions of peace and stability, both domestically 
and internationally in the surrounding region." This was to be
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achieved by developing "the capacity to live with a minimum 
degree of internal disturbance and external interference, so 
as to enable the establishment of relative peace and stability 
without which national development becomes practically 
impossible." Malik concluded therefore that: "Whether
consciously or unconsciously, considerations of national and 
regional security have also figured largely in the minds of 
the founders of the ASEAN."47. Although he may have 
exaggerated the extent of convergence in the political outlook 
of ASEAN members, Malik confirmed that from the beginning 
ASEAN's objectives went beyond the purely economic sphere into 
the fields of politics and security. ASEAN was, after all, the 
creation of a meeting of foreign ministers, not economic 
ministers. Their interest in the political and security 
aspects of the Association was evident from their public 
remarks at the inaugural meeting and subsequently. Thanat 
Khoman, for example, stated in October 1968 that Thailand's 
motives in supporting regional groupings were "not only 
economic, social, the motivations are certainly - and I do not 
shy from saying that - are certainly political."48•
(a) Intra-regional conflict
It is particularly notable when evaluating ASEAN's 
initial objectives that the environment that gave rise to 
the Association was one in which the most pressing need was 
for the reconciliation of political differences amongst its 
members. The minimal and most immediate objective might 
reasonably have been to provide a framework for the avoidance 
or regulation of disputes amongst themselves. ASEAN’s
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formation brought to a close a turbulent period during the 
late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s when the 
prospective members of ASEAN had been mutually engaged in a 
number of highly acrimonious and destabilizing disputes. In 
the case of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore 
these disputes were for much of this period the dominant 
preoccupations of their respective foreign policies. In June 
1966 Tun Ismail stated his view that "no other region of the 
world can match Southeast Asia in its turbulence." He 
continued: "It is a region still fraught with danger and
tension. Twenty years after World War II, Southeast Asia has 
not learned to live at peace within itself. Intra-regional 
conflict and confrontation has set nation against nation and 
baIkanisation has remained an ever-present threat."49.
Even if they were not actually in conflict, many of 
ASEAN's members had only very recently developed regular 
bilateral contacts. One observer noted at the time of ASEAN's 
formation that: "The Malaysian elite still tends to know more
about Britain, the Filipinos about America and the Thais about 
Europe in general than they know about one another. Even the 
Indonesians really think more often with nostalgia of the joys 
of fighting the Dutch rather than living and struggling with 
their immediate neighbours."^- The ASEAN countries were set 
apart from each other by a variety of factors including their 
different historical and ideological experiences, their 
differing political, social, economic and ethnic make-ups and 
their particular geographical and geopolitical circumstances. 
This diversity was frequently noted by ASEAN members. In its 
early days it was therefore to be expected that regional
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Cooperation within ASEAN would concentrate on the improvement 
of political communication between members, as well as on the 
settlement of bilateral disputes, before more ambitious 
political goals were attempted.
Of the several bilateral disputes during this period 
Indonesia's Confrontation policy and the Philippine claim to 
Sabah have already been mentioned.51• After the formation of 
Malaysia, Malayan and Singaporean leaders fell out over their 
different approaches to the management of communal and 
economic policies in the new Federation. These differences led 
to Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965 and to 
continued friction between the two countries in subsequent 
years. Thailand, which was more preoccupied with developments 
in countries to its north and east, had generally good 
relations during this period with its future fellow-members of 
ASEAN, although in the case of Malaysia frictions surfaced 
occasionally due to Malaysian feelings that Thailand was 
giving insufficient support to joint efforts against Malayan 
Communist Party insurgents in the common border area, and due 
to Thai feelings that Malaysia was turning a blind eye to 
support and encouragement being given by Malaysian citizens to 
Muslim dissidents in southern Thailand.
The resolution of most of these disputes by the end of 
1966 offered the opportunity to put earlier attempts at 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia on a much sounder basis 
through the establishment of a new and more broadly-based 
grouping. ASEAN was seen as having inherited from ASA and 
Maphilindo the role that these organizations had played in
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facilitating the resolution of disputes between members. 
Discussing in June 1966 the role of the proposed new regional 
grouping that was to later to be named ASEAN, Tun Ismail 
called attention to the way in which "undisciplined 
nationalism" in Western Europe had "torn and bled that region 
for about four centuries, despite its common Christian 
heritage." He noted that it was "only after two world wars, 
both of which started in Western Europe, that the countries in 
the region decided to form a community, a Common Market." He 
observed, however, that regional cooperation in Western Europe 
had "come to stay", and asked: "Is there any reason why we.
Southeast Asians, should not make a similar attempt? Is there 
any good reason why we should not succeed?"52. That ASEAN 
arose directly out of a desire to avoid the recurrence of 
debilitating intra-regional disputes is further attested in 
remarks made in November 1978 by Malaysia's Minister of Home 
Affairs Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, which also provide an 
interesting insight into the events which led to ASEAN's 
formation. Ghazali acknowledged that he might "be accused of 
immodesty if I claimed a little credit for the idea of ASEAN", 
but explained that he had "always believed that no economic 
and social progress could ever be achieved by any country 
without peace and stability which in turn could not be built 
alone without the help of neighbours." ASA, he said, had been 
"the fruit of such an idea", but Confrontation frustrated its 
growth. It was, however, during Confrontation, he recalled, 
that secret contacts had been made by Malaysia with the 
Suharto regime. During these meetings they had discussed "the 
proposal for a post confrontation programme of a regional 
cooperation." Ghazali said that he remembered quite distinctly
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"squatting on the floor in a room of a Japanese restaurant in 
Bangkok. Ali Moertopo and I together with a few friends 
including Benny Moerdani and Jabid seriously discussed the 
ways and means of ensuring that the confrontation when it 
ended should never be allowed to repeat itself. And we hit 
upon the idea of a very close cooperation between Indonesia 
and Malaysia as the base bringing Thailand , the Philippines 
and Singapore into a strong economic and cultural 
organization."53.
(b) Anti-communism
Clearly, however, ASEAN's political objectives went 
beyond merely the settlement of intra-regional disputes. The 
suggestion is frequently encountered that at least a partial 
reason for ASEAN's formation was that it should serve as an 
anti-communist grouping and in particular that ASEAN was 
designed primarily to counter, even if only indirectly, the 
allegedly expansionist ambitions of the People's Republic of 
China. It would be difficult to dispute that at the time of 
ASEAN's formation all prospective member-countries would to a 
greater or lesser degree have had in mind the existence of 
actual or potential threats from communist forces. The 
governments of all five were actively engaged in the 
suppression of communist movements in their own countries. 
Most were also giving active encouragement to United States 
military involvement in Indochina, which was then near its 
peak. Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO and 
had sent contingents to Vietnam. At the time of ASEAN's 
formation the Cultural Revolution in China was also in full
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swing, accompanied by heightened hostility towards 
non-communist Asian countries.
Several other contemporary developments would have 
contributed to concern about communist activity in the region 
and could be construed to provide an anti-communist rationale 
for ASEAN. July 1967 had seen an announcement by Britain of 
its intention to withdraw from most of its defence commitments 
"East of Suez" by the mid-1970s, much to the consternation of 
Malaysia and Singapore. June 1966 had seen the formation in 
Seoul of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), which included 
as members Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand - along with 
Australia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and South 
Vietnam. The joint communique of ASPAC1s inaugural meeting had 
endorsed President Park's call for "greater cooperation and 
solidarity among the free Asian and Pacific countries in their 
efforts to safeguard their national independence and integrity 
against any Communist aggression or infiltration."
Given all these developments it is not surprising that 
some observers saw the emergence of a clearly perceived 
external threat, principally from China, as the major impetus 
behind ASEAN's formation.^ 4. Some support can be found for 
such views; certainly the "domino theory" found ready support 
at this time. For example, in August 1967 Lee Kuan Yew 
reportedly stated that if South Vietnam were to fall it would 
be "only a matter of time before the same process of 
emasculation by military and political techniques will 
overtake neighbouring countries. •  Although the source of 
threat is not specified in the following remarks made at
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ASEAN’s inaugural meeting, it is not difficult to read an 
anti-communist interpretation into them. Narciso Ramos 
declared that "the time has come for a truly concerted 
struggle against the forces which are arrayed against our very 
survival in these uncertain and critical times." Thanat Khoman 
asserted that the people of the region "want to remain 
forever, free men and free women, unchained by the shackles of 
bondage. "
China and the USSR concurred in the accusation that 
ASEAN was an anti-communist grouping. Peoples Daily on 12 
August 1967 declared that ASEAN was "an out-and-out 
counter-revolutionary alliance against China, communism and 
the people." Radio Moscow on 7 August 1967 observed: "it is
clear to us that it was Washington that gave the orders and 
promoted the new organization."
(c) Non-a1iqnment
While it is clear that anti-communism was an important 
element in the formation of ASEAN, and possibly even the 
deciding element in the case of some individuals, it is 
difficult to sustain the contention that ASEAN, as a grouping, 
was specifically and purposefully anti-communist. The fact 
that one searches in vain in the official statements of ASEAN 
for explicitly anti-communist views seems not so much due to 
an excess of discretion as to an apparent consensus amongst 
ASEAN's members that the Association, if not its individual 
member-countries would be best advised to espouse the
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principles of non-alignment and self-reliance. Rajaratnam's 
statement at the inaugural meeting is typical: "I would like
to stress that those who are outside the grouping should not 
regard this as a grouping against anything, against anybody.
We have approached ASEAN as standing for something, not 
against anything."
Indonesia played a particularly important role in 
encouraging the espousal of non-alignment within ASEAN and in 
giving credibility to ASEAN’s non-aligned image. Not only in 
Indonesia but in all ASEAN member—countries the principles of 
non-alignment were, to a greater or lesser extent, exercising 
an increasing allure by the time of ASEAN’s formation. A 
foreign policy posture that was less subservient to the 
interests of the major Western powers was emerging to some 
degree in each of them. In addition to considerations of 
national pride, which made dependence on foreign powers seem 
degrading, the conclusion was being reached by many ASEAN 
leaders that in view of the strife and uncertainty that had 
almost invariably followed major power involvement in regional 
affairs, the interests of the region would be best suited, 
ideally, by minimal involvement of such powers in the region. 
Even though ASEAN members were staunchly anti-communist in 
their domestic policies and were unwilling to give up existing 
security alignments with Western countries, they saw value in 
seeking to avoid ASEAN becoming embroiled in Cold War 
entanglements.
The experience of ASPAC also probably illustrated to 
ASEAN members the shortcomings of a grouping that was overtly
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anti-communist and that moreover included a number of 
extraregional members. ASPAC's anti-communist stance seems to 
have been chiefly responsible for its lack of substantive 
progress.
(d) Se1f-re1iance
Having rejected an explicitly anti-communist role, ASEAN 
provided a vehicle through which members could more readily 
explore new structures for the international relations of the 
region as alternatives to continued dependence on major power 
support. Tun Razak stated at the inaugural meeting that the 
time had come for "a new perspective and a new framework for 
our region." Many of those involved in ASEAN's formation 
appeared to believe that national and regional self-reliance 
were essential features of such a new framework.
Self-reliance was not a new concept in indigenous 
discussions on the subject of regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. The colonial legacy was blamed for the 
relative lack of progress towards regional cooperation and 
self-reliance in the early post-war period. The ASEAN 
countries' reactions to their colonial heritage combined with 
their negative views about the benefits that had arisen from 
subsequent major power involvement in the region to produce 
frequent expressions of a desire to manage their own affairs 
without the interference of any outside powers, no matter what 
their political complexion. In a speech in 1963 Dr Jose D. 
Ingles, then Philippine Ambassador to Thailand, declared that: 
"Emerging from their isolation, the newly independent nations
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of Southeast Asia have become more keenly aware that the 
destiny of the region rests in their own hands, for them to 
shape and to build in thier own fashion, without dictation and 
coercion from elsewhere."56- Disillusionment with Cold War 
politics and the concommitant involvement of the great powers 
in the region was eloquently expressed by Thanat Khoman in a 
speech in October 1969. He commented: "The cold war, together
with the resultant polarization of the world into two opposing 
camps, came into being without, so to speak, the advice and 
consent of the smaller powers, but carried with it the 
unprecedented danger of massive destruction for one and all. 
The Asian countries, no less than others, were caught in the 
maelstrom which has oftentimes, threatened to suck them into 
its vortex."57. early as July 1961 Thanat had questioned 
the reliability of external guarantors. This led him to 
suggest that: "It was perhaps a mistake to cast our glance too
far away; the immediate neighbours should receive greater 
attention and be more closely cultivated. Even though they 
share our weakness and our want, there is a heartening feeling 
that their fate and ours are unmistakably linked 
together."58.
That such thinking was operative in the formation of 
ASEAN can easily be illustrated. Rajaratnam declared at the 
inaugural meeting that ASEAN countries had "learnt the lessons 
and have decided that small nations are not going to be 
balkanized so that they can be manipulated, set against one 
another, kept perpetually weak, divided and ineffective by 
outside forces." As might have been expected, such views were 
put with special vigour by Indonesia. Adam Malik, explaining
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in an address to a student group in Jakarta in December 1966 
why he had initiated moves towards a new regional grouping, 
reportedly stressed the need for "a strong bulwark against 
imperialist manipulations as well as a decisive stablilizing 
factor in this part of the world ... ending once and for all 
foreign influence, domination, and intervention ... stemming 
the "yellow1 as well as the "white1 imperialism in Southeast 
Asia. "59. the inaugural meeting Malik stated that 
Indonesia wanted to see Southeast Asia develop into a region 
that could "stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend 
itself against any negative influence from outside the 
region. 1
Several of ASEAN's founders regarded the task of 
promoting national and regional self-reliance as a matter of 
some urgency in view of the perceived danger of a "power 
vacuum" might develop in the region. They drew attention to 
the necessity for such a vacuum to be filled by indigenous 
countries in order to forestall major power intervention with 
its attendant problems. Tun Razak warned at the inaugural 
meeting that "unless we take decisive and collective action to 
prevent the growth of intra-regional conflicts, our nations 
will continue to be manipulated one against the other. The 
vacuum left by the retreat of colonial rule must be filled by 
the growth and consolidation of indigenous powers." He noted 
that ASEAN represented "the collective will of our respective 
peoples to stand on our own feet and firmly determined to 
shape our future and our destiny by our own efforts. Razak's 
views were echoed by Indonesia's Soedjatmoko, who stated that 
in Indonesia the collapse of Sukarno’s foreign policy had
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brought home sharply a realization that decolonization had 
resulted in a "serious power vacuum" in Southeast Asia which 
if it continued would be filled by the major powers. He cited 
the Vietnam war as evidence of the "serious consequences" that 
this would have. He asserted that the general direction of 
political thought on this subject in Indonesia was "towards a 
strategy that would lead to the earliest possible creation of 
enough power by the nations indigenous to the region to fill 
the vacuum and thereby obviate the need for external powers to 
play a direct role in the maintenance of security in the 
region." He urged that Southeast Asian countries should "build 
up their own military capacities in coping with insurgencies, 
as well as gradually to fill up the regional power vacuum with 
their own joint military strength."60•
It may well be argued that many of those who referred at 
this time to the danger of a regional power vacuum were 
concerned primarily about the possibility of that vacuum being 
filled by communist powers, particularly the People's Republic 
of China. When Tun Ismail expressed concern in June 1966 about 
the "grave threat" posed by the "power-vacuum left over from 
the retreat of western colonial rule" he had indeed accused 
China of taking advantage of this vacuum.^• The significant 
point, however, is that Tun Ismail and others who later spoke 
of such a power vacuum believed it would be best filled by the 
growth of indigenous power, rather than as in the past by 
primary emphasis on alliances with external powers. This is 
indicated in some candid remarks made by Rajaratnam in a 
speech in 1977. He suggested that the best way to understand 
ASEAN was "for us to see how and why it was formed, as
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perceived by those who participated in its formation". He 
claimed that by 1967 it had become clear to Singapore that the 
war in Vietnam could only end with the withdrawal of American 
forces from that country, which in turn would mark the end of 
the Western presence in Southeast Asia. He continued: "For the
first time then, the non-Communist ASEAN States had to 
contemplate seriously the reality of having to co-exist and 
live in close proximity with States theoretically committed to 
converting the rest of Southeast Asia through their 
ideological kith and kin in non-Communist countries to the 
Communist cause. On our own and as isolated political 
entities, we were well aware, we could not long withstand a 
concerted pressure by so massive a concentration of Communist 
States operating from Asia itself." Moreover, support from 
friendly external countries could not be assumed. Therefore, 
he concluded, the ASEAN states realized that they had to learn 
to look after themselves and that this "could be best achieved 
through collective strength. At that time, speaking frankly, 
we had no clear idea of how regional strength and solidarity 
were to be forged."62. These remarks were probably of course 
made a little wiser by hindsight. Many ASEAN leaders, 
particularly in Thailand and the Philippines, undoubtedly 
considered at the time of the Association's formation that it 
would be necessary to continue to rely on Western military 
support and security guarantees for some considerable time.
But few appeared to regard that support as sufficiently 
durable and effective that it would be inappropriate to 
emphasize the development of indigenous strength and 
solidarity, at least as a long-term objective.
(e) International prestige
It was recognized by ASEAN's founders that, even 
co11ectively, member-countries were not a formidable economic 
or military bloc. There appeared, nevertheless, to be a 
widespread conviction that unity through ASEAN would result in 
greater international standing and prestige for its individual 
members. This consideration was highlighted on several 
occasions, including in remarks by Adam Malik after the 
inaugural meeting. He reportedly stated that if Southeast 
Asian nations cooperated effectively they would not become "a 
mediocre power" but "a force which could convince the 
world".63- Thanat Khoman, in 1975, assigned central 
importance to this objective. Describing his own motivations 
in supporting ASEAN he confessed that these motivations "were 
less lofty and idealistic [than those outlined in the ASEAN 
Declaration] but stemmed from more practical and realistic 
considerations, among them the fact that Southeast Asian 
nations are comparatively weak and small .... Separately, they 
represent little, if any, significance in world affairs. 
Politically they are "balkanized' by prolonged diverse 
colonial rule." Thanat noted the need for colonial isolation 
to be overcome by the development of regional cohesiveness and 
collaboration. If this could be achieved ASEAN members' 
individual weakness and impotence would be "gradually replaced 
by a greater combined strength and their voice will be heard 
and their weight noted on the international forum." These, he 
claimed, were the aims that the founders of ASA and ASEAN set 
for themse1ves.64. Similarly, in an article published in 
1968 Thanat had argued that through regional cooperation in
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Southeast Asia a new power base could be established which 
would "help our group to become respectable in the eyes of our 
foes and at the same time serve as an entity for our friends 
to cooperate with .... Alone, each nation in Southeast Asia is 
a tiny speck on the global landscape, but, united, they will 
become a viable entity of more than 200 million people with an 
abundance of resources .
(f) Regiona1ism
Growing support amongst prospective members of ASEAN for 
greater efforts towards regional cooperation was thus grounded 
in the pragmatic expectation of certain positive political 
benefits stemming from greater international influence. Such 
cooperation increasingly took the form, however, of deliberate 
efforts to promote the more abstract goal of "regionalism". 
This was reflected, firstly, in a critical evaluation of the 
consequences of excessive nationalism. In June 1966 Tun Ismail 
declared: "We, Southeast Asians, have had our fill of the 
"heroic' phase of nationalism. It was a phase in which 
regrettably, progress toward regionalism was set back by 
conflicting national impulses and rivalries born of mutual 
suspicion. It was a phase in which, by and large, nationalism 
failed to come to grips with the problems of economic 
development and raising living standards of the people."66. 
This theme was to become a particular favourite for 
Rajaratnam. At ASEAN's inaugural meeting he recalled that for 
the past twenty years ASEAN members had acted "on the basis of 
nationalist fervour". This approach had proved insufficient, 
however, and he claimed that the realization had grown that it
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was necessary "to marry national thinking with regional 
thinking". Where conflict occurred between the two, "painful 
adjustments" would have to be made if regionalism was not to 
remain a utopia. At ASEAN's Second Ministerial Meeting 
Rajaratnam called for a new definition of national interest in 
view of the fact that "the conditions of life transcend the 
boundaries of nation-states." He suggested that just as during 
the struggle for independence the leaders of Southeast Asia 
developed inspiring nationalist philosophies to mobilize their 
peoples, so would it now be necessary for leaders to 
contribute equal inspiration to the cause of "interdependence" 
between nations, which in Europe and other areas of the world 
had been recognized as a necessity in a rapidly shrinking and 
increasingly technological world. The growth of global 
interdependence had been cited by other Southeast Asian 
leaders as reason for greater efforts towards regional 
cooperation and the encouragement of a spirit of regionalism. 
The preamble to the ASEAN Declaration itself contained the 
observation that regional cooperation was particularly 
appropriate in "an increasingly interdependent world".
The notion of regional cooperation as an imperative for 
survival is illustrated by Tun Ismail's exhortation in 1966 
that: "We must create a deep, collective awareness that we 
cannot survive for long as independent peoples - as Burmese, 
Cambodians, Indonesians, Laotians, Malaysians, Filipinos, 
Singaporeans, Thais and Vietnamese — unless we also think and 
act as Southeast Asians. Unless we prove, by deed, that we 
belong to a family of Southeast Asian nations, with its own 
character, its own identity and its own destiny."67- Less
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e l o q u e n t l y  b u t  w i t h  g r e a t e r  b r e v i t y ,  R a j a r a t n a m  s u g g e s t e d  i n  
M a r ch  1968  t h a t  a h e l p f u l  I n c e n t i v e  f o r  ASEAN w o u l d  be  t h e  
c r u d e  s l o g a n :  " E i t h e r  we h a n g  t o g e t h e r  o r  we h a n g
s e p a r a t e l y . " 6 8 .
A M i l i t a r y  R o l e ?
I t  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w e r e  o f  m a j o r  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  ASEAN's f o u n d e r s .  
Th e y  c l e a r l y  w e r e  v e r y  m i n d f u l  o f  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  s p i n - o f f s  f o r  
n a t i o n a l  a nd  r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  t h a t  w e r e  t o  be  a n t i c i p a t e d  
f r o m  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  a nd  p o l i t i c a l  s p h e r e s .  
M o r e o v e r ,  b o t h  b e f o r e  and  a f t e r  t h e  i n a u g u r a l  m e e t i n g  i n  
B an g ko k  i t  was  on o c c a s i o n  r e m a r k e d  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  c o o p e r a t i o n  
m i g h t  become a more  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  ASEAN's a c t i v i t i e s  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  i n a u g u r a l  m e e t i n g  o f  ASEAN b o t h  
Adam M a l i k  a n d  Tun Raz ak  w e r e  r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  commented  t h a t  
s e c u r i t y  w o u l d  be d i s c u s s e d  by ASEAN member s  a t  f u t u r e  
m e e t i n g s .  R a z a k  i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  s a i d  t h a t  i t  was  p o s s i b l e  
f o r  ASEAN t o  h a v e  d e f e n c e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  " o n c e  we h a v e  become 
g o o d  f r i e n d s  w i t h  a common i n t e r e s t  a n d  d e s t i n y .  I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a y  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  w i l l  be  a d e f e n c e  a r r a n g e m e n t  
n o w . "  He a d d e d :  " N a t u r a l l y  i f  a n o t h e r  f r i e n d  i s  i n  t r o u b l e ,  we 
w i l l  o f  c o u r s e  h e l p . "69-  S i m i l a r l y ,  Adam M a l i k  r e p o r t e d l y  
c o m p a r e d  ASEAN t o  a h o u s e  w i t h  f i v e  d o o r s .  " I f  a b u r g l a r  comes  
i n  o ne  d o o r ,  i t ' s  a p r o b l e m  f o r  e v e r y o n e  i n  t h e  h o u s e . "70-
S p e c u l a t i o n  t h a t  ASEAN was  a c t i v e l y  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  
s p e c i f i c  f o r m s  o f  s e c u r i t y  c o o p e r a t i o n  was  f u e l e d  by r e p o r t s  
o f  s t a t e m e n t s  by ASEAN l e a d e r s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  m o n t h s  o f
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1968.7 -^- During a visit to Indonesia President Marcos 
reportedly discussed the threat to the region from China and 
remarked that it might be necessary to develop "arrangements 
for collective security on the basis of ASEAN principles and 
purposes. " 7 7 ■ In an interview in Tokyo, President Suharto 
was reported to have said that ASEAN was aimed at, amongst 
other things, establishing peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia, and to have observed: "From this standpoint, there is a
possibility that ASEAN may arrive at establishing military 
cooperation."7^• Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister, General 
Praphas, was reported to have supported a military role for 
ASEAN during a visit to Manila, and Razak is alleged to have 
also endorsed an ASEAN role in defence cooperation. Attention 
was drawn by commentators to earlier statements by Indonesian 
generals which were said to indicate support for such 
cooperation, especially to statements by General Panggabean 
who in 1966 was reported to have said in an address to the 
Army Command and Staff College in Bandung that.there was "a 
need for a joint defence organization among countries in 
Southeast Asia in view of the fact that People's China is now 
strongly engaged in strengthening its influence in this part 
of the world."74 .
Despite numerous reports of this kind, however, there is 
very little evidence of any firm support for early moves 
towards military cooperation within ASEAN itself. On the 
contrary, such reports led to a rash of "clarifications" and 
of denials that ASEAN’s militarization was imminent.75• 
Indonesians drew attention to a July 1966 resolution of the 
Indonesian parliament that prohibited Indonesia's membership
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in any military pact directed against another country. Close 
examination indicates that the majority of press reports at 
this time alleging that various individuals were in favour of 
a military role for ASEAN were unwarranted amplifications of 
remarks that merely acknowledged the security significance of 
ASEAN's activities in other fields, or that speculated that 
defence cooperation could become part of ASEAN's activities at 
some distant time in the future. Those few who appeared to 
advocate seriously a military role for ASEAN, such as Praphas, 
did not exercise decisive influence on national policy.
The publicity generated by suggestions that ASEAN would 
acquire a military role led to further statements 
reemphasizing ASEAN's primary role in promoting economic, 
social and cultural cooperation. For example, in March 1968 
Tunku Abdul Rahman stated that ASEAN should first be made to 
work "in its present role". He was not personally averse to 
defence arrangements within ASEAN but thought that "it might 
drive others away if we do it too quickly."76. Tun Razak 
added: "Our main concern is not so much defence, but security.
The idea is to ensure security with as little expense as 
possible."77 - Adam Malik commented that Indonesia did not 
want ASEAN to become a military organization because it should 
first achieve its basic aim of economic, social and cultural 
cooperation. .  Rajaratnam urged that ASEAN should not be 
overloaded with too many problems because economic development 
would need all available resources. He expressed agreement 
with Malik that: "ASEAN should not be made a vehicle for
resolving our defence problems. It could be made outside of 
ASEAN in such a way and manner as members find convenient and
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suitable . "79 •
Other ASEAN spokesmen rejected a military role for ASEAN 
on the pragmatic grounds that its members were militarily too 
weak, either individually or collectively, to form a credible 
military alliance.80* The belief was often stated that the 
primary threat to security stemmed from internal rather than 
external factors. Moreover, it was on occasion acknowledged 
that if an external threat were to arise it would be necessary 
to continue to rely on major power support, particularly from 
the U.S.81- Thailand and the Philippines accordingly showed 
no tendency to see an ASEAN military alliance as an 
alternative to their defence links with the U.S. Bilateral 
agreements were evidently considered to be the most 
appropriate form for military cooperation between ASEAN 
members. By the time of ASEAN's formation such agreements 
existed between Indonesia and Malaysia and between Malaysia 
and Thailand. Formal agreements were supplemented by other 
more limited forms of cooperation, such as attendance by the 
military personnel of other ASEAN countries at Indonesian 
staff colleges.82-
ASEAN members' objections to a military role for the 
Association were also rationalized by the argument encountered 
earlier that political and security objectives were best 
pursued by concentration on economic development. For example, 
in 1966 Tun Ismail, in dismissing the notion that any new 
regional grouping should take the form of a military alliance, 
had stated that he did not believe that military alliances, by 
themselves, could provide "a lasting solution to the problem
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of communist expansionism." He argued: "The communist
challenge, centred in Peking, is a total challenge that poses 
a total threat to Southeast Asia. Although force must be 
matched by force, in the interests of self-defence, as when 
North Vietnam seeks to annex South Vietnam, we Southeast 
Asians must first prove our capacity to provide more food, 
more jobs for our people."83• Shortly before the formation 
of ASEAN Adam Malik employed a similar argument in rejecting 
the feasibility of a regional defence organization. He also 
emphasized the financial constraints, noting: "If you talk
about defence arrangements, you must talk about weapons, air 
planes, military equipment, etc. You create the need for more 
expenditure for weapons. But this is not the problem for us 
now. The problem is food for the stomachs of our people. The 
greatest danger lies in this direction." He concluded: "This
doesn't mean we must forget the defence problem. But we don't 
give it priority now."84.
Probably the strongest proponent of the view that 
economic development was the most important requirement for 
the security of the region, and therefore the most appropriate 
focus for ASEAN, was Rajaratnam. Speaking to Singapore's 
parliament in September 1967 he stressed that ASEAN "as such" 
was not concerned with the military problems of the region. He 
explained: "This is not to say that member countries are
disinterested in defence matters. In fact economic and social 
progress in the region would become well-nigh impossible if 
these countries cannot safeguard their national integrity and 
security. However one of the consequences of the successful 
realization of the aims and objects of ASEAN would be to bring
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economic stability and thereby enhance prospects for peace and 
security in the region." Only in this sense was he prepared to 
concede that ASEAN was an organization for promoting peace and 
security in the region.85. At the Second ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting Rajaratnam observed, according to a paraphrase by a 
Singapore Government publication, that "one significant 
clarification that had emerged as a result of discussions at 
meetings of the standing committee was that ASEAN was an 
organisation to promote economic, social and cultural 
cooperation between the member countries." Rajaratnam thought 
that this would dispose of "early misunderstandings that ASEAN 
had military implications". He clarified that this was "not to 
minimise the importance of security problems in the region, 
but the Singapore Government believed that, for a variety of 
reasons, this should not and could not be secured through 
ASEAN. The security and integrity of the countries of 
Southeast Asia were more likely to be jeopardised through 
economic stagnation and collapse within the region than from 
overt military threat from the outside."®®-
Integration
ASEAN's subsequent record of achievement has often been 
judged by the Association's success, or lack of it, in 
achieving progress towards "integration" amongst its members. 
ASEAN's founders saw important limits to the process of 
integration, however. In particular, they believed that 
political integration should not be pursued to the extent that 
it might compromise the sovereignity of member-countries. 
Indonesia, for example, had followed the example of Maphilindo
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in suggesting in its draft declaration prepared prior to 
ASEAN's formation that it should be stipulated that members of 
ASEAN would pursue their objectives "without surrendering any 
part of their sovereignity."®^-
This suggests that on whatever other grounds ASEAN’s 
subsequent performance might be criticized, it should not be 
on the basis of their lack of progress in developing forms of 
political cooperation that would make substantial inroads on 
national sovereignity. Even in the economic sphere integration 
was seen at most as a very long-term objective.
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICIZATION
Although politics was generally disavowed by ASEAN's 
founders as the principal focus of the organization's 
activities, in the years immediately after ASEAN's formation 
political influences, at first on a bilateral basis, had a 
notable effect on its development. At ASEAN's inaugural 
meeting Singapore’s Foreign Minister Rajaratnam had cautioned 
that the new organization was a mere skeleton and that the 
really difficult task would be to give it flesh and blood. He 
stated his belief that the Association would "run into more 
rocks than calm waters." It must have been a severe 
disappointment to ASEAN's founders that the events of the next 
few years amply supported Rajaratnam's prediction. Even 
Rajaratnam may not have anticipated, however, that ASEAN's 
initial difficulties would stem mainly from bilateral 
political disputes.
The Sabah Dispute
The first seven months of ASEAN's existence were 
relatively untroubled. Difficulties began when on 21 March 
1968 the Philippine press carried reports about a secret 
"special forces" training camp on Corregidor Island in Manila 
Bay. Filipino Muslim recruits had allegedly been receiving 
training for infiltration into Sabah.1■ The issue might have
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dissipated had it not become entangled with scheduled 
discussions in Bangkok in June 1968 between Malaysia and the 
Philippines concerning the latter’s claim to Sabah. The 
Bangkok talks, which lasted for one month, were disastrous in 
their effect upon relations between the two countries.
These events made it inevitable that ASEAN's activities 
would be affected, especially since from the time of the 
Second Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in August 1968 the 
Standing Committee had been based in Kuala Lumpur. During that 
month the Philippines issued a circular instructing all 
Philippine delegates at the United Nations and at other 
intergovernmental conferences "to enter appropriate 
reservation against the authority or competence of Malaysia to 
represent North Borneo or Sabah."2- Malaysia's reaction was 
to announce that it would refuse to send any delegates to 
ASEAN meetings until the Philippines retracted its 
reservation.3•
The problem was not finally resolved until a meeting on 
15 December 1969 between Tunku Abdul Rahman and the new 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo, on the eve of the 
third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting which commenced the following 
day at the Cameron Highlands north of Kuala Lumpur. The Tunku 
announced the normalization of relations with the Philippines 
in his opening address. Romulo noted that the normalization 
agreement had been reached "without preconditions". But if 
Malaysia was unsuccessful in persuading the Philippines to 
abandon the claim, the Philippines had also made concessions 
in agreeing not to continue to announce its reservation
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concerning Malaysia's authority over Sabah, and, even more 
importantly, by putting its claim to one side so that it could 
for most practical purposes be ignored.
That the Sabah dispute had a seriously damaging effect 
upon ASEAN's development is obvious. It impeded ASEAN's 
activities for a substantial period. Many observers, 
particularly from outside the region, believed that even the 
future of the Association had at times been in grave doubt. It 
is of considerable significance, however, that for the most 
part these doubts did not appear to be shared by ASEAN's 
participants. They consistently professed to see the concept 
of regional cooperation, as embodied in ASEAN, as an objective 
that transcended bilateral conflict. Both Malaysia and the 
Philippines shared this view. Although their practical 
commitment was at times questionable, both countries appealed 
to the ideal of regional cooperation in attempting to modify 
the behaviour of the other; the essential difference being 
that Malaysia saw the Sabah claim as disruptive and therefore 
in conflict with efforts towards regional cooperation whereas 
the Philippines asserted that it was possible and desirable to 
separate such bilateral disputes from regional endeavours.
Thus Ghazali Shafie commented of the Sabah dispute that: "we 
weep to see the tragedy that this has brought to the prospect 
of regional cooperation which has painfully been cultivated 
over so many years."4- Romulo, on the other hand, stressed 
that the Philippines "will not destroy ASEAN. The Sabah 
dispute is not necessarily an obstacle to regional 
cooperation."5• There was, moreover, some willingness on 
both sides to concede that flexibility was desirable in
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relation to the dispute in the interests of regional 
cooperation.
The fact that ASEAN itself played no direct role in 
mediating the Sabah dispute could be interpreted as a failing. 
Unlike a number of other regional organizations, ASEAN had no 
formally assigned role in the settlement of disputes between 
its members. However, ASEAN's failure to intervene should 
perhaps be seen in the light of the belief which apparently 
was held by those members not involved in the dispute, that 
such intervention could be counter-productive. This was 
probably a prudent judgement, especially considering that the 
dispute did not extend to military conflict. Moreover, despite 
the absence of formal dispute settling procedures, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Singapore exerted considerable suasion in 
appealing privately and publicly to both Malaysia and the 
Philippines to consider the effect of the dispute on the 
prospects for ASEAN. Adam Malik argued that "we should be able 
to separate ASEAN cooperation from other problems not 
pertaining to it."®* Rajaratnam urged: "whatever differences
we may have, we must to the best of our ability not jeopardise 
ASEAN."7 •
ASEAN can thus take some credit for the putting aside of 
the Sabah dispute. That the incentive for compromise was in 
large part derived from the desire of the two parties not to 
undermine the Association is implied, at least on Malaysia's 
part, by remarks made by Tunku Abdul Rahman when announcing 
the normalization of relations with the Philippines. He 
stated: "This shows the great value we place on ASEAN and what
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we think it can do for the good of our countries and peoples. 
It is my earnest hope that we have now permanently succeeded 
in overcoming whatever problem we may have so that we can now 
embark on a fresh start and forge ahead with our various plans 
and programmes in regional cooperation.” He added that 
"without genuine goodwill among us, the edifice of ASEAN which 
we are attempting to build will have a foundation of shifting 
sand.” The Tunku was even inclined to see some benefit in the 
interruption of ASEAN's activities by the Sabah dispute 
because it had driven home these lessons. Subsequent 
developments appeared to bear out at least partially the 
Tunku's belief that ASEAN had learnt something from its recent 
travails, which Tun Razak referred to at the Third Ministerial 
Meeting as the organization's "teething troubles”. The 
Philippines showed thereafter little enthusiasm for the Sabah 
claim.
The Sabah claim was not the only source of tension in 
bilateral relations between ASEAN members during the 
Association's early years. The deterioration in 
Indonesia-Singapore relations following the hanging of two 
Indonesian marines in October 1968 was perhaps second only to 
the Sabah dispute in its potential effect upon ASEAN, coming 
as it did at the height of the crisis in Malaysia-Phi 1ippines 
relations. A commentator described it at the time as "one more 
nail in the ASEAN coffin which many feel has already been 
polished to a fine finish by Fi 1ipino-Malaysian antagonism 
over Sabah.” ASEAN, he observed, looked to be merely "a 
boiling stew of incompatible nationalisms.”®- A number of 
other bilateral tensions, both temporary and enduring.
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u n d o u b t e d l y  h a m p e r e d  ASEAN's p r o g r e s s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  d i d  n o t  s e r i o u s l y  d i s r u p t  ASEAN's d e v e l o p m e n t .
E x t e r n a l  S t i m u l i
By t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  ASEAN a p p e a r e d  t o  h a v e  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  o v e r c o m e  i t s  e a r l y  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
s t e m m i n g  f r o m  b i l a t e r a l  d i s p u t e s  f o r  t h e  p e n d u l u m  t o  s w i n g  t o  
t h e  o t h e r  e x t r e m e  a nd  f o r  members  t o  b e g i n  t o  e x p l o r e  new and  
a m b i t i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n  t h a t  c o n t a i n e d  a 
s t r o n g  e l e m e n t  o f  i d e a l i s m .  F o r  some ASEAN s p o k e s m e n  t h e s e  
g o a l s  came t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  on  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n .  I n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  ASEAN t o o k  a s t e p  c l o s e r ,  e v e n  
i f  t e n t a t i v e l y ,  t o w a r d s  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a n d  s e c u r i t y  p r e o c c u p a t i o n s  o f  ASEAN's member s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  be 
s u p p r e s s e d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  f o r m a l  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  u p o n  e c o n o m i c ,  
s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  ASEAN h a d  i n  f a c t  s e r v e d  f r o m 
i t s  i n c e p t i o n  a s  a f o r u m  f o r  " i n f o r m a l "  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  and  s e c u r i t y  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a f f e c t i n g  
m e m b e r - c o u n t r i e s . "
The  s e a r c h  f o r  new p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g i e s  w i t h i n  ASEAN was  
s t i m u l a t e d  by a n umber  o f  m a j o r  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  r e g i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  
1968 t h e r e  w e r e  two  i m p o r t a n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  t h a t  a d d e d  u r g e n c y  
t o  ASEAN m e m b e r s '  e f f o r t s  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a  new a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  r e g i o n ' s  a f f a i r s .  The  f i r s t  o f  t h e s e  was 
B r i t a i n ' s  a n n o u n c e m e n t  on 16 J a n u a r y  o f  a n  a c c e l e r a t e d  
t i m e t a b l e  f o r  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  i t s  f o r c e s  f r o m  e a s t  o f  S u e z .  
The  s e c o n d  was  t h e  T e t  o f f e n s i v e  s t a g e d  by  N o r t h  V i e t n a m  and
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the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, which was 
clearly a major setback for the United States and South 
Vietnamese forces and marked a turn-about in U.S. attitudes 
towards involvement in the war. These developments seemed to 
portend for ASEAN members the not-too-far-distant prospect of 
withdrawal from the region of their two most important 
external guarantors. There was some evidence of an ASEAN 
response during the Second Ministerial Meeting in August 1968. 
It was reported that at the end of the meeting the ministers 
met "informally" to discuss security and other problems, 
including the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, the U.S. presence 
in the area, the pending British withdrawal and the failure of 
some countries to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Further developments in the region during 1969 appeared 
to strengthen ASEAN members' views about the utility of the 
Association in coping with these changes, even while most of 
them continued to cling to their traditional alliances. 
Foremost amongst these developments was the continued decline 
in U.S. enthusiasm for the war in Vietnam and the enunciation 
by President Nixon in July 1969 of the "Guam Doctrine" in 
which he advocated that "the nations of Asia can and must 
increasingly shoulder the responsibility for achieving peace 
and progress in the area ... with whatever cooperation we can 
provide."9- Although this doctrine aroused fears of a 
precipitate U.S. withdrawal, it was not entirely unanticipated 
or unwelcomed by ASEAN members. It was in fact quite 
consistent with the aspiration which they had expressed from 
the time of ASEAN's formation for reduced involvement of the 
major powers in the region and greater self-reliance.
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Other elements of a new structure of major power 
relationships affecting the region were also beginning to be
dimly perceived by some ASEAN observers in 1969. The Ninth 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969 marked 
the drawing to a close of the Cultural Revolution and raised 
the prospect of China playing a more positive and less 
revolutionary role in international affairs. The announcement 
in June 1969 by Secretary-General Brezhnev of the Soviet 
proposal for an Asian collective security system drew 
attention to the growing interest of the USSR in the region. 
Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Malaysia had been 
established in March 1967 and with Singapore in June 1968. The 
first deployment of Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean 
had occurred in March 1968. Japan was also having a greater 
impact on the region as a consequence of its rapidly-expanding 
economic presence. These developments caused Soedjatmoko, then 
Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States, to comment that 
in viewing the future of Southeast Asia one observation 
inescapably emerged, namely "the multipolarity of the new 
constellation of forces in the post-Vietnam era."l°-
The changing regional environment was the occasion for 
some comment at the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
December 1969. Adam Malik commented that the British 
withdrawal and U.S. disengagement from the region "may well 
induce us to jointly consider policies in our effort to cope 
with the new emerging situation." He advocated that Southeast 
Asian nations themselves should find the means to cope with 
these new circumstances rather than rely on external powers.
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Carlos Romulo saw ln the developing regional situation an 
opportunity for the implementation of President Marcos' 
long-standing proposal for an "Asian forum".
During 1970 the regional development of most serious 
concern to ASEAN's members appeared to be the deteriorating 
situation in Indochina, especially the extension of the war to 
Cambodia following the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk. At 
ASEAN's Fourth Ministerial Meeting in March 1971 Adam Malik 
expressed his support for greater political cooperation within 
ASEAN with his assertion of the need for ASEAN's members to 
"engender and develop an understanding among ourselves so as 
to present a united front, to the fullest extent possible, for 
our undertakings in the many regional and international 
forums. In this respect, truly based upon ASEAN spirit, I 
suggest to this Meeting to instruct their respective 
representatives to cooperate closely and to act jointly." The 
joint communique noted that the ministers had "reiterated the 
necessity of close consultation and cooperation amongst their 
representatives at regional and international forums so that 
the members of ASEAN would always present a united stand to 
advance their common interests." Perhaps in an attempt to 
illustrate such a united stand, member-countries announced at 
the conclusion of the meeting their joint support for Malik’s 
candidacy as the next president of the U.N. General Assembly.
Even more unsettling regional developments were to 
follow in 1971. China launched its exercise in "ping-pong 
diplomacy" which served as an effective symbol of its 
new-found moderation and desire for improved relations with
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the non-communist world. In July 1971 it was revealed that 
President Nixon's national security advisor, Dr Henry 
Kissinger, had made a secret visit to Peking and it was 
announced that the President himself would soon be paying a 
visit to China. Except in the case of Malaysia, ASEAN members' 
contacts with China had not been of much substance. By the 
time of the crucial vote on China's admittance to the United 
Nations in October 1971 there still remained a good deal of 
uncertainty and distrust in ASEAN countries' attitudes towards 
China and ASEAN members failed conspicuously to coordinate 
their voting positions.
But despite this disarray the rapid pace of 
international and regional developments during this period had 
served at least to encourage the consideration of new 
approaches and new responses. ASEAN members met in Kuala 
Lumpur in November 1971 to consider, amongst other matters, 
Malaysia's proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, 
which was the most ambitious and well-defined of these new 
approaches. While international developments had caught ASEAN 
members by surprise, they did not catch them completely 
unprepared.
Malaysia's Neutralization Proposal
The Malaysian proposal was first articulated by Tun 
Ismail during the course of a debate in the Malaysian 
parliament on 23 January 1968. Referring to Britain's 
announcement one week earlier of plans for an accelerated 
withdrawal of its military forces from the region, and to
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apprehension about a "vacuum" if effective defence 
arrangements could not be substituted. Tun Ismail suggested 
that the time was "ripe for the countries in the region to 
declare collectively the neutralization of Southeast Asia. To 
be effective, this must be guaranteed by the big powers, 
including Communist China." He further suggested that 
Southeast Asian countries should sign non-aggression treaties 
with each other and that they should declare a policy of 
peaceful coexistence which would involve undertaking not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and 
accepting whatever form of government they chose to elect, or 
adopt.H •
Little apparent headway was made with the neutralization 
proposal, however, until April 1970 when it was raised by Tan 
Sri Ghazali Shafie in his capacity as Malaysia's delegate to 
the Dar es Sa 1aanTpreparatory meeting for the non-aligned 
summit held later that year. Ghazali expressed Malaysia’s hope 
that non-aligned countries would endorse the neutralization of 
the whole of Southeast Asia to be guaranteed by China, the 
USSR and the U.S. When Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned in 
September 1970 and Tun Razak succeeded him as Prime Minister 
with Tun Ismail as his deputy, the Malaysian government 
commenced a serious effort to promote the neutralization 
proposal.
Malaysia did not at any time present publicly a complete 
and detailed official explanation of its proposal. It appeared 
to crystallize over a period of time and as such can only by 
deduced from a series of speeches and articles by several
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Malaysian spokesmen commencing in October 1970. The initial
stress was on the fact that there were several preconditions 
for the realization of the proposal. Razak told a political 
rally that the main aim was firstly to consolidate regional 
cooperative efforts by organizations such as ASEAN, secondly 
to obtain acceptance within the region that Southeast Asia 
should no longer be the arena of the power struggle of the big 
nations and, thirdly, to get the big powers - China, the USSR 
and the U.S. - to guarantee that Southeast Asia remained 
peaceful and prosperous.12. During his visit to Indonesia in 
December 1970 Tun Razak pointed to favourable developments in 
the international environment, such as the decline of the Cold 
War, and to evidence of "a new approach and new thinking" 
amongst the big powers, in order to support his view that the 
time had come for Southeast Asian countries to "chart a new 
common strategy". To assist this strategy he particularly 
argued that efforts should be made to draw China into the 
international community.13. By April 1971 Tun Razak seemed 
to believe that the prospects for neutralization had further 
improved. He asserted that the "era of confrontation between 
the major powers has given way, if not exactly to one of 
conciliation, at least to a period of adjustment of particular 
points of differences or conflict".^.
Tun Razak's optimism appeared to increase still further 
following the July 1971 announcement of Nixon's forthcoming 
visit to Peking. He commented to Malaysia's parliament that 
"we are living in a world very different from that which 
obtained up to only a few years ago - even, in some ways, up 
to only a few months ago." He recalled that when Malaysia’s
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neutralization proposal was first made there was "a general 
attitude of scepticism" and that it was regarded as 
"unrealistic, idealistic or even worse". But he claimed that 
as a result of the latest exchanges between China and the U.S. 
there had been a "growing appreciation that this policy far 
from being idealistic is in fact a very realistic one".15.
Probably the most detailed explanation available of 
Malaysia's neutralization proposal is that contained in an 
article published in October 1971 by Ghazali Shafie, who had 
been made Minister with Special Functions and Minister of 
Information in Tun Razak1s cabinet.1^ - Ghazali sought to 
dispel the notion that the neutralization proposal was 
"premised upon a euphoric view of the world or of the natural 
tendencies of states in the international arena." Pointing to 
Malaysia's experience during its 1948-1960 struggle against 
communist insurgency and during Confrontation he asserted that 
Malaysia "does not need any lesson from anyone about the 
realities of the power-struggle" of which in any case the 
"holocaust in Vietnam" was "a sufficiently grim reminder". 
Rather, he argued, the proposal was "based on the long view of 
the developing mood on the regional as well as the 
international stage", a mood which "must be used to positive 
purpose or it may go wrong."
Ghazali detailed the steps that Malaysia envisaged for 
the implementation of its neutralization proposal, which he 
said might be viewed on two levels:
On the first level the countries of Southeast Asia
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should get together and clearly view their present
situations and agree upon the following:
- individual countries in the region must respect one 
another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
not participate in activities likely to directly or 
indirectly threaten the security of another. This is 
an essential requirement. Non-interference and 
non-aggression are basic principles which Southeast 
Asian countries must unequivocally accept before any 
further steps can be taken.
- all foreign powers should be excluded from the region.
- the region should not be allowed to be used as a 
theatre of conflict in the international power 
struggle.
- they should devise ways and means of, and undertake 
the responsibility for, ensuring peace among member 
states.
- they should present a collective view before the 
major powers on vital issues of security.
- they should promote regional cooperation.
On the next level, the major powers (the U.S., the
USSR and China) must agree on the following:
- Southeast Asia should be an area of neutrality.
- the powers undertake to exclude countries in the 
region from the power struggle among themselves.
- the powers should devise the supervisory means of 
guaranteeing Southeast Asia's neutrality in the
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international power struggle.
He summarized by explaining that "just as the Southeast Asian 
countries will be responsible, under the Neutralization Plan, 
for maintaining peace among themselves, so will the 
responsibility of preventing externally-inspired conflict in 
the region rest upon the three guaranteeing powers." With 
regard to the major powers, he also emphasized that each must 
be given assurances that its withdrawal or non-involvement in 
the area would not benefit the others. He stressed the need 
for the three major powers to agree upon an effective 
supervisory method capable of enforcing the neutralization 
arrangement.
It is evident that Malaysia's neutralization proposal 
was based upon broad principles that were acceptable to the 
majority of ASEAN’s participants. These included the 
principles that regional problems should increasingly be met 
by regional solutions; that traditional dependence on the 
support of outside powers should ideally be replaced by 
greater self-reliance and the promotion of regional 
cooperation; that major power interference in the affairs of 
the region should be halted; and that all countries in the 
region, regardless of ideology, should be given the 
opportunity to participate in regional cooperative schemes.
The difficulties and disagreements that arose between Malaysia 
and the other ASEAN member-countries over the neutralization 
proposal stemmed mainly from the fact that the proposal 
represented an attempt to formalize and institutionalize these 
principles.
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Kuala Lumpur Declaration
On 2 October 1971 the five ASEAN foreign ministers 
attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York met 
in Tun Razak's hotel suite and agreed to a further meeting in 
November in Kuala Lumpur to discuss recent international 
developments as they affected Southeast Asia, as well as 
President Marcos's proposal for an Asian summit meeting.17• 
(Marcos had revived this proposal soon after President Nixon's 
announcement of his visit to Peking.) The chief advocate of 
the Kuala Lumpur meeting had been Carlos Romulo.
During the course of a preparatory meeting in 
early-November, Malaysian officials confirmed that the 
neutralization proposal would be discussed at the foreign 
ministers meeting.18* One week later they told reporters 
that four ASEAN countries supported a zone of peace and 
neutrality proposal.19. The matter proved to be not so 
simple, however. The Philippines, in particular, opposed the 
endorsement of a neutralization proposal at this time.20- 
Marcos observed that neutralization was "by no means a settled 
concept and the idea of neutralizing a collection of sovereign 
states with vital interests that inevitably differ, must be 
unprecedented in history."21. Two days prior to the Kuala 
Lumpur meeting Tun Razak and Romulo had a 45 minute meeting in 
an unsuccessful attempt to resolve their differences. Romulo 
issued a statement referring to "possible other alternatives" 
to neutralization being discussed at the meeting of foreign 
ministers.22•
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Other ASEAN countries were less vocal in expressing 
opposition to Malaysia's proposal prior to the Kuala Lumpur 
meeting, but "diplomatic sources" reported strong reservations 
in all of the other four capitals.23. Rajaratnam commented 
on arrival in Kuala Lumpur that neutralization was "a good 
concept but we must discuss with our colleagues how practical 
or feasible it is and whether it is a long-term objective." He 
warned of "many difficulties", although he thought they could 
be surmounted. Two such difficulties were whether the big 
powers would support the proposal and how it could be 
reconciled with membership of SEATO and the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements. Rajaratnam said Singapore had submitted a paper 
for the conference giving a general review of items that had 
been suggested by Malaysia.24. Adam Malik was reported to 
have commented regarding the neutralization proposal that: "If 
it means to free the region from outside interference, in 
principle we shall have no objection." He raised, however, the 
problem of "policing" neutralization - what would happen if a 
nuclear-weapons carrying ship approached the Straits of 
Ma1acca?25.
The Kuala Lumpur meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers was 
held on 25-27 November 1971. Although there were several other 
items on the agenda, the neutralization issue dominated the 
meeting. The discussions at both the official and ministerial 
level were reported to be difficult with an impasse being 
reached at one point when the Philippines insisted that the 
neutralization proposal could only be decided upon at a 
meeting of Asia's leaders.26. Yhe declaration that was
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finally agreed upon shows evidence of dilution and 
compromise.
The operative paragraph of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration 
merely states:
(1) that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary 
efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for. 
Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference 
by outside Powers;
(2) that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted 
efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would 
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer
re 1 ationship.
In the preambular passages it was agreed "that the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and 
that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its 
realization." It was also noted that the signatories were 
"Cognizant of the significant trend towards establishing 
nuclear-free zones", and that they reiterated their commitment 
to the portion of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration that stated the 
primary responsibility of Southeast Asian countries for the 
affairs of the region and their determination to resist 
external interference.
An accompanying joint communique stated that the 
ministers had agreed that they would "bring the contents of
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their Declaration to the attention of other countries of 
Southeast Asia and would encourage them to associate 
themselves with the aspirations and objectives expressed in 
the Declaration.” It was also agreed to "establish a Committee 
of Senior Officials initially of the ASEAN countries to study 
and consider what further steps should be taken to bring about 
their objectives.” The Committee was to be convened in 
Malaysia. Regarding the proposed summit meeting favoured by 
the Philippines, the ministers agreed to recommend that a 
summit of ASEAN Heads of State be held in Manila at a date to 
be announced later.
Following the signing of the Declaration Tun Razak 
stated that three major steps were required to make 
neutralization a reality; namely, a clear determination by the 
ASEAN states to resist external interference, an approach to 
the other Southeast Asian countries to commit themselves to 
the principle of neutrality, and an approach to the big powers 
to guarantee that neutrality. He clarified that an approach to 
the big powers could only be made after Southeast Asian 
countries had been approached. He also clarified that once 
neutralization was accepted, bases and treaties with external 
powers would be phased out.27. ^t the conclusion of the 
meeting Razak described the Declaration as "an important and 
vital step in our efforts to ensure a new era of peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia”. Some of his disappointment at 
the response from Malaysia's ASEAN partners to its 
neutralization proposal is suggested, however, by his warning 
that: "Whether we succeed in the further steps ahead depends
on our ability to work together. We cannot expect others to
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respect us as independent and sovereign countries unless we 
are ourselves prepared to work to maintain our independence 
and our sovereignty and unless we show our determination to 
look after ourselves so as to be free from any form of 
external interference."
But Razak's remarks also showed a willingness to make 
some concessions to the views of other ASEAN member-countries 
He acknowledged that a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality 
could only be attained "if all countries show that they will 
scrupulously respect our independence and integrity and that 
they will not interfere in any manner in our internal affairs 
either overtly or covertly." Razak stated that he had "no 
illusion about the long and difficult road ahead of us." He 
suggested that ASEAN members should proceed "with caution as 
well as with imagination." He assured that Malaysia would 
"always be in step with all our friends in Southeast Asia as 
we proceed on the path which this Declaration sets out."
Slow Progress
Despite mixed reactions to the Declaration, including 
continued scepticism amongst other ASEAN members and adverse 
comment from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Malaysian 
spokesmen continued to extoll the virtues of neutralization 
and to express optimism about its prospects. In the wake of 
the Kuala Lumpur meeting Tun Ismail exhorted that "in these 
times of flux in the world power balance. Southeast Asia may 
be in the rare position of being able to get out from under, 
breathe the free air and grasp the opportunity to decide its
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own destiny." Opportunities such as these, he declared, "do 
not present themselves more than once in several decades or in 
a century or may never ever appear again." Malaysia had 
comparatively little to say, however, about arrangements for 
the implementation of neutralization. This is understandable 
since little had been decided at the Kuala Lumpur meeting and 
the Committee of Senior Officials set up to undertake this 
task made slow progress during subsequent years.
Matters were further complicated when Philippine Foreign 
Secretary Carlos Romulo announced on departure from Manila for 
ASEAN's Seventh Ministerial Meeting in May 1974 that he would 
propose "the establishment of effective machinery to resolve 
disputes which may arise between member states". He believed 
that such an organ was necessary "to preserve unity and lend 
credibility to the association, no less than to the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom an Neutrality proposed to be established in 
Southeast Asia."28- It was reported that in deference to 
Malaysian sensitivities Romulo agreed to refer to 
dispute-settling "procedures" rather than "machinery".29• 
Malaysia's delegate, Hussein Onn, stated that any ASEAN 
agreement on conciliation procedures for intra-regiona1 
disputes was not meant to apply to the Philippine claim to 
Sabah and the southern Philippines problem. The press 
statement issued by the ministerial meeting recorded that the 
ministers had "unanimously endorsed in principle the 
establishment of effective procedures for the pacific 
settlement of intra-regiona1 disputes". They considered that 
the adoption of such procedures would be "a positive step 
towards the strengthening of ASEAN and towards the
77
establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 
Southeast Asia".
Consideration of steps towards a zone of peace, freedom 
and neutrality was hastened by developments in Indochina 
during the first half of 1975. Senior officials met in Bangkok 
in January and a "working group" met again in Bangkok in 
April. Another senior officials meeting was held in Kuala 
Lumpur just prior to ASEAN’s Eighth Ministerial Meeting held 
on 13-15 May 1975. During this second senior officials meeting 
"conference sources", presumably Malaysian, were reported to 
have stated that officials hoped to finalize the blueprint for 
the zone for submission to the foreign ministers. Blueprint 
clauses reportedly covered guidelines for members of the zone, 
expectations governing relations of outside nations with the 
zone, means to declare its existence and procedures on 
violations. After the foreign ministers had adopted the final 
blueprint it was hoped that they would proceed to decide on 
how to approach the communist nations of Indochina to join the 
zone and discuss steps to implement it. The sources also 
stated, however, that there were major differences over timing 
of the approach to the Indochina countries to join the zone, 
over the method by which the international community should be 
required to announce recognition of the zone and on the issue 
of procedures for settlement of bilateral disputes among zone 
members. On the latter, the Philippines reportedly had 
proposed a strict, legal arbitration system while Malaysia 
wanted a mediation council of officials.30•
In his opening speech to the Eighth Ministerial Meeting
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Tun Razak strongly asserted his view that the time was 
appropriate for the objectives of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration 
to be pursued with greater vigour. Other ASEAN ministers were 
evidently more sceptical, however. Malaysia's efforts to move 
towards implementation of the zone appeared to founder. It was 
reported that the meeting had decided to shelve the blueprint, 
partly from fear of rejection by the countries of Indochina 
but probably more importantly because of several major 
remaining areas of disagreement. The joint communique noted 
rather lamely that ministers "reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to 
the objectives of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration" and agreed 
"that its relevance for the region was now more evident".
Instead of finalizing the blueprint, the ministers 
evidently hoped to initial a draft "Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation" that had been completed during the senior 
officials meeting - presumably as a fallback from the zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality proposal. The treaty was 
intended to provide a structural framework for the pacific 
settlement of disputes between ASEAN members and was open for 
signature by other Southeast Asian countries. In the event, 
the ministers decided to endorse only the broad terms even of 
this draft treaty and to direct it back to their respective 
governments for further study and approval, probably in hope 
of overcoming the differences already mentioned between the 
Philippines and Malaysia over the means to be adopted in 
settling intra-regiona1 disputes.31-
Other Political Issues
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Although the Kuala Lumpur Dec 1aratIon’was a 
transparently political document, ASEAN members sought to 
promote the fiction that it was not an official ASEAN 
initiative in order to preserve the formal position that ASEAN 
was not a political organization. In Adam Malik's words, the 
Kuala Lumpur meeting was not a formal session of ASEAN but "a 
meeting of countries which happen to be members of 
ASEAN."32. in reality, this was a somewhat ingenious 
distinction, and one that was frequently overlooked. For 
example, in his closing speech at the Kuala Lumpur meeting 
Thanat Khoman referred to "this highly significant ASEAN 
ministerial meeting". And a Straits Times editorial observed 
a few days after its signing that the Declaration was a 
regional initiative "inspired by ASEAN" and "conforming to 
ASEAN desires for the solution of ASEAN objectives".33. The 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration was in fact merely the most prominent 
manifestation of the increasing politicization of ASEAN.
Though other ASEAN members did not share to the same degree 
Malaysia's enthusiasm for the concept of a zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality, they concurred that there was a need 
for a collective political response to new developments in the 
international relations of the region. ASEAN came increasingly 
to be seen as the most appropriate vehicle for that response, 
and to take into its agenda a number of other international 
political issues.
At the Kuala Lumpur meeting Thanat had pointed to the 
"many momentous changes" occuring on the international scene, 
and urged a common approach. Shortly thereafter Carlos Romulo 
advocated that ASEAN countries should get together to make "a
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common a s s e s s m e n t "  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n .  He a s s e r t e d
t h a t  ASEAN h a d  f i n a l l y  b e g u n  t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  v a l u e  o f  " an  
i n t e g r a t e d  r e g i o n a l  a p p r o a c h "  t o  i t s  member s  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  
o u t s i d e  w o r l d . 34 .
The f i r s t  c o n c r e t e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  ASEAN s h o u l d  
e l e v a t e  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  " i n f o r m a l "  p o l i t i c a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  
a m o n g s t  i t s  member s  came f r o m  S i n g a p o r e .  I n  h i s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  
F i f t h  ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g  h e l d  i n  S i n g a p o r e  on 1 3 - 1 4  
A p r i l  1972 ,  R a j a r a t n a m  n o t e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  ASEAN m i n i s t e r i a l  
m e e t i n g s  h a d  o f f i c i a l l y  b e e n  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s ,  
" u n o f f i c i a l l y "  member s  h a d  t a k e n  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d i s c u s s  
p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r s .  " Q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y " ,  he  s a i d ,  o b s e r v e r s  h a d  
n o t  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  ASEAN f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  s p e n t  two o r  t h r e e  
d a y s  t o g e t h e r  d i s c u s s i n g  o n l y  e c o n o m i c  p r o j e c t s .  R a j a r a t n a m  
p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  t i m e  h a d  come f o r  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  " t o  
r e g u l a r i z e  t h e i r  e x t r a - c u r r i c u l a r  a c t i v i t i e s " .  He c o n s i d e r e d  
t h a t :  " S i n c e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  m a j o r  p o w e r s  a r e  c h a n g i n g
i n  ways  w h i c h  t h e y  t h e m s e l v e s  may n o t  be  s u r e  o f ,  t h e r e  i s  a 
n e e d  now f o r  ASEAN F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r s  t o  m e e t  t o  a s s e s s  n o t  
o n l y  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  t h e  g r e a t  p o w e r s  b u t  a l s o  t o  g e t  t o  
know o u r  i n d i v i d u a l  r e a c t i o n s  t o  new d e v e l o p m e n t s  a nd  r a p i d  
c h a n g e s  i n  o u r  a r e a . "  R a j a r a t n a m  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  a s t a r t  i n  t h i s  
d i r e c t i o n  h a d  b e e n  made a t  t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur  m e e t i n g  w h i c h  he  
s a i d  was  "on t h e  w h o l e  a u s e f u l  m e e t i n g  i n  w h i c h  we h ad  
g r e a t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  n o t  o n l y  o u r  a g r e e m e n t s  b u t  e v e n  o u r  
d i s a g r e e m e n t s " .  He a d d e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  he  p u t  h i s  p r o p o s a l  
f o r  more  r e g u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  " n o t  a s  p a r t  o f  o u r  
o f f i c i a l  a g e n d a  b u t  a s  p a r t  o f  o u r  e x t r a - c u r r i c u l a r  
a c t i v i t i e s " .  The f i c t i o n ,  t h o u g h  i n c r e a s i n g l y  t e n o u s ,  was  t o
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be maintained.
Comments made by other delegates at the Fifth 
Ministerial Meeting were supportive. Adam Malik urged that 
"calculated, well-planned and coordinated actions" should be 
agreed upon by ASEAN countries to reassert their position in 
the new emerging pattern of power relations. For Indonesia's 
part, he asserted that it had always recognized ASEAN as "the 
nucleus of our independent and active foreign policy". Tun 
Ismail noted that although political developments were 
"outside the framework of ASEAN", the Association would have 
to take account of these developments because they affected 
the general climate within which ASEAN had to operate. He felt 
that ASEAN provided "a firm basis for close consultation and 
joint action". He saw the November 1971 Kuala Lumpur meeting 
as proof of "the single-minded approach ASEAN members have to 
problems affecting them" and as testimony to the achievements 
of "a truly ASEAN identity". Thailand and the Philippines were 
also reported to have supported Rajaratnam's proposal.35. 
Thanat agreed that ASEAN should add political exchanges to its 
consultations on economic and social matters. The Philippines' 
Jose Ingles offered Manila as a site for a political meeting 
of ASEAN foreign ministers to pave the way for a five-nation 
summit.
At the conclusion of "unofficial" political 
consultations following the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
the ministers issued, for the first time, a press statement 
which recorded that during these consultations they had agreed 
that "a Ministerial meeting should be convened at least once a
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year to discuss international developments of concern to the
region". These meetings would be "outside the purview of 
ASEAN" and "informal" in character. Also for the first time, 
the official joint communique of the Fifth Ministerial Meeting 
noted that ministers had engaged in political discussions, in 
which they had reviewed significant world events and 
developments in relations amongst the major powers. They 
recognized "the necessity for cooperating even more closely" 
in view of these developments.
The first "informal" ASEAN foreign ministers meeting was 
eventually held in Manila on 13-14 July 1972. A second was 
held in Kuala Lumpur on 15 February 1973. By the time of the 
Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting at Pattaya, Thailand, in April 
1973 the idea of an "informal" political role for ASEAN had 
become well established. The press statement issued at the 
conclusion of the ministers' political discussions at this 
meeting was a lengthy one covering a large number of issues. 
This set the pattern for later years.
The major issue which preoccupied ASEAN members during 
this period was Vietnam. Consideration of the possible 
membership of South Vietnam in ASEAN became an issue at the 
Cameron Highlands meeting. The possibility of serious 
consideration of South Vietnam's membership in ASEAN was 
foreclosed, however, by Rajaratnam's statement at a press 
conference just prior to the ASEAN meeting that Singapore felt 
that until ASEAN "really got itself going" its membership
should not be enlarged.36-
83
Growing concern amongst ASEAN members about developments 
in Indochina was suggested by Tun Ismail's comment at ASEAN's 
Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Manila in March 1971 that the 
Paris peace talks which had once been “a chink of light that 
brought a glimmer of hope for peace in the area", now looked 
more and more "like a flash in the pan that never fails to 
disappoint". The Vietnam issue received little attention in 
the public remarks of ASEAN ministers at the Fifth ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting. That Vietnam was discussed by the 
ministers at greater length in private is suggested by the 
fact that it was at this meeting that the first informal 
meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers was decided upon and that 
the meeting, when held, concentrated chiefly on the Vietnam 
issue. At the conclusion of the July 1972 informal meeting in 
Manila, a press statement was issued which noted that the 
meeting had reviewed "with grave concern" the continuing 
conflicts in Indochina and had decided "to urge the parties 
concerned to intensify their efforts to achieve a just 
settlement". The view was further expressed that the ASEAN 
countries should "explore the possibility of making a concrete 
contribution towards the final settlement of the Indochina 
question". No other details of the meeting's deliberations 
were revealed until the end of the month when Adam Malik 
disclosed that a proposal worked out by the foreign ministers 
in Manila to end the fighting in Indochina had been submitted 
to all parties to the conflict. According to press reports, 
the ASEAN peace plan called for an immediate and unconditional 
ceasefire by both North and South Vietnam; withdrawal of U.S. 
troops within four months simultaneously with the release of 
U.S. prisoners-of-war; the setting up of a team of
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"custodians" comprising members from Indonesia, Malaysia and
Japan; leaving North and South Vietnam to decide all issues 
without interference; and free general e1ections.3?■ Malik 
reportedly claimed on 20 August in Bangkok that a "five-point" 
ASEAN proposal had been accepted by the U.S., South Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos.38• By that stage, however. North 
Vietnam's foreign ministry had officially informed the 
Indonesian mission in Hanoi of its rejection of the proposal 
on the grounds that it favoured the U.S. and South 
Vietnam.39. To their credit, ASEAN members were not easily 
discouraged by the rejection of their diplomatic efforts. 
Publicity about progress in the Paris peace talks during the 
following months led them to agree to Indonesia's proposal for 
another informal meeting to discuss the Vietnam issue further. 
In the event, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring 
Peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973 and 
the ASEAN foreign ministers did not meet until 15 February 
1973.
The February 1973 meeting gave the impression overall 
that ASEAN members had found considerable difficulty in 
formulating a joint approach on future policy towards 
Indochina. Subsequent events did little to dispel that 
impression, although members continued, on most occasions, to 
strike compromises that papered over their differences. On 30 
March 1973 Malaysia established diplomatic relations with 
North Vietnam. Singapore followed soon after in May 1973, but 
it was not until 1976 that the Philippines and Thailand also 
established relations. The first meeting of the ASEAN 
Coordinating Committee for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
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of Indochina States was held in Kuala Lumpur in April 1973.
The press statement noted only that the meeting had drawn up 
"an action programme" as a recommendation back to the Standing 
Committee. The ASEAN officials reportedly decided to call on 
the major powers to provide aid on an untied basis and agreed 
to prepare a report on what aid each of the ASEAN countries 
could offer.40-
At the end of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in April 
1973, it was announced that ASEAN foreign ministers had made 
"a thorough review" of recent developments in Indochina. The 
press statement noted that ministers had expressed "particular 
concern" about the "grave situation" in Laos and Cambodia. In 
spite of their evident concern, ASEAN members made an effort 
to put on a brave face and expressed high hopes that the 
future would hold better things. Malaysia adopted a 
conciliatory stance. Tun Ismail expressed the view that an 
expansion of ASEAN's membership would be sure to engender "a 
high degree of strength, solidarity and close relationship 
amongst the nations of the region and lead to a situation 
whereby no country in the region need feel that it is in a 
hostile environment". Thailand and the Philippines 
concentrated much of their attention at the meeting on the 
promotion of Thailand's proposal for a 10 nation conference of 
Southeast Asian countries on the Indochina issue. The press 
statement noted that ministers had reaffirmed the desirability 
of convening such a conference "at an appropriate time".
Perhaps discouraged by the lack of success of its 
earlier initiatives, ASEAN gave little attention to the
86
Vietnam problem until the time came for Indonesia to host the 
Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Jakarta 
on 7-9 May 1974. Exercising its prerogative as host, Indonesia 
went out of its way to be accomodating to Hanoi by issuing an 
invitation to North Vietnam to send an observer delegation 
without issuing a similar invitation to South Vietnam. North 
Vietnam declined, however.
Public comments made by the foreign ministers about the 
Vietnam issue during the Seventh Ministerial Meeting were 
mainly pessimistic in tone. ASEAN's leaders must have watched 
the deteriorating fortunes of non-communist forces in 
Indochina during the following year with increasing dismay. 
They evidently saw little scope for the Association to 
influence the course of events. ASEAN ambassadors reportedly 
met in Bangkok on 2 May following the fall of Saigon to 
discuss recognition of the new government there - but no joint 
statement was issued.41.
Another important foreign policy issue for ASEAN 
countries in this period was the development of their 
respective relationships with China. Relations with China were 
discussed at the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur in November 1971. The communique noted that the 
ministers had agreed to continue to consult each other "with a 
view to fostering an integrated approach on all matters and 
developments which affect the Southeast Asian region". It 
later became clear that this was intended to apply 
particularly to the normalization of relations with China. 
Rajaratnam told Singapore's parliament in March 1972 that
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ASEAN members had agreed to consult each other before 
establishing diplomatic relations with China.42.
The agreement to consult on this issue probably was 
prompted by the concern of other ASEAN members at the pace of 
Malaysia's developing contacts with China. Despite the warmth 
of its early contacts with Peking, Malaysia was sensitive to 
these concerns. It was probably for this reason, and for the 
sake of ASEAN unity, that Malaysia agreed to consult its 
partners before establishing diplomatic relations. All ASEAN 
countries appeared to agree that in the longer term the 
normalization of relations with China was desirable, and in 
fact necessary, if China was to be able to participate in the 
establishment of the proposed zone of peace, freedom and 
neutrality in Southeast Asia.
As the months went by, Malaysia appeared to become 
impatient with the continued opposition of other ASEAN members 
to any specific measures to normalize relations with Peking.
In June 1973 Malaysia commenced negotiations with China in New 
York, leading to speculation that diplomatic relations would 
be only a few months away. Malaysia showed itself willing, 
however, to prolong the negotiations in order to obtain the 
most favourable terms. It also appeared conscientious in its 
efforts to keep its ASEAN partners informed of progress in the 
talks.43. The matter was again discussed at the Seventh 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in May 1974.44- Razak met with 
Suharto prior to his visit to Peking at the end of the month 
which formalized the establishment of diplomatic relations.
The other ASEAN countries appeared to accept this event with
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good grace. A foreign office spokesman in Jakarta said that it 
was in line with a joint ASEAN policy and confirmed that all 
ASEAN countries had agreed in principle to establish relations 
with Peking.
Despite a multiplicity of trade, sporting and other 
contacts, particularly in the case of Thailand and the 
Philippines, none of Malaysia's ASEAN partners followed in its 
footsteps until about one year later. The catalyst appears to 
have been provided by the events in Indochina. The Philippines 
established diplomatic relations with China on 9 June 1975 and 
Thailand on 1 July 1975.
* * *
By the time of ASEAN's Eighth Ministerial Meeting the 
politicization of the Association was becoming an accepted 
fact. Rajaratnam, for example, while insisting that ASEAN's 
primary role should continue to be as an economic 
organization, now acknowledged that ASEAN had also become "an 
organization for sorting out and harmonizing political and 
security policies in this region on an ad hoc basis".45. On 
occasion, ASEAN's spokesmen expressed considerable 
satisfaction with their achievements in this area of their 
endeavours. Adam Malik, for example, as early as October 1972, 
commended ASEAN's success in moulding "an increasing degree of 
political cohesion" amongst its members and "a more integrated 
approach towards common problems". He concluded that "within 
the ASEAN spirit" the nations of Southeast Asia could be seen 
to be assuming an increasing role towards the solution of the
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region's problems.46.
At least one foreign observer, an academic, did not 
agree with this assessment. Writing in October 1973, he 
concluded that although ASEAN's members consulted with some 
regularity they had demonstrated "only a limited sense of 
common political purpose in regional matters47. Critics 
were also to be found within the ASEAN countries. An 
Indonesian commentator in January 1973 detected "a feeling of 
uncertain commitment among the ASEAN nations as to what that 
regional cooperative body is for". He felt that ASEAN 
spokesmen displayed an "over-cautious attitude" in their 
reluctance to speak of political issues and suggested that 
ASEAN needed to strive harder in the field of political 
cooperation if it was to become more than a fictitious 
entity.4®- A Filipino observer complained in October 1974 
that "in its anxiety to avoid the sensitive and controversial, 
ASEAN stands the risk of neglecting areas where the need for 
discussion and consensus is most crucial".49.
These comments reflect the shortcomings of ASEAN's 
endeavours in the field of political cooperation. It is 
evident, however, that by the mid-1970s such cooperation had 
become recognised as an important focus of ASEAN's activities. 
This was not always recognised by outside observers. For 
example, one long-time foreign observer of ASEAN concluded, 
following the Eighth Ministerial Meeting, that the Association 
had "once again failed to live up to its rhetoric". He noted 
that during the meeting an intriguing melody had been played 
called "the ASEAN song". "Appropriately", he cracked, "it was
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a tune without words". He conceded, however, that it could 
safely be said that the ASEAN ministers were "their own best 
critics", noting that they had called repeatedly for ASEAN to 
exert itself more strenuously in order to inject greater 
dynamism into the Association.^- This was an accurate 
comment. ASEAN's spokesmen frequently acknowledged that the 
Association's tangible accomplishments had been few. But in 
the area of intangibles significant progress was often 
claimed, especially with regard to the development of 
cooperation amongst its own members. Tun Razak's remarks to 
the Eighth Ministerial Meeting are typical. He admitted that 
"nothing very dramatic has hitherto been achieved at ASEAN 
meetings", but asserted that during the seven years of ASEAN's 
existence some progress had been made "in establishing among 
us a genuine and growing spirit and habit of thinking and 
working together in regional terms". He felt that the frequent 
meetings of ASEAN officials and foreign ministers had served 
to create a climate of goodwill and understanding which 
fostered the evolution of regional solidarity and of regional 
political consciousness. This he regarded as ASEAN's "most 
salient achievement". In fact as early as 1971 during the 
Fourth Ministerial Meeting, Tun Ismail had referred to the 
development of "a growing and genuine habit of cooperation and 
... a practice of thinking and working together." In April 
1972 Lee Kuan Yew remarked to the Fifth Ministerial Meeting 
that the greater mutual understanding of each country's 
problems that had arisen from ASEAN meetings was "perhaps the 
most valuable achievement" of these meetings. In March 1973 
Ghazali Shafie also had asserted that it was "in the realm of 
the intangibles" that ASEAN had made the most progress. The
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constant coming together of ASEAN officials had generated, he
claimed, "a genuine and growing habit of cooperation".^ • 
Similar remarks were freqently made by other ASEAN spokesmen 
and commentators.52. ASEAN's spokesmen also noted with 
satisfaction that these modest beginnings were helping the 
Association to become established as an organization whose 
views were taken into account in international forums.53.
FOOTNOTES
1. Accounts of the "Corregidor Affair" are contained in Lela 
Garner Noble, Philippine Policy Towards Sabah: A Claim to 
Independence, University of Arizona Press, 1977, pp.165-166; 
Michael Leifer, "The Philippines and Sabah Irredenta", in The 
World Today, October 1968, pp.422-426; and Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 18 April 1968, pp.168-169.
2. Noble, op cit., p.185.
3. Abell, op cit., p.368.
4. The Manila Claim in Perspective, speech to the National 
Press Club, Kuala Lumpur, 6 November 1968.
5. Barbara French Pace et al ., Regional Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia; The First Two Years of ASEAN, 1967-1969, 
Research Analysis Corporation, RAC-R-98-2, October 1970,
p . 38.
92
6. The Age (Melbourne), 19 October 1968.
7. Straits Times, 19 October 1968.
8. Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 October 1968, p.181.
9. Cited in J.L.S. Girling, "The Guam Doctrine", in 
International Affairs, January 1970, p.50.
10. Southeast Asia in World Politics. Dillingham Lecture, 
East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 14 May 1969, pp.8-10.
11. Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
Vol. IV, No.22, pp.3615-6, cited in Noordin Sopiee, 
"Neutralization of Southeast Asia", Chapter II in Hedley Bull 
(ed), Asia and the Western Pacific: Towards a New 
International Order, Nelson - Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, Sydney, 1975, p.137.
12. AAP, Kuala Lumpur, 10 October 1970.
13. Straits Times, 18 December 1970.
14. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, June 1971, pp.13-20.
15. ibid., September 1971, pp.24-29.
16. "Neutralization of Southeast Asia", in Pacific Community,
October 1971.
93
17. Straits Times, 4 October 1971.
18. ibid., 5 November 1971.
19. Manila Bulletin. 11 November 1971.
20. ibid., 14 and 18 November 1971.
21. ibid., 19 November 1971.
22. ibid., 24 November 1971.
23. ibid., 26 November 1971.
24. Djakarta Times. 26 November 1971; Straits Times, 25 
November 1971.
25. Straits Times. 23 and 24 November 1971.
26. Bangkok World, 26 November 1971; Japan Times, 26 November 
1971 .
27. Asian Almanac, p.4981.
28. Bulletin Today. 5 May 1974.
29. Straits Times. 9 May 1974.
30. Bangkok Post, 12 May 1975.
94
31. Straits Times, 15 May 1975.
32. Djakarta Times, 26 November 1971.
33. Straits Times, 29 November 1971.
34. "Towards a New Era in Asia", in Solidarity, March 1972, 
pp.8 and 9.
35. Japan Times, 14 April 1972.
36. Asian Almanac, p.3772.
37. Asian Almanac, p.5440; Djakarta Times. 28 August 1972.
38. Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand). August-October 1972.
39. Asian Almanac, p.5440.
40. Japan Times, 3 April 1973.
41. Straits Times. 3 May 1975.
42. Asian Almanac, p.5188.
43. Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 July p.13.
44. Indonesian Times. 11 May 1974; Asia Research Bulletin, 30 
June 1974,. p.2819.
95
45. Cited in Lau Teik Soon, "Singapore and its Neighbours", in
Trends in Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1975, p.49.
46. "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", in Indonesian Quarterly, 
October 1972, p.30.
47. Michael Leiter, "The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook", in 
International Affairs, October 1973, pp.600 and 607.
48. Juwono Sudarsono, "ASEAN: The Uncertain Commitment", in 
Indonesian Quarterly, January 1973, pp.9 and 10.
49. Alejandro Melchor Jr., "Security in Southeast Asia", in 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia, op. cit., pp.47 and 48.
50. Harvey Stockwin in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 
May 1975, pp.22 and 24.
51. The Search for Stability, Speech at the Malaysian 
Investment Conference in Zurich, Switzerland, 5 March 1972.
52. See, for example, Anand Panyarachun in Bangkok Bank 
Monthly Review, August 1975, p.473, and Somsakdi Xuto in The 
ASEAN: Problems and Prospects in a Changing World, op. cit., 
p.235.
53. For example, Rajaratnam's interview in Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 9 August 1974, Singapore Focus, p.8.
CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC ENDEAVOURS
Despite the debilitating effects of the Sabah dispute 
and, to a lesser extent, of other intra-ASEAN tensions, some 
progress was made by ASEAN's members in the early years of the 
organization's existence towards the fulfilment of its stated 
aims and purposes in the economic sphere. These beginnings 
were, however, at best modest. The main theme of discussions 
between ASEAN's members during this period continued to focus 
on whether a cautious or an ambitious approach should be 
adopted towards economic cooperation, with advocates of the 
cautious approach clearly in the ascendancy. Most ASEAN 
members appeared to endorse a gradualist approach. For 
example, Rajaratnam recalled that even the European Economic 
Community had taken some 10 years of haggling before it got 
off the ground. He felt that ASEAN should therefore "be 
satisfied if there is a steady, even if slow, movement towards 
regional ism."1• At the first meeting of Secretaries-Genera1 
of the ASEAN Secretariats in the following month, an initially 
unambitious and practical approach was endorsed by the 
adoption of criteria for the implementation of ASEAN projects 
that emphasized "feasibility for immediate implementation; 
quick yielding in fruitful results; benefits accruing to all 
participating members; minimum financing; and furtherance of 
the objectives embodied in the Bangkok Declaration of August 8 
1967."2-
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At the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in August 1968 
the first stocktaking was made of ASEAN's progress. Despite 
acknowledgement of the Association's meagre accomplishments at 
that stage, considerable optimism was expressed. The 
Philippines was the exception in favouring more ambitious 
proposals. As early as January 1968, during his visit to 
Malaysia, President Marcos had proclaimed his belief that "the 
time is ripe for new and masterful schemes for economic, 
technological and scientific, educational and cultural 
cooperation in our region." He suggested industrial 
complementation schemes and a regional plan for development.
At an ASEAN Conference of Representatives of Commerce and 
Industry that was held in Manila in September/October 1968, 
the Philippines reportedly presented studies on a free trade 
area or common market for ASEAN. This was apparently resisted 
by the other four member-countries.^-
The joint communique of the Second Ministerial Meeting 
expressed members' "satisfaction that after industrious 
preparation, ASEAN reached the operational stage in the 
implementation of its projects." It agreed to set up an ad 
hoc committee to study financial matters connected with ASEAN 
projects, including the possibility of a joint fund. The 
meeting drew some critical press comment, however. A Straits 
Times editorial asserted that the conference had "produced 
little to stir the imagination".^- Of some considerable 
significance for the future, however, was the communique's 
welcoming of an offer by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) to carry out an
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economic survey. The purpose of the study was to assist ASEAN 
member-countries in "identifying opportunities for closer 
economic cooperation". An ASEAN Advisory Committee was to be 
created and it was acknowledged that the success of the 
project would depend, "to a very great extent", on the degree 
of involvement and participation by ASEAN member-countries.
The Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in December 1969 was 
marked by a notably optimistic atmosphere, commencing as it 
did with the announcement of normalization of relations 
between Malaysia and the Philippines. Adam Malik asserted in 
his opening statement that: "Whereas since its inception there 
was pronounced cynicism on ASEAN's potentiality to survive, 
today there is much acclaim of ASEAN being an effective 
regional forum .... ASEAN has now embarked from the road of 
programming into that of realization." Thanat Khoman found it 
deeply gratifying that "after what looked ominously like a 
storm which threatened to sweep away all that has been 
painstakingly achieved in the field of regional cooperation, 
brighter atmosphere has returned to prevail in the Southeast 
Asian skies." At the same time he cautioned that: "Our 
responsibility ... is not discharged by an announcement of 
unanimous agreements and recommendations. We may make speeches 
but our performance will speak, far more eloquently than our 
words." Other ministers stressed the need for realism in 
assessing new proposals. Rajaratnam thought it would be better 
if ASEAN's projects and policies were designed "not with a 
view to impressing the world but directed single-mindedly 
towards solving pressing problems of social and economic 
development .... This approach may not be very exciting but
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this may be a good thing for a region where- for long politics 
and economics were used primarily as ingredients for composing 
exciting political melodramas."
The joint communique of the Third Ministerial Meeting 
gave approval to 98 recommendations contained in the Report of 
the Standing Committee, covering proposals for cooperation in 
the fields of commerce and industry, tourism, shipping, civil 
aviation, air traffic services and meteorology, transportation 
and communications, food supply and production including 
fisheries, mass media and cultural activities and finance. A 
close study of the recommendations reveals, however, that many 
did not involve substantive joint projects.^- Besides 
approving these recommendations the ministers also signed two 
agreements at the conclusion of their meeting - one for the 
establishment of an ASEAN Fund and another for the promotion 
of mass media and cultural activities. Despite these modest 
accomplishments, the media appeared to share the optimism of 
ASEAN members following the Cameron Highlands meeting. The 
Far Eastern Economic Review concluded that "there is no 
question that those participating in ASEAN activities are 
beginning to think more in regional terms", and that "it seems 
more likely that ASEAN has a modest but constructive future as 
the first effective organization for promoting regional 
economic cooperation in Asia."^-
The Third Ministerial Meeting also endorsed the 
commencement of the United Nations economic study by ECAFE.
The ASEAN Advisory Committee met in March 1970 to approve the 
guidelines for the study, and in November 1970 to discuss the
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f i r s t  p r o g r e s s  r e p o r t  s u b m i t t e d  by t h e  s t u d y  t e a m  e n t i t l e d  "A
P r e l i m i n a r y  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  C o o p e r a t i o n  P o s s i b i l i t i e s  a nd  P o l i c y
7
I n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  ASEAN". ' T h i s  300 p a g e  r e p o r t  a p p a r e n t l y  
p r o v o k e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s c u s s i o n .  I t  f o c u s s e d  e s p e c i a l l y  on 
" c o o p e r a t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  on s u g g e s t e d  m a j o r  i n d u s t r i e s "  and  
" t h e  s c o p e  a nd  p o s s i b l e  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  ASEAN t r a d e  
e x p a n s i o n " .
At t h e  F o u r t h  ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g  i n  Mar ch  1971 
Tun I s m a i l  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  o r  w e r e  
b e i n g  i m p l e m e n t e d  r e p r e s e n t e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  b a s e d  on " t h e  l o w e s t  
common f a c t o r "  a nd  w e r e  " n o t  l i k e l y  t o  s t a r t l e  t h e  s e n s e s  n o r  
s t i r  t h e  i m a g i n a t i o n " .  T h a n a t  Khoman a l s o  a c k n o w l e d g e d  a t  t h i s  
t i m e  t h a t  ASEAN's a c t i v i t i e s  m i g h t  n o t  l o o k  v e r y  i m p r e s s i v e  t o  
o u t s i d e  o b s e r v e r s .  He c i t e d  a j u d g e m e n t  i n  a s t u d y  made by  t h e  
R e s e a r c h  A n a l y s i s  C o r p o r a t i o n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h a t :  " I n  
s p i t e  o f  w e l l  d e s i g n e d  e f f o r t s ,  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  l i t t l e  p r o g r e s s  
i n  t h e  r e a l m  o f  j o i n t  d e v e l o p m e n t . " ® -
Such  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  ASEAN's 
p r o g r e s s  w e r e  g e n e r a l l y  c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  by more  
p o s i t i v e  c om m e nt s .  R a j a r a t n a m  a s s a i l e d  t h e  " p r o f e s s i o n a l  
p e s s i m i s t s "  who h e  c l a i m e d  h a d  b e e n  p r o v e n  w ro n g  n o t  o n l y  by 
ASEAN's s u r v i v a l  b u t  by i t s  a c h i e v i n g  " f a r  more  i n  t h e  way o f  
m u t u a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  t h a n  e a r l i e r  e f f o r t s . "  He o b s e r v e d  t h a t  
ASEAN h a d  " q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y "  c h o s e n  t o  move f o r w a r d  t h r o u g h  a 
s e r i e s  o f  s m a l l  s t e p s .  T h i s  was  no d o u b t  "a  t e d i o u s  way o f  
m o v i n g  f o r w a r d "  b u t  i t  w o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  be  "a  s u r e r  a nd  more  
r e l i a b l e  way o f  p r o m o t i n g  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n . "  C o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h i s  v i e w ,  R a j a r a t n a m  s a i d  t h a t  he  saw " n o t h i n g  w r o n g  i f
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at this juncture of ASEAN's evolution, it is used as an 
instrument to assist national consolidation and the 
transformation of ASEAN states into thriving and vigorous 
entities", rather than concentrating more directly on the 
promotion of regional interests. Thanat Khoman drew comfort 
from the more complimentary references in the Research 
Analysis Corporation study, including the comment that: "ASEAN 
should be recognized for what it is - a new effort, indeed a 
first-time effort among nations that feel strongly that 
cooperation with neighbours is essential for their own 
development .... Nor should one expect too much from ASEAN in 
terms of immediate and tangible projects in its early stages 
and overlook its real if immeasurable, potential and value."
The joint communique of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting 
stated that the ministers had approved a Report from the 
Standing Committee containing 121 recommendations. The 
communique also noted that the ministers had reviewed the 
preliminary report of the UN Study Team on ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation and directed that sectoral studies be pursued, and 
that they had signed a Multilateral Agreement on Commercial 
Rights of Non-Schedu1ed Air Services Among the ASEAN Nations. 
Media reaction was more subdued than it had been at the 
previous ministerial meeting. A Straits Times editorial 
commented: "There has been progress, of course, but it is less
than spectacular, being mostly preparatory .... ASEAN has 
tremendous potentiality, but the job has barely begun.
The Fourth Ministerial Meeting typified the broad acceptance 
up to this time by ASEAN's members, except perhaps the 
Philippines, of a cautious and realistic approach to the
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Association's development. Members showed themselves willing 
to devote increasing time and energy to cooperative efforts, 
but they remained realistically aware of the many constraints 
and obstacles facing more ambitious proposals. This was 
especially true of Singapore. Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee 
likened himself to "an archbishop in medieval Europe who 
publicly questioned the doctrine of immaculate conception" 
when he asserted that regional economic cooperation would face 
increasing rather than diminishing obstacles. Given the 
importance to ASEAN countries of trade with the developed 
countries, he believed that this should be the focus of 
concern rather than intra-regiona1 t r a d e . .
Reappraisa1
Although many of ASEAN's official spokesmen continued to 
advocate a step-by-step approach, by the early 1970s there 
were an increasing number who began to challenge this view. At 
the same time as ASEAN was beginning to play a useful role in 
encouraging political cooperation between its members, the 
failure of the organization to acquire momentum in its 
allegedly primary role as an association for economic, social 
and cultural cooperation was becoming a matter of growing 
embarrassment and concern.
A Thai academic. Dr Somsakdi Xuto, produced at this time 
an important study of regionalism in Southeast Asia which is 
notable for its insightful and constructive obversations about 
ASEAN's goals and activities.H * He noted that a serious 
drawback of Southeast Asian regionalism was its "apparent
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Inability to produce concrete results", which he thought were
badly needed if regionalism was not to deteriorate into "a 
mere good idea of no practical consequence".^ • He asserted 
that Southeast Asian regionalism was a crossroads. Its 
critics, he noted, "raised doubt about the practicality of the 
whole movement", while its supporters tended to be 
over-optimistic and to exaggerate its significance and 
achievement. Somsakdi suggested that the widely-held belief 
that regionalism was inevitable had led to regionalism being 
practiced "for its own sake without proper regard being paid 
to devising a realistic and appropriate goal and strategy for 
ensuring its effectiveness". The result was "a kind of 
directionless drift".
On the positive side, Somsakdi pointed to the increasing 
number of "regional cooperation practicioners" in Southeast 
Asia who were committed to the idea of regional cooperation 
and had established friendly relations with their counterparts 
in other countries. Results had also been achieved in the area 
of planning and preparation and other "behind the scenes" 
activities. Yet he considered that these positive elements 
were insufficient to convince any but a minority group of 
dedicated and convinced elites. The general impression of 
interested outsiders was of "a, great deal of movement without 
actually moving". Somsakdi emphasized that over-optimism and 
lack of realism had to be avoided. He counselled ASEAN against 
pursuing grandiose schemes involving unacceptably large 
resources and outlay. He recommended instead the pursuit of 
low-risk, low-cost projects that would produce an accumulation 
of various small and seemingly insignificant results rather
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than a few outstanding ones.
Another non-government commentator, a Malaysian 
economist writing in January 1972, expressed rather similar 
v i e w s . ^ 1 He noted that almost all leaders of ASEAN 
countries were aware of the theoretical advantages of regional 
economic cooperation and that they were "at the fore in 
extolling the virtues of regionalism and in making pious 
pronouncements". But when it came to implementation some of 
these leaders tended to adopt "a short-sighted parochial view 
based mainly on national and political considerations".
Such views reflected a growing feeling amongst those 
Southeast Asians who took an interest in ASEAN that something 
needed to be done to stimulate the Association's progress, 
particularly in the economic sphere. Remarks made by ASEAN 
foreign ministers at their Fifth Ministerial Meeting in 
Singapore in April 1972 indicated that they were becoming 
increasingly aware of this problem. There was a corresponding 
decline in the former emphasis on the merits of gradualism.
The tone was set by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in his opening 
address. He pointed out that in ASEAN's first year it had 
produced a total of 102 recommendations none of which were 
implemented; in its second year 161 recommendations, of which 
10 were implemented; in its third year, 207 recommendations, 
of which 22 were implemented; and in its fourth year 215 
recommendations of which 48 were implemented. He said that he 
mentioned these figures "not to denigrate what has been 
achieved, but rather to remind us of what more needs to be
done".
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A n o t h e r  v o c a l  a d v o c a t e  o f  a r e a p p r a i s a l  o f  ASEAN's 
f u t u r e  a c t i v i t i e s  was  Tun I s m a i l .  He f e l t  t h a t  i t  was  an  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t i m e  f o r  ASEAN t o  t a k e  s t o c k  o f  i t s  s u c c e s s e s  and  
f a i l u r e s ,  Adam M a l i k  a l s o  s p o k e  o f  t h e  " u r g e n t  n e c e s s i t y "  f o r  
an  o v e r a l l  r e v i e w  i n  o r d e r  t o  i m p a r t  a n  " a c c e l e r a t e d  i m p e t u s "  
t o  ASEAN's a c t i v i t i e s .  The o u t c om e  o f  s u c h  r e m a r k s  by 
d e l e g a t e s  was  a s t a t e m e n t  i n  t h e  j o i n t  communique  t h a t  " i n  
v i e w  o f  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  among t h e  
ASEAN c o u n t r i e s " ,  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  " a n  o v e r a l l  
r e v i e w  o f  ASEAN's o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a n d  p r o c e d u r a l  f r a m e w o r k "  and  
t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  "new g u i d e l i n e s  a nd  c r i t e r i a  o f  
p r i o r i t i e s " .  D e l e g a t e s  t o  t h e  S i x t h  M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g  i n  
A p r i l  1973 a l s o  u r g e d  g r e a t e r  c om m i t m e n t  t o  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  
ASEAN's o b j e c t i v e s .
The r e a s o n s  w h i c h  l a y  b e h i n d  t h e  g r o w i n g  f e e l i n g  a m o n g s t  
ASEAN s p o k e s m e n  t h a t  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  u r g e n t l y  n e e d e d  t o  
r e a p p r a i s e  i t s  r o l e  a n d  t o  p l a c e  mo r e  e m p h a s i s  on t h e  
a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t a n g i b l e  r e s u l t s  w e r e  u s u a l l y  n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  b u t  t h e r e  a p p e a r e d  t o  be  s e v e r a l  c o n t r i b u t i n g  
f a c t o r s .  D e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s p h e r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  
n e e d  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  c h a n g i n g  n a t u r e  o f  m a j o r  p owe r  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  a nd  e v e n t s  i n  I n d o c h i n a ,  w e re  
p r o b a b l y  f o r e m o s t  i n  t h e i r  m i n d s .  Some o u t s i d e  c o m m e n t a t o r s  
w r o t e  f a v o u r a b l y  o f  ASEAN’ s m o d e s t  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s  and  
a p p a r e n t  d u r a b i l i t y ,  b u t  w i t h o u t  c o n t i n u e d  momentum r e g i o n a l  
s u p p o r t e r s  o f  ASEAN p r o b a b l y  f e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  
s t a t u r e  a nd  c r e d i b i l i t y  w o u l d  b e g i n  t o  s u f f e r . ^4 .  The 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  was  a l s o  e v i d e n t l y  a
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factor.
The UN Study
ASEAN's reappraisal of its economic role coincided with, 
and was probably in part stimulated by, the economic study 
being conducted by ECAFE. The ASEAN Advisory Committee held 
its fifth meeting in Denpasar, Bali, in July 1972 and 
reportedly considered the final report of the Study Team.15•
To encourage industrial development, the Report recommended 
three "separate but inter-related" techniques. Firstly, it 
advocated selective trade liberalization, negotiated on an 
item-by-item basis and applied on a progressively wider scale. 
Secondly, a system of industrial complementarity agreements 
was recommended which would allow individual ASEAN countries 
to specialize on different products or components within a 
particular industry. The third and most ambitious technique 
recommended was a system of "package deal" agreements 
negotiated between ASEAN governments for the establishment of 
large-scale industrial projects and their allocation to 
particular ASEAN countries, together with agreements to 
provide their products with the necessary tariff or other 
assistance to make them viable. This technique was deemed most 
suited to industries not hitherto established in ASEAN and 
which could only be efficiently established if provided with a 
regional market.
The Report observed that the agricultural sectors of all 
ASEAN economies except Singapore were of great importance, but 
the problems were considered to be mainly national problems.
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Nevertheless, ASEAN cooperation was recommended In several
areas. Cooperation was also suggested in shipping, marketing 
and forest management. Other forms of cooperation were 
recommended to pool resources, avoid unnecessary duplication, 
establish common standards, exchange information and generally 
to coordinate and harmonize policies. The need for improved 
intra-ASEAN transport services was highlighted. The expansion 
of ASEAN economic cooperation was considered likely to create 
needs and opportunities for ASEAN cooperation in the provision 
of financial, monetary and insurance services that would meet 
joint requirements.
Mixed Response
Given the very ambitious scope of the UN Team's 
recommendations, it is perhaps not surprising that they met 
with a mixed response from ASEAN's members. Even though 
members favoured a reappraisal of their cooperative 
activities, and renewed vigour in their implementation, they 
appeared for the most part to be unready to go as far as the 
UN Study had recommended. The communique of the Fifth 
Ministerial Meeting urged ASEAN governments to study the 
team's recommendations "with a view to identifying those areas 
in which ASEAN could cooperate more fruitfully." The Sixth 
Ministerial Meeting recommended that "appropriate steps should 
now be taken by ASEAN to implement those recommendations of 
the UN Study Team which can be agreed upon". It appeared, 
however, that few of these recommendations could at that stage 
be agreed upon. The only specific step towards greater 
regional economic cooperation agreed at the meeting was the
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endorsement of the drawing up of "appropriate strategies for 
the ASEAN development decade". Nevertheless, at the conclusion 
of the meeting delegates expressed satisfaction with the 
progress of ASEAN up to that point. Rajaratnam recalled that 
when it was formed six years previously ASEAN had been 
"nebulous and we were confused about objectives", but now it 
was a going concern. Romulo felt that ASEAN had demonstrated 
"that unity and cohesiveness which are essential to any 
regional cooperation worthy of the name" and that the 
Association bristled with new confidence and new hope "if not 
a new purpose".
External observers found these signs of apparent 
complacency amongst ASEAN leaders disappointing. One 
commentator noted that the Sixth Ministerial Meeting had been 
"typical of this oft-meeting group" in that "a great deal of 
bonhomie" had been mixed with "considerable vagueness on 
issues", leaving ASEAN-watchers uncertain as to whether the 
Association was going ahead or staying still. He noted 
also that there had been the "almost traditional" references 
to greater efforts and to doing better, but too little had 
been done "to bridge the gap between platitudinous speeches, 
bland communiques and the ongoing ASEAN reality".^. Another 
observer referred to "red faces" in ASEAN over the UN Report 
since no-one knew what to do with it. The Report had been 
greeted with "approving generalities but a nervous absence of 
commitment" . •
Outside Influences
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It was not long, however, before external political and 
economic developments began again to force the pace of ASEAN's 
development. In a speech in January 1974, Lee Kuan Yew 
forecast that "it may well be that the changes which have 
taken place in East and Southeast Asia will give added impetus 
to ASEAN's search for more substantial economic 
progressIS• Such sentiments found fuller expression at the 
Seventh Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in May 1974. In his 
opening address President Suharto observed that despite its 
achievements ASEAN was still "a very fragile reality". In the 
meantime, "time may be running out on us in facing the new 
tremendously complex and far-reaching problems with which the 
world, and especially developing countries, are being 
confronted at present". He saw ASEAN as entering the second 
stage of cooperation in which the time had come for more 
efforts to be devoted to "the actual realization of economic 
cooperation". He referred in particular to cooperation in the 
industrial field and the setting up of ASEAN industrial 
projects. Adam Malik told the meeting that although ASEAN was 
gaining in international stature it must not lapse into 
complacency. Despite the emergence of detente, he perceived 
"an alarming chain-reaction of new crises enveloping the 
world". He referred specifically to the adverse trend of 
events in Indochina.
The Indonesian delegation's views received strong 
backing from Rajaratnam. The initial thrust of his remarks was 
complimentary about ASEAN's achievements to date. He was 
convinced that ASEAN was "an established organization" that 
had gone "past the point of no return". It could not be
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dismantled "without each of us getting into very serious 
economic and political difficulties". In spite of these 
positive aspects, however, he emphasized the challenges that 
lay ahead. He declared that "new troubles and new fears, whose 
nature and causes leave the experts baffled, avalanche upon 
us". He suggested that ASEAN should give more serious 
consideration than it had previously to the report of the UN 
Study Team, which he described as "the blueprint" for economic 
cooperation in ASEAN. Although ASEAN Permanent Committees had 
been studying the report he felt their work would remain 
"sterile and confused" unless the various governments 
indicated "in a positive way" that they were prepared to 
venture into the more difficult areas of economic cooperation. 
Rajaratnam asserted that the three main techniques for 
economic cooperation recommended by the UN Team were the 
"basic ingredients of regionalism" without which it would 
remain "a shadow without substance". If ASEAN did not progress 
in economic cooperation it would be "difficult for others to 
regard ASEAN seriously".
The communique noted that the ministers had agreed that 
ASEAN should embark on "a more substantial and meaningful 
cooperation". It appeared, however, that Rajaratnam's 
enthusiasm had swayed them only a little, since they confined 
themselves to observing that the techniques of cooperation 
which he advocated "might be useful techniques for ASEAN 
cooperation".
During the following year little further progress was 
made towards adoption of any of the major recommendations of
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the UN Report. One Interesting development, though it produced 
few immediate results, was an unprecedented joint meeting of 
the ASEAN Standing Committee, the ASEAN Secretaries-Genera1 
and the ASEAN Permanent Committee Chairmen in Kuala Lumpur in 
October 1974 to consider proposals for increased 
organizational efficiency. In his opening address Tun Razak 
noted that it was "all very well" to have so many committees 
covering ostensibly so many forms of cooperation, to be 
meeting one committee after another almost continually 
throughout the year and to be submitting hundreds of 
recommendations to the annual ministerial meeting - but he 
warned of the danger that ASEAN might become the special 
preoccupation and concern of only the officials in the 
respective National Secretariats and others who were directly 
involved in the day-to-day running of ASEAN.
At officials level, some modest progress was made during 
the year in considerating the new techniques for economic 
cooperation recommended by the UN Report. The Working Group on 
Selective Trade Liberalization held its second meeting. The 
Working Group on Industrial Complementation held its first two 
meetings. The meeting of the Permanent Committee on Commerce 
and Industry in December 1974 reportedly endorsed a program of 
trade liberalization and industrial complementation.19- 
Proposals for ASEAN industrial projects were also discussed 
during this period. Another interesting development was the 
revelation by Indonesia's ASEAN National Secretariat of 
details of Indonesia's proposal for an ASEAN Development 
Strategy. The Secretariat stated that Indonesia had provided a 
"working concept" of the Strategy which it said was meant to
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complement and give content to President Marcos's proposal for 
an ASEAN Development Decade.20.
On the eve of ASEAN's Eighth Ministerial Meeting in May 
1975 a Western journalist commented that the UN Report had 
been "gathering dust amid lackadaisical bureaucratic 
discussion".21• In the aftermath of the fall of Saigon, the 
meeting appeared preoccupied with political matters. Adam 
Malik was the only head of delegation to comment publicly at 
any length on ASEAN's economic progress. He urged no further 
delay in taking a decision on the recommendations of the UN 
Report and in coordinating development plans. That Malik's 
views had some support is indicated by the more determined 
tone of those portions of the joint communique that dealt with 
economic cooperation. The ministers endorsed the establishment 
of an "ASEAN Trade Negotiation Body" to set up an ASEAN system 
of trade preferences and urged that trade negotiations be 
intensified and expanded to cover all possible products. The 
meeting adopted "guidelines" for ASEAN industrial 
complementation and also urged "an early study" on the 
possibility of adopting the package deal approach for the 
allocation of joint industrial projects to member-countries.
Though the connection was not drawn publicly, it is 
highly likely that the incentive behind this new determination 
to promote economic cooperation lay in the belief that it was 
politically necessary, following the fall of South Vietnam, to 
bolster ASEAN's credibility by demonstrating its ability to 
make tangible progress in this area. Rajaratnam reportedly 
expressed the hope that out of the current sense of crisis
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would come the "water" capable of laying the "dust" that 
continued to gather on ASEAN schemes for cooperation in 
industry and trade.2d.
Other Areas of Cooperation
Although ASEAN was slow to respond to the major 
recommendations of the UN Report concerning cooperation in the 
fields of trade and industry, the Association could point to 
modest achievements and progress in several other areas of 
economic cooperation by the time of the Eighth Ministerial 
Meeting. One proposal of long standing, which had been 
endorsed by the UN Report, was for the creation of an ASEAN 
secretriat. The joint communique of the Fifth Ministerial 
Meeting agreed that there should be "consideration of the need 
and desirability of a central secretariat". The joint 
communique of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting recorded that 
ministers had decided that "the time had come" for 
establishment of such a secretariat.
The question of the location of the secretariat produced 
some delicate diplomacy amongst ASEAN's members. Both 
Indonesia and the Philippines evidently wished to host it. The 
Philippines reportedly was unwilling to give up its offer that 
the secretariat be located in Manila and offered very generous 
financial inducements, including construction of a 14-storey 
building.23. But the Philippines was obliged to give way. 
Romulo recommended withdrawal of the Philippines' offer given 
the strength of Indonesian feelings that Jakarta should be the 
site, and noted that President Marcos had agreed.24. Little
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progress was made, however. In deciding the structure of the 
secretariat. A draft agreement on the establishment of a 
secretariat was reportedly prepared.
In other areas of cooperation progress was modest, but 
ASEAN's activities in these areas covered an increasingly wide 
field and, in aggregate, began to have a significant impact in 
member-countries. In such areas as finance, shipping and 
tourism some useful progress was made. Achievements in other 
fields included: the signing at the Fifth Ministerial Meeting 
of an Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Aircraft in 
Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Aircraft Accidents; the 
conclusion of an Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in 
Mass Media and Cultural Activities; publication of an ASEAN 
Journal; establishment of an ASEAN products display centre in 
Bangkok; and the signing at the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of 
an Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Ships in 
Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Ships Accidents. An 
increasing number of special interest groups were also 
established including the Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (established in 1972), the Confederation 
of ASEAN Journalists, the ASEAN Motion Picture Producers 
Association, and the Association of ASEAN Museum Experts. In 
some areas tangible achievements were not spectacular but 
ASEAN's cooperative activities became increasingly 
diversified. Personal contacts were established and 
information exchanged amongst a wide variety of groups, from 
artists to drug enforcers. A meeting of ASEAN parliamentarians 
in Jakarta in January 1975 set up a Working Committee to 
discuss the formation of an ASEAN Parliamentary Union.25.
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The first meeting of ASEAN Labour Ministers was held in
Jakarta in April 1975 and according to the communique of the 
Eighth Ministerial Meeting "consultations" were held amongst 
Ministers of Trade. Some progress was thus beginning to be 
made towards what Indonesia’s Ali Moertopo referred to as the 
"socialization" of ASEAN.26.
* * *
Whether ASEAN's record of economic achievement as 
described above is considered impressive or disappointing is a 
matter of perspective, but it is clear that while progress may 
often have seemed leisurely, and the results meagre, a great 
deal of spadework was done during this period without which 
the accomplishments of the following few years, which drew 
much greater international acclaim, would have been 
impossible. This record also gives support to those who, like 
Rajaratnam, argued that ASEAN had become more than just a 
political convenience. Rajaratnam acknowledged that ASEAN was 
more involved in political questions than it had been, but he 
drew attention to the fact that if ASEAN's official documents 
were examined it would be seen that ASEAN committee meetings 
were held at the rate of two or three a month and none of them 
were concerned with political questions. "Naturally", he 
observed, "the foreign ministers meeting for three days tend 
to discuss politics as well as economics. But in between I 
think most of the activities, 95 percent of the activities of 
ASEAN, are not political."
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CHAPTER 4
SECURITY CONCERNS
The rapid pace of events in Indochina, leading to the 
fall of Saigon in April 1975, provided a major stimulus to 
ASEAN's development. In the political sphere, it required new 
foreign policy responses; and in the economic sphere, added 
urgency to ASEAN's endeavours. The demise of the non-communist 
regimes in Indochina also gave rise to questions concerning 
the relevance of ASEAN to the defence and security interests 
of its members.
Security issues had been considered at the time of 
ASEAN's formation, with the consensus view, as already noted, 
being in favour of a low profile for the organisation in this 
area. These issues had continued to be discussed 
intermittently during ASEAN's early years. In particular, the 
utility of military alliances with external powers continued 
to be debated.
One particular argument against military alliances with 
external powers was heard with increasing frequency; namely, 
that the major threat to the security of ASEAN countries was 
in any case from internal insurgency and subversion and that 
external support was not useful against such a threat (as the 
experience of the Vietnam war was believed to have shown), 
and was likely in fact to be detrimental. Adam Malik, for
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example, asserted that the main threat to the region was from 
subversion and insurgency, against which he believed the most 
effective defence was the development of national 
resi1ience.1• Not all ASEAN leaders were convinced by such 
arguments, however, or by the view that military alliances 
should be dismantled to make way for neutralization. Few 
policy-makers in Thailand and the Philippines seriously 
advocated the dismantling of their alliances with the U.S.
Even Malaysia acknowledged that "in the face of external 
encroachment the support and assistance of friendly powers 
should be useful - and indeed often crucial".2.
But while they may have differed about the merits of 
traditional military alliances, it is especially noteworthy 
that during the Association's early years ASEAN's leaders, 
with very few exceptions, continued to reject a possible 
alternative means to seek to ensure their security, namely by 
placing primary reliance on the formation of a military 
alliance amongst themselves - either within ASEAN or outside 
its auspices. There seemed to be a widespread feeling that 
ASEAN itself was best suited to quite different purposes. 
Allegations to the contrary were often made. Commentators 
frequently asserted that Indonesian military leaders, 
especially, were in favour of a regional military alliance. 
However there was, in most cases, little convincing evidence 
of this. As at the time of ASEAN's formation, speculation was 
fed by exaggerated press reporting. ASEAN spokesmen would 
occasionally acknowledge that the Association had a role to 
play in the security field, meaning more often than not simply 
that by encouraging economic development and political
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Cooperation ASEAN helped to promote regional stability. These 
comments were very likely to be interpreted, however, as 
suggestions that ASEAN was contemplating the formation of a 
military alliance or pact between its members. In January 
1971, General Panggabean was reported to have told Indonesia's 
national defence institute: "More than just agreeing to it, I
will arrange for a joint defence of ASEAN countries". But he 
proceeded to refer only to exchanges of visits and students, 
and possibly of arms.3• Tun Ismail explained that the 
security that ASEAN gave the region was "in the form of 
stability which is created by good neighbourly relations and 
in the form of economic and social progress".4- Rajaratnam 
argued that ASEAN should remain "an organization solely to 
promote economic cooperation in the region" because the 
problems of economic cooperation would "strain ASEAN to its 
fullest for many years to come. To burden it with ideological 
and security problems is to invite its breakdown."
On more pragmatic grounds, Somsakdi Xuto also concluded 
that there were many reasons against the introduction of a 
Southeast Asian regional security arrangement. He believed 
that the type of security cooperation that was "practical and 
relevant" was bilateral cooperation.^* This view, prevalent 
from the time of ASEAN's formation, apparently continued to be 
accepted by most of ASEAN's participants. Tun Razak instanced 
Malaysia's border cooperation with Thailand and Indonesia, and 
its cooperation with Singapore in the Five Power arrangements, 
as examples of a "criss-crossing network of bilateral links" 
that would when extended contribute to "an atmosphere of 
regional understanding and harmony".6*
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While the general tenor of remarks by the majority of 
ASEAN’s leaders during this period was thus firmly against 
multilateral security cooperation amongst the non-communist 
countries of the region, there were occasional exceptions to 
this rule. These exceptions mostly still fell short of 
advocacy of a military alliance. Nevertheless, in some 
instances some ASEAN participants did appear to have had in 
mind a somewhat more substantial role for ASEAN in military 
affairs. A few individuals appeared to keep an open mind about 
the possibility of formal multilateral security arrangements, 
at least for the future. Thanat Khoman commented that instead 
of having a regional military alliance the tendency seemed to 
be towards "separate interlocked security arrangements". But 
he added: "They may ultimately be integrated. We don't know.
It may be three, five or ten years"7- In 1972 Jose Ingles, 
then Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reportedly 
stated that the Philippines would propose military cooperation 
amongst ASEAN members, and that this would be "better than 
SEATO" because it would exclude outside powers. Ingles said 
that the proposal would be made at the ASEAN foreign ministers 
meeting in Manila in July 1972 and that the initial stage 
would consist of joint patrols and training and intelligence 
exchanges.Thailand’s Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn 
also seemed to favour security cooperation in ASEAN. In his 
opening address to the Sixth Ministerial Meeting Thanom urged 
ASEAN members to "collectively tackle the problems of 
security" in the region.9- Reports such as these suggest 
that proposals for an ASEAN role in security cooperation were 
discussed privately at ASEAN meetings during the Association’s
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early years, although It also seems clear that opposition to 
ASEAN acquiring a role in this area continued to prevail.
Nevertheless, commentators in ASEAN countries and 
elsewhere fuelled continuing speculation about the prospects 
for multilateral military cooperation within ASEAN.
Singapore’s Lau Teik Soon thought that the Association could 
become "the core of a regional security organization in the 
future". He claimed that Indonesia had already considered 
ASEAN in this light. While a formal military pact might not 
emerge. Lau claimed that ASEAN members had "tacitly agreed on 
the need for closer cooperation in defence matters" and that 
"an ASEAN role in the defence of the area may no longer be 
questioned in future."10* Indonesia's Sutomo Roesnadi 
alleged that it could not be denied that "certain groups exist 
in every ASEAN member country which want to convert ASEAN into 
a military alliance."11* Within the region there were some 
advocates of quite ambitious schemes for military cooperation. 
K.K.Nair argued that since most Southeast Asian countries had 
the military capability "to engage only in very limited wars, 
regionally centred arrangements with greater resources to fall 
back upon become all the more imperative." Lieutenant-Colonel 
Syed Abdul Aziz favoured the creation of "a combined force" 
amongst ASEAN countries for the maintenance of the stability 
of the region.12- Amongst outside academic commentators,
Justus van der Kroef alleged that there remained "considerable 
interest in ASEAN military circles in moving toward a common 
defence "framework1". He claimed that the term "regional 
resilience" was increasingly serving Indonesian officials as 
"a code for some form of non-threatening, low-profile
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collective security and defense".13. Bernard Gordon claimed 
that "some in Djakarta" hoped to see defence included, "even 
formally", as an ASEAN subject. He thought that Indonesia, 
with some support from Malaysia and Singapore, was likely to 
initiate formal defence cooperation in areas such as training, 
intelligence and agreements on equipment commona1ity.14. 
Leftist academics in the West asserted that the groundwork for 
the "militarization" of ASEAN was being carefully and 
surreptitiously laid.l^.
The subject of ASEAN's potential role in security 
cooperation was dealt with at some length in a conference 
paper presented in March 1975 by Ghazali Shafie. Ghazali began 
by stressing that ASEAN was "merely an economic-cultural 
grouping" that was "never intended by its founders to be a 
security or even security-oriented grouping." He asserted that 
"the security bonus that ASEAN derives through the collective 
economic advancement of its members, it must be borne in mind, 
constitutes a peripheral, not the central concern of the 
Organization." While ASEAN had a role to play in encouraging 
"regional resilience", Ghazali insisted that ASEAN members 
must "remain mindful of the pitfall of transforming the 
Organization into a collective security alliance." Its 
strength lay in its "non-ideological, non-military and 
non-antagonistic character". If this changed, he argued, its 
"acceptability quotient" regionally and internationally would
decrease substantially.^.
Vietnam
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After the fall of Saigon, security issues acquired
renewed prominence for ASEAN's members, leading them to 
re-evaluate the primary objectives of the Association. A range 
of views on Indochina issues was reflected amongst ASEAN 
delegates to the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur on 13-15 May 1975. Attention focussed initially on the 
question of the most appropriate diplomatic response and on 
the possibility, now opened at least theoretically, of 
expanding ASEAN's membership.
The most enthusiastic advocate of closer ties between 
ASEAN and the countries of Indochina was Malaysia's Tun Razak, 
now Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Following the 
communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam a short time 
before the meeting, Razak was reported to favour a formal 
invitation to the Indochina countries and Burma to join 
ASEAN.I?- He noted that at the time of its birth ASEAN had 
envisaged "the creation of a family of nations in Southeast 
Asia which would embrace the whole region" and that ASEAN's 
growth had been nurtured with care to maintain its 
non-military character. With the end of the war in Indochina, 
Razak saw "the opportunity to extend the scope of regional 
cooperation throughout Southeast Asia". He acknowledged that 
the way ahead to "an expanded ASEAN" would be difficult, but 
expressed the "confident hope" that the "sense of history" of 
ASEAN members would guide them to the right choices so that 
the dream of a "Community of Southeast Asia" could at last be 
fulfilled. The new Thai government of Prime Minister Kukrit 
Pramoj also appeared to favour a conciliatory ASEAN policy 
towards Vietnam. Prior to his departure from Bangkok for the
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ministerial meeting, Foreign Minister Chatichai reportedly 
stated that it was time for ASEAN to include North Vietnam, 
South Vietnam, Laos and Burma in the Association now that 
peace had come to the region.
The chief advocate of a more restrained response to 
events in Indochina appeared to be Singapore. Rajaratnam urged 
that: "ASEAN should not give the impression that it is 
disconcerted by the emergence of communist or
communist-influenced regimes in Indochina. Nor should we give 
the impression that we are prepared at any cost to readjust 
ourselves to win the favour of the Indochina states." He 
believed that: "We should not be the only one wooing the new
regimes in Indochina; they should be wooing us too. They must 
feel that we are as important to their well-being as we think 
they could be to our well-being." He added later that if ASEAN 
was made "a going concern", it would not need to "go around 
touting" for new members. It was reported at the time that 
these remarks by Rajaratnam were commended by "ASEAN political 
circles" in Kuala Lumpur, because he had been bold enough to 
say what some others had wanted to say but did not. There may 
also have been some sympathy for Rajaratnam's views amongst 
the Indonesian delegation. In his remarks to the meeting Malik 
advised that for ASEAN's relationship with the rest of 
Southeast Asia to be genuinely equal it must be based on 
strength - "not the strength of arms or of armed alliances, 
but that of ASEAN's identity and common purpose, of its 
internal cohesion and functional efficiency". Like Rajaratnam, 
Malik appeared to believe that the first goal should be to 
strengthen ASEAN within its existing membership.
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The press statement of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting 
indicated a victory for those in ASEAN who favoured a 
wait-and-see attitude towards Vietnam. ASEAN members professed 
their readiness to enter into friendly and harmonious 
relations with the countries of Indochina and reiterated their 
willingness to cooperate with them in "the common task" of 
national development on the basis of adherence to the five 
Bandung principles of peaceful coexistence. Along with such 
general expressions of goodwill, however, the statement 
emphasized that ASEAN members were "convinced" that the 
Association would "continue to offer the logical framework for 
establishing peace, progress and stability in the region".
They reaffirmed their determination to further strengthen 
ASEAN by intensifying and broadening cooperation amongst 
existing member-states. Despite Malaysia’s advocacy, no 
mention was made of a desire to expand ASEAN's membership.
The concerns of ASEAN's members extended beyond the need 
to consider the most appropriate overt response to Vietnam's 
victories in Indochina, however. There can be no doubt, 
whatever their public statements, that they feared that the 
end of the Indochina war could lead to an increased threat to 
their security. Commentators spoke of an atmosphere of 
considerable nervousness in ASEAN capitals following the 
communist victories. Rajaratnam later remarked that:
"Overnight the assumptions on which their confidence and 
political vision were based melted away. There was confusion 
and uncertainty as to how they should react."19- Prior to 
the end of the war Singaporean leaders had been the most
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outspoken about the dangerous consequences that might follow 
an American defeat. Lee Kuan Yew told the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting in Ottawa in 1973 that: "A collapse in 
Indochina will bring a threat of guerilla insurgency to our 
doorstep by way of Thailand and West Ma1 aysia."20• Such 
fears were more widely expressed after Vietnam ousted the 
United States. An Indonesian commentator asserted that: "Given 
the amount of military equipment now in the hands of the 
Vietnamese communists, and their unparalleled experience in 
guerilla warfare, the possibility of Vietnam providing 
military assistance, in the form of both training and 
materiel, to communist groups outside its borders must be 
given serious consideration."21• President Suharto agreed 
that the Indochinese communists had acquired so much modern 
weaponry surplus to their own needs "it is only likely that 
they will pass them on."22. Malaysian concerns were more 
than academic since they coincided with a conspicuous upsurge 
in communist insurgent activity, including the spectacular 
blowing up on 26 August 1975 of the war memorial to those 
killed in the Malayan Emergency. Tun Razak reportedly told his 
military commanders that it was necessary to review Malaysia's 
defences in view of the communist successes in Indochina.23. 
Thailand publicized evidence of what it claimed to be 
large-scale Vietnamese support for communist insurgents in 
Thai 1 and.24. Romulo speculated that the partial withdrawal 
of the United States from Asia was "bound to create a vacuum 
which, as in nature which abhors a void, others will doubtless 
try to fill".
At the Eighth Mministerial Meeting delegates reportedly
129
had private talks about the captured or abandoned U.S. weapons
in South Vietnam and Cambodia, variously estimated to be worth 
between two and five billion U.S. dollars and including over 
1.5 million rifles and enormous amounts of ammunition.^ 5.
What is more significant, however, is that as early as this 
meeting ASEAN spokesmen began, whatever their fears about the 
dramatic developments in Indochina, to caution concurrently 
against an over-reaction, and to stress the need for a 
carefully considered response on the part of ASEAN. At a more 
fundamental level, it was apparently concluded that the time 
had come for a re-examination of ASEAN's overall objectives 
and purposes, and of its long-term approach towards its 
relations with the new communist regimes in Indochina. Romulo 
counselled ASEAN against a reaction that would "cause 
demoralization of the kind which could lead to panic solutions 
.... We must move, though with prudence and caution, to take 
stock of ourselves and be absolutely clear in our minds what 
we want ASEAN to be".
Such sentiments, combined with an optimistic appraisal 
of Vietnam's intentions and of the internal strengths of ASEAN 
countries, led some ASEAN leaders to play down the threat from 
Indochina. For example, Rajaratnam said that he had been 
"reading the United States' comments suggesting that the ASEAN 
countries are alarmed, confused and in disarray over the 
emergence of the new regimes in Indochina; that it is only a 
matter of time before this revolutionary wave sweeps over the 
rest of Southeast Asia, especially the ASEAN countries." He 
thought this was "a melodrama because Indochina is not all of 
Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries collectively are more
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populous than the rest of Indochina. The ASEAN countries are 
economically more dynamic than the rest of Indochina. The 
ASEAN countries, because we have been working together for 
eight years, are more integrated as a regional unit than the 
Indochinese states". Hence he thought that ASEAN should not 
"give the impression that we are alarmed, that we are weak 
.... As an ASEAN group, we are definitely a strong group. So,
I for one, do not believe that ASEAN will fall victim to an 
aggressive Indochina." Tun Razak also noted that in the wake 
of developments in Indochina "some people have expressed 
apprehension and pessimism concerning the future of Southeast 
Asia." But he asserted that most of this had come from outside 
the region. While he thought it natural that there would be 
"anxiety and uncertainty", and acknowledged that there could 
be "pitfalls", he saw the end of the Indochina conflict as 
bringing the opportunity for "establishing real and durable 
peace in Southeast Asia".26. Razak was supported by Ghazali 
Shafie, who asserted that: "In theoretical as well as in 
practical/empirical terms, the domino theory has little 
relevance to the states of Southeast Asia. The collapse of 
American policy in Indochina does not determine the internal 
order of these states, unless their internal order happens to 
be a function of American support".27.
This latter comment re-introduces the viewpoint that 
found continuing support amongst ASEAN spokesmen and other 
commentators, namely the notion encountered earlier that the 
primary threat to the security of ASEAN countries was 
internal. After the fall of Saigon, ASEAN spokesmen stressed 
this viewpoint repeatedly. It is fair to say that it came to
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represent an ASEAN consensus or dogma. One week after the fall
of Saigon Lee Kuan Yew remarked that to counter the threat 
from communist insurgency "each ASEAN country has to ensure 
sufficient economic progress and social justice that will make 
insurgency unattractive and unlikely to succeed. Military 
defence against externally-aided insurgency is only worth the 
effort and the cost if economic and social development take 
place."28- In his address to the Eighth Ministerial Meeting 
Romulo stated the Philippines' view that the greatest danger 
facing Southeast Asia was not overt aggression but subversion 
and infiltration which required a strengthening of ASEAN 
societies. Rajaratnam concurred asserting that: "If there is 
any adverse consequence as a result of what is happening in 
Indochina, it will not be external aggression by Hanoi or 
Khmer Rouge or the Pathet Lao but by our inability to contain 
our domestic communists. So the threat is not external but 
internal ... the way to fight indigenous communists is through 
appropriate economic, political and social policies within our 
own countries." Another unspoken factor that seems likely to 
have influenced ASEAN members, and their assessment of 
possible external threats, is the assessment that evolved 
amongst them in the weeks and months following the fall of 
Saigon that despite its humiliating defeat and domestic 
disillusionment, the United States was nevertheless likely to 
remain an important influence on the security of Southeast 
Asia, and to continue to play the role of ultimate guarantor 
against external aggression.
Consistent with their expressions of confidence that 
there was little danger of external aggression, ASEAN members
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continued, after the Eighth Ministerial Meeting, to lay 
primary emphasis in their public statements on their desire 
for improved relations with the states of Indochina. ASEAN's 
friendly stance seemed initially to be reciprocated by 
Vietnam. An article released on 12 June 1975, although 
describing ASEAN as having been formed as a disguised military 
alliance, noted that the organization had recently talked 
about peace, cooperation and neutrality in the region and 
pointed to "positive signs indicating the intention by 
Southeast Asian nations at this historic turning point to 
embark on a path consistent with their aspiration and 
interests and with the world peoples' struggle against 
aggressive U.S. imperialism for the defence of peace."29. 
However, Vietnam's disappointment with developments in its 
bilateral relations with Thailand apparently led to a 
hardening of its views. Vietnamese media attacks on Thailand 
and other ASEAN countries became frequent. In spite of this, 
ASEAN's leaders continued to hold to a conciliatory stance.
Tun Razak, in October, thought Vietnam should be given more 
time.30- Admitting that it was "perhaps too early to talk of 
the Indochina countries participating in ASEAN", Razak thought 
that it was "essential that the door be left open".31* In 
November 1975 Lee Kuan Yew was able to comment, accurately, 
that all ASEAN countries, "with varying degrees of speed, 
warmth and intensity", had made it clear that they wanted 
constructive and non-antagonistic relations with the countries 
of Indochina.^ 2. jn light of Vietnam's increasingly critical 
attitude, however, many ASEAN leaders probably were drawn 
towards the point of view expressed earlier by Singapore, 
namely that ASEAN should move with circumspection until
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Vietnam showed an Inclination to match ASEAN's efforts to
strengthen regional cooperation. From this time ASEAN's 
members focussed on the development of the Association within 
its existing membership. Those who had hoped earlier for the 
inclusion of Vietnam adjusted realistically to the majority 
opinion that this was not achievable in the foreseeable 
future.
Vietnam and Security
The disappointment of ASEAN's members over Vietnam's 
response to its diplomatic overtures may have led some of them 
to examine once more the possibility of a role for the 
Association as a military alliance or collective security 
organization. At about the time of the fall of Saigon there 
appeared to be tentative indications on the part of Indonesia 
and the Philippines of a revived interest in acknowledging at 
least some forms of security cooperation as a legitimate part 
of ASEAN's concerns. Suharto reportedly expressed the view 
that in the long term ASEAN cooperation should not be confined 
only to the economic, social and cultural fields, but should 
take a "still wider form".33* In his address to the Eighth 
Ministerial Meeting, Romulo remarked that with regard to ASEAN 
the Philippines would like to, see "expanded cooperation in the 
promotion of our security." He thought that the time had come 
to examine "all the options open to us" and to review "in the 
light of recent developments" if previous steps to protect the 
well-being and security of members had not been "rendered 
academic by events". Marcos and Kukrit agreed in July 1975 
that cooperation between ASEAN members should be widened to
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cover fields "which in the past we have not considered". This 
was reported to include security.34. & meeting between 
Suharto and Lee Kuan Yew in September 1975 was also 
accompanied by press speculation about ASEAN security 
cooperation.35■ The most dramatic allegations were made in a 
report by Michael Richardson in which he stated that according 
to "informed sources" Indonesia had proposed, with the 
authority of Suharto, that ASEAN governments should 
"contribute land, air and sea forces for periodic five-nation 
exercises; work towards greater standardization of their 
weapons, equipment and logistic procedures; and establish an 
ASEAN military staff college for training officers". The 
"sources" said that these proposals were an "amicable 
compromise" of several put forward by members to boost ASEAN's 
cooperation in security and defence.36. There were further 
reports in December 1975 that an ASEAN senior officials 
meeting was studying an Indonesian working paper which 
envisaged the extension of existing bilateral, security 
cooperation to multilateral cooperation and the coordination 
of this cooperation by a joint security council. The sources 
were reportedly pessimistic about the chances of these 
proposals being adopted.37-
Just how much substance there was in these reports 
cannot be assessed with confidence. It seems credible, 
however, that they had some substance, even if possibly 
exaggerated. Certainly Malaysia seemed to find it necessary to 
place on the public record its opposition to military 
cooperation within ASEAN and its preference instead for the 
neutralization proposal. Ghazali Shafie asserted that the key
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to national and regional security in Southeast Asia lay "in 
new political-economic arrangements, not in out-dated and 
irrelevant cold-war alignments and military pacts."38- Tun 
Razak again stressed that ASEAN was "non-military, 
non-ideo1ogica 1 and non-antagonistic" in character.3 -^ 
Malaysia's view was eventually to prevail. Instead of relying 
on increased security cooperation, ASEAN's leaders sought to 
bolster ASEAN's collective strength in other ways.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMITRY
Faced with the new challenge presented by a communist 
Indochina, a consensus emerged that the principal focus of 
ASEAN's efforts should be to strengthen the Association 
itself. Lee Kuan Yew told a press conference in April 1975 
that the long-term solution to the region's problems was to 
increase solidarity within ASEAN "ensuring continuing 
stability in the area and uninterrupted economic 
development."1• This theme was taken up by all delegates to 
the Eighth Ministerial Meeting. Malaysia's Minister with 
Special Functions for Foreign Affairs, Tengku Rithauddeen, 
asserted that "against the new setting and background" the 
need had become "more pressing for us in ASEAN to continuously 
give our thought to the structure and efficacy of our 
organization with the purpose of constructing a well-equipped 
machinery to implement our objectives". Rajaratnam, with his 
customary oratory, announced that: "more than ever before I, 
for one, am thankful that eight years ago we decided to form 
ASEAN. More than ever before ASEAN is today our shield." He 
hoped that ASEAN members would regard the events in Indochina 
"not as a tragedy, not as something terrible which is a threat 
to us, but as a stimulus to pay more serious and more loyal 
attention to ASEAN and its objectives."
Behind this rhetoric, a crucial goal that ASEAN leaders
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evidently had In mind was to give the Association sufficient 
international credibility that its views would be considered 
and respected by other countries both inside and outside the 
region. Lee Kuan Yew commented in January 1976 that "the 
strengthening of ties between ASEAN countries would make for 
more constructive relations with the big powers, and with the 
other countries in the region." An Indonesian commentator 
stressed that greater cohesion and cooperation was "a sine 
qua non if the ASEAN voice on regional affairs affecting 
their own geographic surroundings, is to be listened to and 
respected by the interested big and super powers."2.
Given this background, it is understandable that ASEAN's 
leaders became increasingly receptive to suggestions that an 
ASEAN summit meeting should be convened, both to stimulate 
ASEAN's development and to increase its international profile 
and prestige.
The Road to Bali
It was not until April 1975, just a few weeks before the 
fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese forces, that the idea of 
holding a summit meeting attracted real interest. On 14 April 
Adam Malik is reported to have commented after a meeting with 
President Suharto that ASEAN was expected to hold a summit 
meeting to discuss the situation in Indochina. He said that 
the summit could be held following the ministerial meeting to 
be held the next month. On 17 April, the day that Phnom Penh 
fell to the Khmer Rouge, Marcos called for an ASEAN summit "as 
early as possible" to discuss the implications of events in
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Indochina and other Asian developments.^-
In fact, however, ASEAN moved slowly and cautiously 
towards holding its first meeting of heads of government, 
perhaps because some ASEAN leaders wished to avoid an early 
summit which would be seen as a panic reaction to Vietnam's 
victory. The least enthusiastic member appeared to be 
Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew commented later in April that it was 
"too premature at the moment to hold an emergency ASEAN Summit 
in connection with the developments in Indochina."^- At the 
ministerial meeting in May, however, Malik said he felt a 
summit would be important because there were "problems vitally 
affecting all five nations which require discussion at the 
highest level."5- Malik added that the ASEAN foreign 
ministers had agreed to the summit proposal and that the heads 
of government would decide on the date.
The subject came up again in June and July during visits 
by Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj to Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Singapore.6- Kukrit's round of visits 
appeared to remove any remaining opposition to the holding of 
a summit, but timing and venue were still uncertain.?• An 
additional reason for the continued air of indecision appeared 
to be that ASEAN members, especially Singapore, were concerned 
that if a summit was to be held it should be seen clearly to 
have been successful. Rajaratnam stated publicly that from 
Singapore's viewpoint ASEAN's first summit "should result in 
something significant and important emerging" and that it 
should be preceded by intensive preparations. Singapore would 
"rather wait three, four, five or six months to achieve
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something than just meet for the sake of having the summit." 
Only this, he said, would show to the world that ASEAN had 
reached maturity and was prepared to move forward seriously to 
implement its declared aims and objectives.®- Similar views 
were attributed to Malaysia.9- On 15 September, in 
Singapore, ASEAN officials commenced the first of many 
preparatory meetings for the summit. Press reports during the 
meeting stated that the summit would be held "early next year" 
and that there was a "strong possibility" that it would be in 
Bali, or perhaps in Bangkok.
The First Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers took place 
in Jakarta on 26-27 November 1975. In a speech delivered in 
Singapore on 21 November which was probably intended as an 
exhortation to the economic ministers, Rajaratnam described 
ASEAN as an organization with the potentialities of a Rolls 
Royce, but which so far had achieved no more than a Mini Minor 
performance.1^ • The press release said that ministers had 
identified various areas (unspecified) for economic 
cooperation and had agreed on various specific recommendations 
(also unspecified) for consideration by governments and 
eventually also by the summit.
Some uncertainty about the summit arose following the 
death in mid-January 1976 of Tun Razak and the dissolving of 
the Thai parliament in preparation for elections in March, but 
after contacts between ASEAN leaders during and following the 
Razak funeral it was agreed that a postponement was not 
necessary. Marcos appeared to take a lead in seeking agreement 
on the summit agenda. After Razak's funeral he visited
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Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. At the end of January the
Philippines revealed that the main items on the Bali agenda 
would be:
Formation of a permanent ASEAN headquarters and 
secretariat;
Formalization of a formula for the peaceful settlement of 
border disputes among ASEAN members;
Liberalization of trade and the possibility of making the 
development of agriculture and industry in the ASEAN 
countries more complementary;
Cooperation with respect not only to trade, but also to 
the imposition of duties and tariffs and to balance of 
payments problems; and
Establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and 
neutrality.12.
Marcos claimed that differences over the summit agenda 
had been settled and that the heads of government had approved 
the agenda.13- This new mood of decisiveness met with 
favourable comment. One journalist observed that ASEAN had 
"energised itself" and had acquired "a long-desired but little 
seen sense of urgency".14.
ASEAN senior officials continued work on the drafting of 
documents for the summit until the commencement on 9 February 
of the "First Pre-ASEAN Summit Ministerial Meeting" in 
Pattaya.15. The press release at the conclusion of the 
meeting stated that the ministers had agreed upon the agenda 
for the summit, which was set for 23-25 February. A second
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pre-summit ministerial meeting was set for '21 February in 
Bali, and it was also agreed to hold two more senior officials 
meetings - on 18-19 February in Jakarta and on 21 February in
Bali - to discuss some remaining areas of difference and 
disagreement.16 These meetings were held as scheduled. In 
addition, the foreign ministers and their senior officials met 
informally on the evening of 20 February and again on 22 
February, on the eve of the summit. I'7- The economic 
ministers also met on 22 February.
The Bali Summit
Little effort was spared by Indonesia to provide a 
suitable ceremonial welcome and other amenities for the ASEAN 
heads of government attending the Bali summit, which was held 
at the Pertamina Cottages near the airport at Kuta Beach. 
Almost 1,000 policemen and soldiers reportedly were sent from 
Java to provide security, including some 200 crack troops from 
the Silivangi Division. Some 300 journalists assembled to 
cover the proceedings. President Marcos, Malaysia's new Prime 
Minister Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and 
Prime Minister Kukrit stepped from their planes onto a red 
carpet to be garlanded with chempaka flowers by Balinese 
maidens, who danced to the accompaniment of a gamelan 
orchestra while they crossed the tarmac. The route to the 
summit venue was lined by flag-waving children and decorated 
with buntings and the flags of the five nations. The two-hour 
opening ceremony in the opulent Puri Bunga conference hall on 
the morning of 23 February was televised live to the region. 
Journalists found the tight security rather restrictive. An
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Indonesian warship patrolled offshore. The atmosphere 
nevertheless was described as "cheerful" and 
"confident".^ '
The holding of ASEAN’s first summit had aroused high 
expectations in the region. To cite one example, a Singaporean 
columnist in January 1976 saw it as "a foregone conclusion" 
that the summit would be "more than an exercise in empty 
posturing" and that it would reflect "a genuine appreciation 
by ASEAN leaders of the benefits of economic integration" and 
the acceptance by them of "the awesome responsibility of 
taking ASEAN across a watershed."20• Such expectations were 
not discouraged by the heads of government in their speeches 
during the summit’s opening ceremony. Suharto asserted that 
ASEAN leaders were "strongly determined to consolidate common 
approaches and to unify joint actions in translating the 
objectives of ASEAN into reality." Hussein Onn saw ASEAN as 
about to enter a phase of "greater and more intense 
cooperation". He believed that the possibilities for 
higher levels of cooperation, particularly in the economic 
field, were real. Marcos was optimistic that the summit would 
prove to be an historic occasion, a "monument" to the wisdom 
of the leaders of the five member-states. Lee Kuan Yew’s 
initial remarks were non-commital. He commented that ASEAN was 
"at a crossroad". But he went on to urge that ASEAN countries 
should "seize our opportunities for cooperation, for continued 
security and stability as a more cohesive group, pursuing more 
coherent policies." He believed that the meeting would be 
memorable for "consolidating ASEAN as a regional force in the 
international community."
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Adam Malik described the final summit agenda as being
O  1like "a dinner which is ready but not yet served.' It
appears that all important matters were decided upon before 
the heads of government met. This explains why their first 
private meeting on the afternoon of 23 February which was 
scheduled for two hours lasted just 35 minutes. Conference 
sources said the first session went smoothly and swiftly "like 
an express train". At its conclusion Marcos and Lee played a 
round of golf while the other leaders went sightseeing.22. 
Another private meeting was held on 24 February during which 
the leaders reportedly reviewed international issues, and this 
was followed by the closing session that afternoon.23. 
main work of the heads of government had been the approval and 
signature of three major documents; namely, a Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord, and an Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
Secretariat.
The preamble to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
noted that the "High Contracting Parties" were "convinced that 
the settlement of differences or disputes between their 
countries should be regulated by rational, effective and 
sufficiently flexible procedures". To deal with such disputes 
the Parties were to "constitute, as a continuing body, a High 
Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from 
each of the High Contracting Parties". In the event that no 
solution to a dispute was reached through "direct 
negotiations", the High Council would "take cognizance of the 
dispute or the situation" and "recommend to the parties in
147
dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, 
mediation, inquiry or conciliation."
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord attempted to set out a 
framework for future cooperation. Its preamble stated that the 
five countries would endeavour to expand ASEAN cooperation "in 
the economic, social, cultural and political fields". The 
formal affirmation of political cooperation as one of the 
central objectives of ASEAN was one of the key features of the 
summit even though this did little more than legitimize a 
development that had already occurred. The Declaration proper 
commenced by specifying certain objectives and principles to 
be followed in the pursuit of "political stability". The 
remainder of the Declaration elaborated a "programme of 
action" for ASEAN cooperation, including the following 
activities in the economic sphere:
cooperation on basic commidities, particularly food and 
energy;
industrial cooperation; 
cooperation in trade; and
a joint approach to international commodity problems.
In the security area, the Declaration endorsed: "Continuation 
of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states 
in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and 
interests."
The preamble to the Agreement on the Establishment of
the ASEAN Secretariat noted that members were mindful of the
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r a p i d l y  g r o w i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  ASEAN a nd  t h a t  t h e y  r e c o g n i z e d  
t h a t  t h i s  g r o w t h  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  n e e d  f o r  "a c e n t r a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o r g a n  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t h e  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  ASEAN o r g a n s  a nd  f o r  more  e f f e c t i v e  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  ASEAN p r o j e c t s  a nd  a c t i v i t i e s " .  The l o c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  S e c r e t r i a t  was  t o  be  J a k a r t a .  The  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o f  
t h e  ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t  was  t o  be a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  f o r e i g n  
m i n i s t e r s  up o n  n o m i n a t i o n  by a m e m b e r - c o u n t r y  on a r o t a t i o n a l  
b a s i s  i n  a l p h a b e t i c a l  o r d e r ,  a n d  f o r  a t e n u r e  o f  two y e a r s .
The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  was  t o  be  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  ASEAN 
M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g  when i t  was  i n  s e s s i o n  a nd  t o  t h e  S t a n d i n g  
C o m m i t t e e  a t  o t h e r  t i m e s .
B e h i n d  The S c e n e s
Such  w e r e  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t s  t h a t  ASEAN s p o k e s m e n  h o p e d  
w o u l d  s e r v e  t o  ma r k  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  B a l i  s u m m i t .  B e h i n d  t h e  
s c e n e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a nd  a t  t i m e s  mo r e  p u b l i c l y ,  t h i n g s  d i d  n o t  go 
s o  s m o o t h l y  a s  i t  m i g h t  h a v e  s e e m e d .  I n  f a c t ,  on a l m o s t  a l l  
m a j o r  i s s u e s ,  c l o s e  e x a m i n a t i o n  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  s t r o n g  
d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  a p p r o a c h  a nd  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n  by t h e  
s ummi t  a n d  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  s ummi t  d o c u m e n t s  w e r e  m o s t l y  t h e  
r e s u l t  o f  c o m p r o m i s e .
T h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  w e r e  a l r e a d y  e v i d e n t  a t  t h e  F i r s t  
M e e t i n g  o f  ASEAN Ec on omi c  M i n i s t e r s  i n  November  1975 a n d ,  more  
p r o m i n e n t l y ,  a t  t h e  P r e - S u m m i t  M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g  i n  F e b r u a r y  
1976 .  S e n i o r  o f f i c i a l s  h a d  t o  w o r k  l o n g  a nd  h a r d  i n  
p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  m e e t i n g .  O f f i c i a l  s o u r c e s  
r e p o r t e d l y  commented  t h a t  a l l  m a j o r  p r o p o s a l s  h a d  b e e n  o p p o s e d
L
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by one or more of the delegations. Although they met until
2.00 a.m. of the day that the ministerial meeting commenced, 
the officials apparently still failed to reach agreement on 
many substantive issues.24. These disagreements were not 
resolved by the ministerial meeting. Rajaratnam acknowledged 
that it was "no secret that differences of view exist within 
ASEAN about the pace of economic cooperation. Some of us feel 
the Bali Declaration should contain very concrete proposals as 
to how far and in what direction ASEAN cooperation will 
move."25.
The Far Eastern Economic Review commented that the 
failure of ASEAN ministers during their meeting at Pattaya to 
reach agreement on several issues underlined for some 
observers that ASEAN was "still little more than a weak 
association of anti-communist regimes whose mutual differences 
and conflicts of interest outweigh any impetus towards real 
cooperation and unity."26.  ^new regional weekly, ASEAN 
Review, predicted that it seemed "quite unlikely that the 
Bali summit meeting of this five-nation grouping will achieve 
anything tangible. Observers note that attitudes among the 
five on major issues have been so much at variance with one 
another that consensus - the unwritten rule of ASEAN - is 
doubtful to be arrived at."27.
Differences were not resolved during the subsequent 
officials meeting in Jakarta on 18-19 February. Observers 
reported that negotiations were at a "difficult and tense 
stage" and that there had been some "very frank exchanges" 
which had at one stage necessitated a half-hour adjournment to
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9 ft"cool things down". ° m Some sources reported that the 
differences were vital and of a "make-or-break" nature.29. 
After the conclusion of the Bali heads of government meeting 
an Indonesian official acknowledged that some complicated 
problems had only been resolved on the evening prior to the 
summit. In fact it appears that negotiations continued into 
the following morning until just prior to the opening session. 
Journalists commented that at the conclusion of these 
negotiations ASEAN officials were smiling broadly for the 
first time since their arrival at the summit venue.^0-
Two of the heads of government, Suharto and Lee, 
referred during the opening session to disagreements between 
members prior to the summit. Both played down the significance 
of these disagreements. Suharto did not see why differences of 
view should be noted as "disappointing". He claimed that they 
merely indicated "that our minds remain active and our 
conceptions are developing prior to reaching a common 
consensus." Lee Kuan Yew discussed the difficulties 
encountered in pre-summit negotiations at greater length. He 
noted that: "Extensive, at times intense, discussions have 
preceded this meeting. Agreements have not come easily. Though 
we are all agreed on ultimate objectives, it has been 
difficult to get agreements on the next few steps. Many 
domestic economic interests, and several different ideas of 
how to get constructive relations with new governments in the 
region, have temporarily clouded fundamental issues." He 
claimed that healthy argument on ways and means to achieve 
agreed goals was "a sign of vigorous life in the ASEAN 
organization." He had been surprised that "on the eve of the
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m e e t i n g ,  f u l l  a c c o r d  h a d  n o t  b e e n  r e a c h e d " ,  b e c a u s e  he  h a d  
b e l i e v e d  " t h a t  t h e  s a l u b r i o u s  a i r  i n  B a l i  w o u l d  h a v e  a 
s o o t h i n g  e f f e c t  on h a r a s s e d  o f f i c i a l s  and  r u f f l e d  M i n i s t e r s . "  
He r e p o r t e d l y  d r e w  a p p l a u s e  when he s t a t e d  t h a t  on h i s  a r r i v a l  
i n  B a l i  he  h a d  d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  i t  was  t h e  " c a l m  a n d  w i s e  
c o u n s e l "  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  i n f u s e d  by P r e s i d e n t  S u h a r t o  t h a t  h a d  
r e s o l v e d  o u t s t a n d i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e f o r e  t h e  h e a d s  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  a r r i v e d  a t  t h e  s ummi t  v e n u e . 31-  Comment ing  a f t e r  
t h e  s u m m i t ,  M a r c o s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  he  h a d  b e e n  f e a r f u l  t h a t  i t  
" w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  a d e b a c l e  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  
p o s i t i o n s  on a n u mb er  o f  i s s u e s " .  H u s s e i n  Onn a c k n o w l e d g e d  
t h a t  i t  was  "no s e c r e t "  t h a t  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  " m a r ke d  f r a n k n e s s  
a nd  e v e n  c o n t r o v e r s y "  p r i o r  t o  t h e  s u m m i t ,  b u t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h i s  
a g o o d  t h i n g  b e c a u s e  ASEAN c o u l d  o n l y  p r o g r e s s  by  f a c i n g  up t o  
r e a 1 i t i e s . 3 2 .
An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  e a c h  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  on w h i c h  ASEAN 
member s  d i s a g r e e d  w i l l  a s s i s t  t o  f o r m  a more  o b j e c t i v e  
a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s ummi t  a n d  o f  t h e  
d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  i t  s a t i s f i e d  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  e a c h  c o u n t r y .
E c on o mi c  I s s u e s
As n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  ASEAN l e a d e r s  h a d  r e a l i z e d  l o n g  b e f o r e  
t h e  B a l i  s ummi t  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  t o  be t a k e n  
s e r i o u s l y  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r e n a  i t  w o u l d  be  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  
c r e d i b l e  p r o g r e s s  t o  be  made t o w a r d s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  g o a l s  w h i c h  
o s t e n s i b l y  w e r e  i t s  p r i m a r y  r a t i o n a l e .  As R a j a r a t n a m  p u t  i t  a t  
t h e  S e v e n t h  M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g :  " I  am a w a r e  t h a t  e c o n o m i c s  i s  
n o t  a l l  t h a t  m a t t e r s .  Bu t  u n l e s s  we a r e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  v i a b l e
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other countries will listen to us with great politeness but 
with very little else."33. Others lamented that there was 
not a sufficiently strong political will in the ASEAN
countries to initiate movement towards economic 
integration.34. This soon became a familiar theme.
From the moment, however, that ASEAN officials began to 
look seriously at measures that could potentially lead to 
major progress in the scope of ASEAN economic cooperation, the 
obstacles to such cooperation began also to come to the fore. 
The competing pressures arising from national versus regional 
economic objectives, and the problems stemming from the 
priority usually given to the former, were stressed by 
President Suharto at the First Meeting of ASEAN Economic 
Ministers in November 1975. He enjoined ASEAN members to adopt 
’’pragmatic approaches" to economic cooperation that would take 
account of the differences in their stages of development. He 
thought that such cooperation should facilitate "national as 
well as regional resilience" and that ministers should not 
"come forward with expectations which are difficult or not 
feasibile to be carried out within a relatively short 
period."
It was apparent, on reflection, that in the process of 
moving towards economic development on a genuinely regional 
basis, some ASEAN members would benefit more than others. 
Thanat Khoman noted that the "traditional thinking" of ASEAN 
members had been "to balance the net gain" so as to distribute 
the benefit equally amongst members, and that this had 
hampered the negotiating process. He noted that without
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flexibility, in which it was accepted that losses in one area
would be compensated by gains in another, the task would be 
impossible. Singapore was the ASEAN member that had 
potentially most to gain from regional economic development, 
as it had achieved the fastest rate of growth in the region. 
Thanat questioned whether other ASEAN members would open up 
their markets merely to serve Singapore's aspiration to become 
the supplier of manufactured goods to its neighbours while 
using their raw materia1s .35 •
Most ASEAN economic analysts appeared to agree with the 
opinion expressed by Malaysia's Lin See-yan that to date 
ASEAN's achievements in economic cooperation had involved 
"relatively quite unimportant matters", and been "limited in 
the issues that matter to lots of consultation and approaches 
but little else in concrete results". Lin drew attention to 
other obstacles to economic cooperation such as the fact that 
most ASEAN countries were competitors in the export of primary 
commodities, that their domestic markets were often highly 
protected, and that they looked primarily to other countries, 
especially the United States, Europe and Japan, for their 
export markets. For these reasons there was a widespread 
distrust of "regionalism". In spite of all these obstacles, 
however, Lin, and many other ASEAN analysts, believed that 
economic cooperation, if properly approached, had a positive 
role to play.36.
Singapore and the Philippines were the most vocal in 
their enthusiasm for more ambitious steps towards economic 
cooperation. In recognition of the caution displayed by other
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ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, they conceded that 
progress would necessarily be incremental. Lee Kuan Yew stated 
that the extension of economic cooperation had be "gradual"
and "step by step". "There can be no waving of the magic wand 
and together we are in the common market."37. Nevertheless, 
both Singapore and the Philippines frequently called for a 
maximum effort to achieve agreement on new cooperative 
measures in the economic field. Rajaratnam expressed the hope 
that at Bali the ASEAN countries would "come forward with very 
realistic, convincing and rational proposals to enable ASEAN 
to take an important step toward development of a vigorous 
regional economy."20-
Press reports identified Indonesia as the biggest 
stumbling block to agreement on economic cooperation. Harvey 
Stockwin spoke of "growing disappointment that Jakarta is 
dragging its feet" on economic cooperation. He attributed 
Indonesia's caution to its problems with its own economy. 
Malaysia and Thailand may have had reservations about the 
scope and pace of ASEAN economic cooperation advocated by 
Singapore and the Philippines, but they nevertheless favoured 
major new initiatives. In his opening address to the Bali 
summit, Hussein Onn described economic cooperation as "the 
most vital area of ASEAN endeavour" and as the factor that had 
led to ASEAN’s formation. He argued that national and regional 
economic activities were not "mutually exclusive", but that 
they "complement and reinforce each other". Kukrit stated that 
Thailand would be willing to consider and endorse any measures 
which would "raise the level and widen the area of economic
cooperation".
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The m e a g r e  p r o g r e s s  t h a t  was  a c h i e v e d  a t  t h e  B a l l  summi t  
i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t i o n  was  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  
t i r e d  p h r a s e o l o g y  o f  t h e  j o i n t  p r e s s  communique  i s s u e d  a t  t h e  
s u m m i t ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  w h i c h  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  m e e t i n g  h a d  d i s c u s s e d  
ways  a n d  m e a n s  o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  c o o p e r a t i o n  among member  
s t a t e s .  T h e y  b e l i e v e d  i t  was  " e s s e n t i a l "  f o r  t h e m  t o  move t o  
" h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n " ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
f i e l d .  The  communique  f u r t h e r  n o t e d  t h a t  " i n  p u r s u a n c e  o f  
t h e i r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  f o r g e  c l o s e r  e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t i o n "  t h e y  
h a d  a g r e e d  t h a t  a m e e t i n g  o f  e c o n o m i c  m i n i s t e r s  be  c o n v e n e d  i n  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m o n t h  " t o  c o n s i d e r  m e a s u r e s  t o  be  t a k e n  t o w a r d s  
i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  M e e t i n g  o f  ASEAN H e a d s  o f  
G o v e r n m e n t  on  m a t t e r s  o f  e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t i o n " .  The f o l l o w i n g  
a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  a r o s e  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  
a r e a s  w h e r e  m a j o r  new m e a s u r e s  f o r  e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t i o n  h a d  
b e e n  p r o p o s e d .
( a ) T r a d e
M e a s u r e s  t o  p r o m o t e  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  i n t r a - A S E A N  t r a d e  
h a d  b e e n  o n e  o f  t h e  m a j o r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  U.N.  R e p o r t .  
A l t h o u g h  e s t i m a t e s  v a r i e d  w i d e l y ,  i n t r a - A S E A N  t r a d e  was  
b e l i e v e d  t o  c o m p r i s e  o n l y  15 p e r c e n t  o r  l e s s  o f  t o t a l  ASEAN 
t r a d e ,  a n d  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  was  b e l i e v e d  t o  be  d e c l i n i n g .  Some 
ASEAN d e c l i n i n g .  Some ASEAN members  saw g r e a t  s c o p e  i n  t h i s  
a r e a .  The  P h i l i p p i n e s  h a d  on s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s  m o o t e d  t h e  i d e a  
o f  an  ASEAN f r e e  t r a d e  z o n e  o r  common m a r k e t .  At t h e  ASEAN 
s e n i o r  o f f i c i a l s  m e e t i n g  i n  m i d - S e p t e m b e r  1 97 5 ,  t h e  
P h i l i p p i n e s  was  e x p e c t e d  t o  s u b m i t  a p a p e r  a d v o c a t i n g  a common 
m a r k e t  a n d  f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a s  w i t h i n  ASEAN.^ 9 .  I t  was  a l s o
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r e p o r t e d ,  p e r h a p s  o p t i m i s t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  o f f i c i a l s  w e r e  
u n d e r s t o o d  t o  h a v e  a g r e e d  on d r a f t  p r o p o s a l s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a 
f r e e  t r a d e  z o n e ,  s t a r t i n g  w i t h  m u t u a l  c u t s  o f  a b o u t  10 p e r c e n t  
a n d  w i t h  t h e  u l t i m a t e  a i m o f  s e t t i n g  up a common m a r k e t . 4 0 .
Lee  Kuan Yew a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  a common m a r k e t ,  i m p l y i n g  
i m m e d i a t e  f r e e  m o b i l i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  l a b o u r  w i t h i n  ASEAN, 
wa s  n o t  f e a s i b l e .  B u t  he  t h o u g h t  t h a t  ASEAN c o u l d  move t o w a r d s  
a d o p t i o n  o f  a f r e e  t r a d e  z o n e .  He b e l i e v e d  t h a t  s u c h  a z o n e  
was  a " d i s t i n c t  p o s s i b i l i t y "  w i t h i n  s e v e n  t o  t e n  y e a r s  b e c a u s e  
i t  w o u l d  be a p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  e c o n o m i e s  o f  
s c a l e .41•
The  f r e e  t r a d e  z o n e  p r o p o s a l  was  c o n s i d e r e d  by t h e  ASEAN 
e c o n o m i c  m i n i s t e r s  a t  t h e i r  f i r s t  m e e t i n g  i n  November  1 9 7 5 .  I n  
a n  a r t i c l e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  m e e t i n g ,  H a r v e y  S t o c k w i n  saw a 
" d i s t i n c t  l i k e l i h o o d "  t h a t  ASEAN h e a d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  
a g r e e  a t  t h e  f o r t h c o m i n g  summi t  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  an  ASEAN 
f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a .  He c i t e d  " a u t h o r i t i v e  s o u r c e s "  i n  t h r e e  o f  
t h e  f i v e  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s  who s a i d  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o g r e s s  
h a d  b e e n  made t o w a r d s  t h i s  e n d . 4 2 .  s t o c k w i n  a c k n o w l e d g e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  p r o b l e m s  c o n f r o n t i n g  ASEAN t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ,  s u c h  a s  " t h e  a c t u a l  a n d  p e r c e i v e d  p o s i t i o n  o f  
S i n g a p o r e ,  t h e  i n h i b i t i o n s  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  w h o l e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
r e g i o n a l  ' r e l a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e ' " ,  b u t  he  t h o u g h t  t h e r e  was  " an  
ASEAN p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  t o  move f o r w a r d " . 43-
ASEAN a c a d e m i c  e c o n o m i s t s  p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  i n  
s t i m u l a t i n g  p u b l i c  d e b a t e  a b o u t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .  Mo s t  w e r e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  a m b i t i o u s  
m e a s u r e s ,  t h o u g h  s t a r t i n g  on a s m a l l  s c a l e .  An i t e m - b y - i t e m
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approach was thought to be the most realistic, but a target 
date for achievement of a free trade zone was supported.44• 
ASEAN economists generally argued also that the differences in 
the tariff structures and rates of development of the ASEAN 
countries need not be a barrier to trade liberalization.45- 
An Indonesian economist, J. Panglaykim, argued that tariff 
reductions need not be detrimental to any one ASEAN member if 
implemented on a selective basis and within a reasonable 
time-frame.4®■
Despite such positive appraisals, it soon became 
apparent to most insiders and informed observers that 
Indonesia's strong reservations about any rapid movement 
towards trade liberalization were a major obstacle. In another 
lengthy article in January 1976, titled "Indonesia:
Frustrating ASEAN Ambitions", Harvey Stockwin concluded that 
although momentum towards economic cooperation had been built 
up late in 1975, 1976 now looked like being a disappointing 
year for ASEAN.4  ^• He asserted that at Indonesian insistance 
progress towards an ASEAN free trade zone had come "to a 
grinding halt", creating "deep-seated doubts in some 
influential minds" about ASEAN's future. "Several sources", 
according to Stockwin, reported that one Indonesian official 
had asserted that Indonesia would not be interested in an 
ASEAN free trade zone "in 100 years". A technocrat reportedly 
had stated that Indonesia's industries needed more protection, 
not less.4®- Despite suggestions that Indonesia could be 
compensated for its expected disadvantage in an ASEAN free 
trade zone, its opposition did not soften.4 -^ Adam Malik 
claimed that a consensus had been reached at the meeting of
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economic ministers "that free trade will be the last objective 
for the progress of ASEAN." Lee Kuan Yew, he observed, was "a 
salesman" who wanted a free trade zone "so that all his goods 
can enter Indonesia with its population of 130 million people, 
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines".
Singapore was not so daunted by Indonesia's opposition 
to the free trade zone proposal as to cease expressing its own 
support for it. On his arrival in Pattaya for the February 
1976 foreign ministers meeting, Rajaratnam told the press that 
he thought ASEAN should be integrated as a free trade area, 
following the example of the European common market. He 
claimed that ASEAN would have to move quickly to keep ahead of 
the likely pace of economic integration in Indochina.^0• The 
meeting appeared to result only in an ill-defined 
understanding that a compromise of some sort had to be found 
in the area of trade cooperation. General agreement was 
reportedly reached on a vague resolution favouring gradual 
lowering of tariffs, beginning on a selective basis.^1- At 
the end of the meeting Rajaratnam told reporters that 
Singapore and the Philippines had agreed that the "basic 
foundation" of a geniune ASEAN regional community would be the 
setting up of a free trade area. Singapore, he said, was 
prepared to "go all the way". He conceded that a free trade 
area was "not immediately feasible" due to Indonesia’s 
opposition, but urged that "steps, small but not 
insignificant, should be taken to move towards eventual 
regional economic entity."52. Marcos reportedly stated at 
this time that the idea of preferential trade agreements in 
place of a free trade zone had been put forward by Malaysia,
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53probably at Indonesia's behest.
Speaking to reporters at Singapore airport before 
leaving for Bali Rajaratnam said he was sure "some sort of 
working agreement" could be reached on the question of 
preferential trade, "providing everybody agrees not to have 
things all his own way". If officials could not agree the 
foreign ministers would have to "have a go".54. On his 
arrival in Bali, Rajaratnam said that Singapore had agreed not 
to raise the free trade proposal in exchange for Indonesia’s 
support for cooperation in the industrial area, including the 
concept of joint industrial projects. 5^. a Straits Times 
editorial commented that Singapore and the Philippines had 
given a practical demonstration of the "ASEAN spirit" by 
giving way on the free trade issue and by their willingness to 
look into other areas of economic and industrial cooperation. 
Pre-summit discussions, the editorial stated, "seem to have 
sketched in a compromise formula, which includes preferential 
tariff cuts on certain products".^6• Malaysia supported 
Indonesia's opposition to a free trade zone. Trade and 
Industry Minister Datuk Hamzah said that such a zone would be 
suicidal for Indonesia - it would kill its growing domestic 
industry.5?•
It is not surprising, in view of the discord caused by 
disagreement on the future direction of trade cooperation, 
that Suharto in his opening address to the Bali summit 
emphasized the need for harmony, especially "harmony between 
mutual benefit and that of each individual member state". In 
developing economic cooperation he felt that ASEAN should
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"select areas and. methods which are mutually beneficial. And 
certainly not the contrary. The levels of our economic growth 
are not the same." Lee Kuan Yew for his part observed that: 
"Many domestic economic interests" had "temporarily clouded 
fundamental issues". Other ASEAN heads of government avoided 
mention of this contentious subject. On his departure from 
Bali, however, Marcos told journalists that the inability to 
agree on a free trade area had been the principal area of 
disagreement at the summit.58-
The major outcome of the Bali summit in the area of 
trade cooperation was a direction that the economic ministers 
would discuss the matter further at their next meeting. The 
joint press communique stated that the economic ministers 
would discuss the "instruments to be employed in preferential 
trading arrangements to facilitate the expansion of trade 
among ASEAN member states in basic commodities, particularly 
in food and energy and the products of ASEAN industrial 
projects." At the conclusion of the summit a New Straits 
Times editorial praised the outcome of deliberations about 
the desirability of a free trade zone as a vindication of the 
soundness of ASEAN's emphasis on consensus. To have agreed at 
that time to a free trade zone would, it was argued, have been 
premature given the disparities between ASEAN members.^- 
Lee Kuan Yew noted that realism had caused Singapore to 
withdraw its free trade proposal in favour of the Indonesian 
proposal for preferential trading agreements, but he wondered 
whether he would ever witness the implementation of an ASEAN 
free trade zone because he would not live to be one hundred 
years.^ 0•
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In summary, the free trade Issue was a deeply divisive 
one. Progress in reaching agreement on new initiatives in this 
area was minimal. Instead, lingering suspicions were created. 
Indonesians and others suspected that Singapore was prepared 
to use ASEAN to push aggressively for its own economic 
self-interest regardless of the consequences for other 
members, while Singaporeans, Filipinos and others suspected 
that Indonesia, with the support of Malaysia, lacked 
sufficient commitment to regional economic cooperation to put 
aside narrowly-conceived notions of national interest.
However, efforts to promote regional economic cooperation 
continued thereafter. Many ASEAN leaders, officials and 
businessmen continued to believe that a regional economic 
community was a worthwhile goal; others saw at least the 
appearance of progress in economic cooperation as a political 
necessity. But after the Bali summit ASEAN planners had a much 
more realistic and modest estimation of what was likely to be 
achievable. This realism was based not only on a more 
pragmatic assessment of the enduring importance of national 
versus regional interests, but also on a more sophisticated 
realization by ASEAN economists that "quick fixes" such as a 
free trade zone were too disruptive and unpredictable in their 
effects to be acceptable to member-countries. Efforts came to 
be focussed instead on measures where the distribution of 
benefits was likely to be more easy to calculate and where 
vested interests were less likely to be upset. At first sight 
the second major recommendation of the U.N. Report, the 
setting up of joint industrial projects, probably seemed more 
likely to fit these requirements.
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(b ) Joint Industrial Projects
The U.N. Report's recommendation that ASEAN should 
support the establishment of joint industrial projects whose 
products would be marketed on a privileged basis in all five 
countries, initially received little public mention in 
pre-summit deliberations. Lee Kuan Yew was one of the first to 
endorse this approach in remarks to visiting financial 
journalists at the end of October 1975. He mentioned the 
recommendation of the U.N. team for projects in areas such as 
steel and petrochemicals where different sectors of these 
industries were allocated to different countries. Lee thought 
that this was "a distinct possibility" because economies of 
scale were necessary for such enterprises to be 
s u c c e s s f u l • Suharto gave some prominence to the concept 
in his speech to the economic ministers meeting. He noted that 
intensive study would be required as to the type, size, 
location and raw material supply of such projects.62. ASEAN 
businessmen also displayed interest in regionally-based 
industries.63. ASEAN economists, however, showed mixed 
enthusiasm for regional industrial projects. Potential 
problems as well as benefits were anticipated, especially 
difficulties in deciding the allocation of projects and in 
ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits. The economic 
feasibility of such projects was also questioned.64-
Agreement to pursue the implementation of joint 
industrial projects appeared to gain momentum following the 
talks between ASEAN heads of government attending the Razak
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funeral. Projects mooted were a petrochemical plant in 
Singapore, a newsprint mill in Indonesia, and a fertilizer 
plant in Malaysia or the Philippines.^- interest in such 
projects increased further, as already noted, following the 
deadlock on the free trade proposal. Indonesia became publicly 
identified as the chief proponent of cooperation in this area, 
but other reports suggest that it may have presented this 
option without great enthusiasm. Singapore reportedly 
nominated a major new petrochemical project under negotiation 
with Sumitomo of Japan as its ASEAN industry.^6 .
Joint industrial projects were endorsed in principle in 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. The joint press communique 
issued following the summit also agreed that the economic 
ministers should discuss the "formulation of appropriate 
measures for initiating cooperative action towards 
establishing ASEAN large-scale industrial projects. Examples 
of some of the ASEAN industrial projects that could be 
considered by the Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers are 
urea, superphosphates, potash, petrochemicals, steel, soda 
ash, newsprint and rubber products."
One commentator noted after the summit that the decision 
to proceed with joint industrial projects was taken "rather 
hurriedly for the purpose of showing that something solid was 
achieved at the summit" and with very little preliminary 
study.67- This observation may well have been accurate.
ASEAN's leaders probably did not anticipate the full range of 
difficulties inherent in establishing such projects. Given 
that vested interests had obstructed progress in the area of
164
trade liberalization, it probably became almost imperative to 
endorse this second major recommendation of the U.N. Report. 
Nevertheless, the commitment to joint industrial projects 
deserves recognition as one of the major achievements of the 
summit. It showed at least a willingness on the part of 
ASEAN's leaders to pursue economic cooperation in a major new 
area, even though it was later to prove difficult to translate 
those good intentions into reality.
(c) Other economic issues
In a proposal closely related to the joint industrial 
projects, the U.N. Report had also suggested ASEAN cooperation 
in the negotiation of industrial complementation agreements. 
Under this concept ASEAN countries would agree to the 
distribution between themselves of exclusive rights to 
manufacture particular industrial components, in a 
complementary way. The Philippines sought to encourage 
industrial complementation agreements in the steel industry, 
and also proposed complementation in the metal, machine tool, 
chemicals, automotive and footwear industries.®®- Modest 
progress was made in this area during the period leading up to 
the Bali summit, but it did not receive much emphasis, perhaps 
because it was recognised that in this area the initiative lay 
primarily with the private sector, and also because 
achievements would in most cases inevitably be modest.
An aspect of economic cooperation which did receive 
emphasis was the proposal that ASEAN should cooperate in the 
areas of food and energy. Suharto suggested that in view of
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the world economic crisis in food, cooperation in the supply 
and production of staple food products should be accelerated 
in order to promote self-sufficiency. He added that the energy 
crisis illustrated the need for similar cooperation in the 
supply and production of energy. Suharto hoped that the 
economic ministers would formulate "concrete measures" that 
could be undertaken "immediately". Romulo claimed after the 
Pattaya foreign ministers meeting that agreement would be 
reached that ASEAN members would receive "priority attention 
in times of scarcity from the ASEAN countries with abundant 
energy and food supplies."69. However, this proposal did not 
in fact receive much more support on this occasion than it did 
when it had been put forward earlier. Indonesia warned that it 
would have difficulty in selling petroleum at preferential 
prices. Although cooperation in food and energy was 
highlighted in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, this was in 
the context of exhortation and general principle rather than 
specific measures.
Political Issues
As planning for the Bali summit progressed, ASEAN's 
leaders appeared to recognize that the organization's 
political role could no longer be realistically ignored. With 
the enhancement of Vietnam's political prestige following its 
victories in Indochina, ASEAN leaders perceived that the 
Association could play a valuable role in counteracting 
Vietnam's political influence in Southeast Asia and in 
enhancing ASEAN's international standing generally. Such 
considerations were undoubtedly a major, if not the major.
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motivation behind the proposal to hold a summit. The decision
to formally acknowledge ASEAN's political role therefore 
attracted none of the controversy amongst ASEAN's members that 
surrounded proposals to involve the Association in security 
matters, even thought for presentational purposes some ASEAN 
leaders still preferred to emphasize ASEAN's primary 
orientation towards economic cooperation. It is significant 
that amongst the several areas of cooperation listed in the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord the political area was listed 
first.
(a) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
The most evident political achievement of the Bali 
summit was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia. When Suharto and Kukrit met in June 1975 they expressed 
the view that a "speedy conclusion" of the Treaty would 
provide "the basic guidelines governing the relationship among 
countries in the region of Southeast Asia."^^' Details of 
the draft Treaty were reportedly "refined" at the Pattaya 
foreign ministers meeting. This process of refinement was 
apparently impeded, however, by continued Malaysian uneasiness 
that the dispute settlement machinery in the Treaty would be 
used by the Philippines, the main architect of the Treaty, to 
revive its claim to Sabah. Rajaratnam noted that 
"clarification" of the Treaty would still be required. The 
issue was "complicated", he said.^l-
The issue was apparently so complicated that an impasse 
was reached which had not been resolved when officials and
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ministers arrived in Bali to make final preparations for the 
summit. It proved to be the most intractable and 
time-consuming issue to be dealt with at the summit. When 
Romulo was asked after his arrival about the Treaty, he 
replied that his chief "would sack him" if he disclosed the 
details. Rithauddeen commented that ASEAN should continue to 
work on the basis of consensus. Other reports suggested that 
this was a reference to Malaysia's objection to the absence in 
the Treaty of a reference which would make it clear that 
before proceeding to the arbitration of disputes, it would be 
necessary that all parties involved should consent to such 
arbitration. Arbitration would not be automatic. Malaysia also 
wanted the Treaty to apply only to future disputes, not 
existing or past disputes. Malaysia's concern evidently had 
arisen from a press conference by Marcos during which he said 
the Philippine claim to Sabah was "completely at a 
standstill", but he immediately went on to add that he hoped 
that ASEAN would arrive at a mechanism for the settlement of 
border disputes. According to Michael Richardson, the 
Malaysian cabinet reacted by instructing its officials to seek 
safeguards in the Treaty. 2^.
Two days of officials talks on the Treaty issue on 18 
and 19 February reportedly ended without a solution. Several 
commentators observed that the Treaty might not be concluded 
at the summit and that the disagreement threatened the success 
of the summit.^3- Officials were said to have worked late 
into the night on 20 February to resolve the differences but 
still without success.^- It was reported that Romulo 
telephoned Marcos during the foreign ministers meeting on 21
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February for further Instructions. New instruct ions from
Marcos led to "major progress". The Philippines apparently 
dropped its insistence on automatic arbitration of all 
disputes. However, Malaysia insisted that the consensus 
principle had to be spelt out. Discussions again continued 
into the evening, concluding at 1.00 am. A compromise solution 
was reached in which the Philippines accepted the principle of 
consensus for the settlement of disputes. This was apparently 
not the end of the matter, however. Marcos told a press 
conference that "only one or two difficult passages" remained 
to be settled. "Whatever is not settled, we (heads of 
government) will settle them. I have no doubt we will sign the 
treaty."75. gn^ e foreign ministers spent a further two hours 
on 22 February trying unsuccessfully to settle this 
controversial matter. It was reportedly not until the morning 
of 23 February, "virtually with minutes to spare" before the 
opening session of the summit that the issue was finally 
resolved, with Rajaratnam as intermediary. Rajaratnam, looking 
"tired but relieved", told the press that the problem was 
solved by a last minute change of heart and by compromise on 
both s i d e s . • The crucial compromise involved Article 16 of 
the Treaty which stipulated that the provisions of the Treaty 
regarding the settlement of disputes would not apply "unless 
all parties to the dispute agr.ee to their application to that 
dispute". This satisfied the Malaysian requirement. The 
remainder of Article 16 softened the blow for the Philippines 
by stating that this would not preclude the other High 
Contracting Parties from offering "all possible assistance" to 
settle the dispute and that the parties to the dispute should 
be "well disposed" to such offers of assistance. There was
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still some substance, however, to claims that the "teeth" of 
the dispute settlement provisions had been removed.77 •
It is difficult to assess what impact the prolonged and 
no doubt frustrating negotiations over the Treaty had on the 
participants. The Treaty was regarded by ASEAN members as a 
significant achievement in spite of its difficult birth and 
the fact that in most areas it said little that was really 
new, with the exception of course of its watered-down dispute 
settlement provisions. Even Rithauddeen remarked that the fact 
that ASEAN members were prepared to enter into "an agreement 
of such long-range impact and significance" augured well for 
the future.78- But while the end result may have been 
commendable, it seems likely that the controversy deepened 
existing suspicions and tensions between Malaysia and the 
Philippines. It demonstrated the fragility of ASEAN unity and 
solidarity.
(b) Neutralization
Romulo commented that the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation was a first step towards attainment of a zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality, since such a zone was 
"self-contradicting unless we can first set our own house in 
order". Nevertheless, Malaysia was probably piqued by the fact 
that progress on a "blueprint" for the neutralization of 
Southeast Asia stalled after the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in 
favour of progress on the Philippines-sponsored Treaty. When 
the summit proposal was first mooted, Tun Razak was reported 
to feel that a summit would only be justified if it included
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the finalization of the neutralization plan. Ghazali 
Shafie observed that if the dynamics of national and regional 
resilience could be made operative, a "Zonal Neutrality 
System" or a "PAX ASEANA" could be brought into being. He 
added optimistically that the blueprint worked out by ASEAN 
officials was "almost complete" and that he had no doubt that 
ASEAN members would give "expeditious consideration" to its 
recommendations. Razak stated his belief that the latest 
developments in Indochina had made the zone of peace proposal 
"more relevant that before" and that the lessons of the 
Vietnam War would give "additional impetus to the speedy 
realization of the neutralization of Southeast Asia."^* 
Ghazali asserted that a neutrality system was already taking 
shape in a de facto sense and that the only question was 
whether it would "eventuate spontaneously, or be 
institutionalized by collective agreement. "83- •
The neutralization proposal was reportedly discussed at 
the September 1975 senior officials meeting and again at a 
further such meeting in Kuala Lumpur in mid-November. The 
latter meeting considered a "progress report" on the 
neutralization concept. At the end of the meeting Malaysia's 
Foreign Secretary, Zaiton Ibrahim, who chaired the meeting, 
told journalists that officials had cleared outstanding 
aspects of a conceptual framework for the proposal.
"Conference sources" claimed that the key portion on 
implementation had been tackled successfully. .  This 
appeared to be an exaggeration, however. Singapore was clearly 
still unenthusiastic. In an interview at this time Lee Kuan 
Yew said that it was "an exercise in futility" to say: "Big
79 .
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powers, all go away." He acknowledged that the zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality concept as a "long-term hope" had a 
"positive psychological effect", but he added: "we are all 
more exercised by the immediate and intermediate problems 
which must be solved before we reach that happy state of peace 
and tranqui1ity."83. Rajaratnam described the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration as "like the Ten Commandments for ASEAN". He 
explained: "as you know, the ten commandments have been with
the Christians for thousands of years and their intent still 
has not been completely fulfilled."®^-
Just prior to the Bali summit, some optimistic reports 
appeared about the prospects for the summit to give impetus to 
the neutralization proposal. It was anticipated that the 
summit would call on the major powers to respect the zone and 
provide guarantees. Drafting of the proposal was said to have 
reached "an advanced stage". Even Singapore was reported to 
have made a reassessment. These reports proved again to be 
exaggerated. Lee was apparently angered by media reports that 
he had endorsed the neutralization proposal.^5 . The proposal 
in fact received only limited encouragement from the summit. 
The joint communique stated that the heads of government had 
"expressed their satisfaction with the progress made in the 
efforts to draw up initially necessary steps to secure the 
recognition of and respect for the Zone." They directed that 
these efforts "should be continued in order to realize its 
early establishment."
Despite the absence of any tangible achievement in this 
area, ASEAN leaders expressed their satisfaction during the
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public sessions of the summit with the progress that had been
made. Progress on the proposal at the time of the Bali summit 
and thereafter was impeded less by lack of support from other 
ASEAN members, although this was certainly still a factor, 
than by the fact that the acceptance and support of other 
countries was required before implementation could proceed.
The summit was significant for the neutralization proposal in 
that at long last overall agreement appeared to have been 
reached on the essential details of the proposal, but this was 
a hollow accomplishment in view of the fact that international 
realities made it impossible, for the foreseeable future, to 
put the proposal into effect or even to disclose the details 
of the final "blueprint" publicly.86.
Security
During the period before the Bali summit it appeared 
that some ASEAN continued to entertain the notion that the 
Association might adopt a direct role in promoting security 
cooperation between its members. Speculation continued about 
differences between the ASEAN countries on the question of 
ASEAN military cooperation. According to some journalists, 
there was a "growing impression" that security was becoming 
the major issue in preparations for the summit. As noted 
previously, Indonesia allegedly favoured such cooperation, 
with support from the Philippines. If so, however, they 
evidently encountered considerable opposition. The other ASEAN 
countries were reportedly "cagey" and unwilling to offend 
Vietnam by such a move.^ ■ Kukrit reportedly told the press 
on one occasion that military cooperation would not be
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discussed at Bali because ASEAN was not a military 
organization. On another occasion he voiced opposition to 
ASEAN becoming a military organization, "either bilateral or 
otherwise". •  So far as Singapore was concerned, Lee Kuan 
Yew remarked on several occasions that economic cooperation 
had to come first, followed by political and diplomatic 
coordination, and then cooperation was possible in "other 
fields".89- Even the Philippines appeared to develop 
reservations. Asked if ASEAN would form a military bloc,
Romulo described this as a "complete misconception". "We did 
not phase out SEATO in order to set up another one."90- 
Marcos told an interviewer that he did not believe in military 
pacts and thought it "best for everyone for all the leaders 
right now to talk about economic cooperation" since there 
could be no security without economic development and he did 
not foresee any external aggression.91• Hussein Onn, 
continued to state Malaysia's opposition to an ASEAN military 
alliance, but he conceded after talks with Suharto at the end 
of January 1976 that this would not preclude the summit 
reaching "a common platform on security matters as a 
whole".92.
The security issue was raised again in coverage of the 
Pattaya foreign ministers meeting in early February. It was 
reported that the Indonesian delegation, with the support of 
the Singapore delegation, had pushed strongly for including 
security on the agenda and, moreover, that Indonesia was 
making a "determined bid to persuade the forthcoming ASEAN 
summit in Bali to agree to some sort of a defence and security 
cooperation among member nations." "ASEAN sources" reportedly
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stated that Malik had raised the bogey of Vietnam to pressure
officials to put defence and security cooperation on the top 
of the agenda for the foreign ministers. The large Indonesian 
delegation was reported to include four senior military and 
intelligence officers. However, the same sources stated that 
the Indonesian move had met with a cool response from the 
other ASEAN countries, who continued to emphasize publicly and 
privately that they did not want ASEAN to become a military 
pact.93. Thailand was particularly outspoken in its 
opposition. Kukrit said it was "impossible" that the summit 
would adopt a plan for ASEAN to become a military grouping, 
and that if there was aggression against an ASEAN country each 
country must fend for itself.
It would appear that these dissenting voices had their 
effect. On his arrival in Bangkok for the Pattaya meeting, 
Malik told the press that he saw "no urgency" for defence 
cooperation "and we have no intentions in this direction 
either." He said that the notion that Indonesia would go to 
the Bali summit proposing some kind of military arrangement 
amongst ASEAN members was erroneous. ASEAN members would 
discuss security problems from time to time but he expected no 
written defence agreement to emerge. Indonesia reportedly 
dropped its proposals for ASEAN security cooperation after 
other members pointed out that public opinion in their 
countries would not accept joint exercises at that stage. 
Romulo commented during the Pattaya meeting that military 
arrangements had always been "taboo" for ASEAN because it 
wanted peace in the region, not confrontation. After the 
meeting he said that complete agreement had been reached on
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the desirability of continuing security cooperation between 
ASEAN members, but the "general view" was that "security 
considerations should not be institutionalized on an ASEAN 
basis."94.
Very little is known publicly about discussions 
regarding security cooperation that may have taken place at 
the Bali summit. Journalists claimed that there was "broad 
agreement" that collaboration in security affairs would be 
low-profile, taking the form of an expansion of existing 
bilateral arrangements.95• As noted above, the main formal 
outcome on this issue at the summit was the statement in the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord that security cooperation between 
members would continue "on a non-ASEAN basis" and "in 
accordance with their mutual needs and interests". On his 
return to Jakarta from the summit Malik denied that a military 
pact had been discussed or that it would ever be taken up by 
ASEAN. He said that the idea had come from "outsiders".96.
Although security cooperation took a low profile at the 
summit, the speeches by the heads of government indicated that 
security concerns were nonetheless an important preoccupation. 
All except Kukrit touched on the subject. Suharto in his 
opening address asserted that it was "unrealistic" to speak of 
the future if one overlooked the security factor. In this 
context he made the interesting observation that "any eventual 
cooperation among us should not be regarded as something to 
frown upon." However, he made it clear that "we have no 
intention of establishing a military pact" and that 
cooperation between ASEAN members in the realm of security was
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not directed against any other parties. Hussein Onn made a
strong statement opposing ASEAN's involvement in military 
affairs. He emphasized that "ASEAN is not, nor should be, a 
security organization." He acknowledged that continued 
bilateral security cooperation was "both necessary and 
desirable" and that it should be intensified and expanded 
when and where necessary, but he believed it was important 
that such initiatives should be left to individual states 
"outside the purview of the organization". ASEAN should not be 
sidetracked from its "central purpose of promoting economic 
and socio-cultural cooperation in Southeast Asia". ASEAN 
remained, as Malaysia had asserted previously,
"non-ideologica 1, non-military, and non-antagonistic", serving 
the interest of "all of Southeast Asia". "Cooperation is its 
credo. Conflict is not its business." Marcos and Lee provided 
support for Malaysia's stance. Marcos said that ASEAN did not 
seek to become either a military alliance or a political bloc. 
As ASEAN could not control the military balance in Asia it 
should continue to concentrate on economic problems. Lee 
commented that with regard to regional peace and stability the 
basic question was how to ensure stability through economic 
development.
In summary, the communist victories in Indochina 
appeared to lead some parties in ASEAN to consider the 
desirability of seeking agreement during the summit for ASEAN 
to involve itself directly in the promotion of military 
cooperation. It emerged that there were apparently some ASEAN 
spokesmen, especially in Indonesia, who believed that short of 
a military pact there were a number of, as Ali Moertopo put
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it, "other alternatives" that ASEAN might in future wish to
encourage in the field of regional security cooperation.^- 
But the majority continued to be sceptical that such 
cooperation was warranted. The low level of external threat, 
the desire to avoid confrontation with Indochina, and the 
perception that ASEAN's traditional concentration on economic 
and political matters remained the most effective approach, 
led ASEAN's leaders to reject, at least for the time being, 
any move towards the overt involvement of ASEAN in this area, 
except perhaps in the indirect encouragement of bilateral 
security cooperation.98. The Bali summit was significant, 
however, for the fact that for the first time security 
cooperation was apparently raised formally for consideration 
as a legitimate concern for ASEAN.
Success or Failure?
The analysis above suggests that in terms of specific 
objectives and achievements the Bali summit was at best a very 
qualified success and, on a less generous assessment, a near 
failure. Several of its more ambitious goals - such as a free 
trade zone, a dispute settlement mechanism, and progress 
towards a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality - were either 
abandoned, compromised or postponed. The Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord was, for the most part, merely a statement of 
objectives or a listing of initiatives that were modest and 
incremental in nature. Many of the summit's accomplishments 
had been in preparation for a long period and were little 
advanced by the deliberations of the heads of government. The 
hard work required to implement new initiatives in the
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economic field, such as limited trade liberalization measures 
and joint industrial projects, was postponed. In this sense 
the summit was less of a turning point than a modest upturn in 
the continued slow evolution of ASEAN. In several areas, 
discussions had been characterized by a high degree of 
disunity and even acrimony, which in one or two cases 
threatened to disrupt the summit. There were many who shared 
this negative assessment. No doubt more frustration and 
disappointment was expressed privately than publicly. Western 
commentators noted the lack of concrete progress in the area 
of economic cooperation and that the hard decisions had been 
pushed into the future. The editor of the Far Eastern 
Economic Review observed that if the Bali summit had "caught 
the tide", it was on the basis of "wordy consensus rather than 
deed". The "compromise package" that had been produced had 
been "a product of anxiety that the summit should not be seen 
to fai1."99•
Yet considering its shortcomings, the summit received on 
the whole remarkably little criticism. Most of those who 
offered some negative comment balanced this by an equal or 
greater amount of praise. The Review editor, for example, 
went on to say that the increased controversy within ASEAN 
demonstrated that members were taking regional projects more 
seriously. Leading commentators on ASEAN developments like 
Michael Richardson and Harvey Stockwin gave a mixed assessment 
of the achievements of the Bali summit but the overall tone 
was positive. Immediately before the summit, Richardson felt 
that after eight and a half years of "significant if 
unspectacular achievement" ASEAN was in danger of stagnating
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unless It made a greater effort to realize Its potential. He
thought that there had been such sharp divisions in the 
internal debate over economic objectives that the summit would 
"almost certainly fail to produce a strategy for survival 
based on concrete agreement rather than generalities and good 
intentions." After the summit, however, he concluded that the 
fledgling organization had acquired some sinew and that to a 
considerable extent ASEAN had "confounded the pessimists who 
thought that conflicting national interests and lingering 
mutual suspicions would prevent them reaching any 
solidly-based agreement." Last minute compromise at Bali had 
"saved the day", even though a lot. of hard bargaining remained 
to put pledges of closer economic and political cooperation 
into practice. ASEAN had been given, he believed, "a fresh 
sense of purpose and direct ion".1^0. stockwin described the 
summit as "a subtle success, not a decisive turning point."
For those in distant capitals for whom ASEAN was only "a vague 
reality" the meeting had failed to produce "dramatic decisions 
and developments", but for idealists in ASEAN it had provided 
grounds for "cautious but renewed hope." The "curious zig-zag 
pattern" of progress towards economic cooperation had been 
sustained. Stockwin concluded that although the "dream summit" 
did not occur, it added up collectively to "a solidifying of 
the spirit of togetherness that had originally brought ASEAN 
together in 1967, and had sustained it over eight difficult 
years."101- Another commentator, noting the extent of 
disagreement amongst ASEAN members about major issues, saw 
this not as a shortcoming but as a virtue marking "a newly 
emergent candid style of decision making" in which 
controversial and sensitive issues were no longer put to one
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side but were "exhaustively thrashed out" in an atmosphere
where ASEAN leaders were no longer afraid that controversy
100would "expose the brittleness of their solidarity".
Within the region the summit was particularly well 
received, perhaps in part because most regional observers were 
confident that the instructions of the heads of government to 
the economic ministers to implement additional measures in the 
field of economic cooperation would, in due course, be carried 
out and would give the Association new impetus. Lau Teik Soon 
felt that ASEAN's leaders had demonstrated the political will 
to overcome obstacles to development and had committed 
themselves to economic cooperation as a priority. •
ASEAN's new political stature also drew favourable comment. 
Noting the Association's new commitment to political 
cooperation the Straits Times observed: "The non-cynical will
take ASEAN seriously: the cynical can no longer afford to 
ignore it. Friends will understand its objectives and deal 
with it with respect: potential enemies cannot confront it 
without paying a price."104.  ^Malaysian journalist made a 
point which though valid was seldom acknowledged. He argued 
that ASEAN's intangible achievements prior to the summit had 
been quite satisfactory and would be apparent to the serious 
observer. The gradual progress made by ASEAN in this area, 
especially the growth of understanding and trust amongst 
member-countries, had set the stage for the summit.105.
Though coloured by their wish to place the outcome of 
the summit in the best light possible, the remarks of the 
heads of government at the conclusion of their meeting are
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noteworthy. As might be expected, considerable satisfaction 
was expressed. Suharto saw the summit as having laid down "a 
new milestone in the annals of ASEAN's history". Kukrit 
effused that the meeting had achieved "all we have set out to 
do, and more". More soberly, Hussein Onn felt that the 
agreements that had been reached in areas of joint economic 
action, joint political action, social cooperation, cultural 
cooperation, and the setting up of a permanent Secretariat 
were "not inconsiderable" achievements. Even Lee Kuan Yew, who 
might be considered to have had cause to be disappointed by 
the outcome of the summit, asserted that the question of 
whether ASEAN had a future had been laid to rest. ASEAN was 
now "a permanent land-mark on the political and economic 
landscape of Southeast Asia". The first steps had been taken 
towards emphasizing "the substance of regional cooperation, 
not the forms."
The heads of government also referred again to the 
strong differences of view on many issues that had 
characterized pre-summit discussions. Hussein Onn felt that 
ASEAN had been strengthened by "the fresh winds of 
controversy". The temptation to be content with "bland but 
ultimately meaningless agreements" had been resisted. Suharto 
noted with satisfaction that ASEAN had adhered to the 
realistic principle that it must operate on the basis of 
mutual consent. Lee commented magnanimously that "common ASEAN 
sense" had prevailed in the process of give and take. He 
accepted that the group could not insist "that one partner 
should give more than he can economically or politically 
afford, for the present, or take more than is reasonable". He
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c o n c e d e d  t h a t  a m o d e r a t e  s p e e d  o f  p r o g r e s s  was  p r o b a b l y  b e s t  
f o r  ASEAN.
A n o t h e r  t heme  o f  r e m a r k s  d u r i n g  t h e  c l o s i n g  s e s s i o n  was 
t h a t  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s ummi t  w e r e  no more  t h a n  a 
b e g i n n i n g .  M a r c o s  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  c l o s i n g  c e r e m o n y  o f  t h e  
s ummi t  m e r e l y  commenced " t h e  a r d u o u s ,  t h e  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  o f  
i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  u n i t y  a nd  c o o p e r a t i o n "  w h i c h  was 
e m b o d i e d  i n  t h e  summi t  d o c u m e n t s .  H u s s e i n  Onn s t r e s s e d  t h a t  
ASEAN h a d  "a  l o n g  way s t i l l  t o  g o " ,  a n d  t h a t  a h e a d  l a y  "a  l o t  
o f  l e a r n i n g  a n d  m u t u a l  a d j u s t m e n t s ,  a l o t  o f  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  a 
l o t  o f  h a r d  n e g o t i a t i o n s " .  Su c h  i n d e e d  p r o v e d  t o  be  t h e  c a s e .  
I t  h a s  b e e n  a c c u r a t e l y  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  B a l i  s ummi t  was  " l o n g  
on w o r d s  a nd  s h o r t  on d e e d s . "  So much s o  t h a t  a s e c o n d  summi t  
was  l a t e r  t o  become n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  g i v e  s u b s t a n c e  t o  
t h e  d e c i s i o n s  made a t  B a l i .
The Road t o  K u a l a  Lumpur
A l t h o u g h  t h e  h e a d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  l e f t  i t  t o  t h e i r  
m i n i s t e r s  a n d  o f f i c i a l s  t o  t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  r e a l i t y  t h e  good  
i n t e n t i o n s  w h i c h  t h e y  h a d  e x p r e s s e d  a t  B a l i ,  t h e y  l e f t  t h e m i n  
l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e y  w i s h e d  a h i g h  p r i o r i t y  t o  be  g i v e n  t o  
t h e  e a r l y  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e a s u r e s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  a g r e e d  
u p o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  d e t a i l s  w e r e  o f  c o u r s e  n e g o t i a b l e .  As one  
d e l e g a t e  r e p o r t e d l y  summed i t  u p :  "The m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t
a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  s ummi t  i s  t h a t  t h e  h e a d s  o f  t h e  f i v e  
g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e i r  E conomi c  a nd  P l a n n i n g  
m i n i s t e r s  s h o u l d  m e e t  a s  o f t e n  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  wo r k  o u t  t h e  
s p e c i f i c s  o f  e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t  i o n  . " 1^6 .
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The first in a long series of such meetings was the 
Second Meeting of ASEAN Economic and Planning Ministers held
in Kuala Lumpur on 8 and 9 March, only two weeks after the 
conclusion of the Bali summit. After what was reported to be a 
marathon two-day meeting, a joint press statement announced 
that the ministers had successfully allocated five ASEAN 
industrial projects, one to each member country, as follows:
Indonesia 
Ma1 aysia 
Phi 1ippines 
Singapore 
Thai 1 and
Urea
Urea
Superphosphates 
Diesel Engines 
Soda-Ash
An experts group was to be established to examine the 
feasibility of these projects.
Over the following months officials endeavoured to reach 
agreement on detailed guidelines for proposed cooperation in 
industry, trade and other areas. Little information was made 
available about the progress of these discussions but it was 
evident that the officials did not find their task an easy 
one .
The Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Manila on 
24-26 June 1976, proved to be somewhat lacking in substance 
given that the main carraige of ASEAN's endeavours at that 
time was in the hands of the economic ministers. Lee Kuan Yew 
subsequently made a concerted effort to quicken the pace of
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p r o p o s e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  t r a d e  a r e a .  He v i s i t e d  J a k a r t a  i n  
l a t e  November  1976 a n d  a f t e r  m e e t i n g  w i t h  S u h a r t o  i t  was  
a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  w o u l d  w or k  f o r  t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  
a b a s i c  a g r e e m e n t  on t r a d e  p r e f e r e n c e s . .
ASEAN e c o n o m i c  m i n i s t e r s  h e l d  t h e i r  T h i r d  M i n i s t e r i a l  
M e e t i n g  i n  M a n i l a  on 2 0 - 2 2  J a n u a r y  1 9 77 .  M a r co s  i n f o r m e d  t h e  
m e e t i n g  t h a t  S i n g a p o r e  a nd  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  a 
b i l a t e r a l  a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d  t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t e n  p e r c e n t  t o  
be  a p p l i e d  t o  e x i s t i n g  t a r i f f s  on a l l  p r o d u c t s  t r a d e d  b e t w e e n  
t h e  two c o u n t r i e s .  The e c o n o m i c  m i n i s t e r s  a p p r o v e d  a D r a f t  
B a s i c  A g r e e m e n t  on t h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  ASEAN P r e f e r e n t i a l  
T r a d i n g  A r r a n g e m e n t s .  At t h e  e nd  o f  J a n u a r y ,  Lee  v i s i t e d  
B angkok  f o r  t a l k s  w i t h  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  T a n i n .  Th e y  a g r e e d  t o  a 
t e n  p e r c e n t  t a r i f f  c u t  b e t w e e n  t h e i r  two  c o u n t r i e s  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h a t  b e t w e e n  S i n g a p o r e  a n d  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s .  Lee  a p p e a r e d  
i n t e n t  on a t t e m p t i n g  t o  g a i n ,  t h r o u g h  b i l a t e r a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  a r r a n g e m e n t s  t h a t  
I n d o n e s i a  h a d  b l o c k e d  m u l t i  l a t e r a l l y . 108•
An " i n f o r m a l "  m e e t i n g  o f  ASEAN e c o n o m i c  m i n i s t e r s  was  
h e l d  i n  S i n g a p o r e  on 16 F e b r u a r y  1 97 7 .  The  m e e t i n g  i n i t i a l l e d  
t h e  A g r e e m e n t  on t h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  ASEAN P r e f e r e n t i a l  
T r a d i n g  A r r a n g e m e n t s  a nd  f o r w a r d e d  i t  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  
f o r  s i g n a t u r e  d u r i n g  t h e i r  " i n f o r m a l "  m e e t i n g  on 24 F e b r u a r y ,  
h e l d  on t h a t  d a t e  t o  commemora t e  t h e  a n n i v e r s a r y  o f  t h e  B a l i  
s u m m i t . 109 .  Th e f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  s i g n e d  t h e  P r e f e r e n t i a l  
T r a d i n g  A g r e e m e n t .  S c e p t i c s  n o t e d  t h a t  i t  h a d  b e e n  d i l u t e d  t o  
p r o t e c t  I n d o n e s i a n  i n t e r e s t s . 110•  The f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  a l s o  
a g r e e d  t o  r ecommend  t h e  c o n v e n i n g  o f  t h e i r  h e a d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t
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ln Kuala Lumpur ln August to coincide with the tenth 
anniversary of the founding of ASEAN. The proposal for a 
second summit meeting had been discussed for several months. 
The Philippines was apparently keen to host the meeting, but 
Lee indicated that Malaysia had been chosen as the venue on 
the basis of alphabetical rotation.
In his opening address to the Fourth ASEAN Economic 
Ministers Meeting on 27-29 June 1977 in Singapore, Lee Kuan 
Yew suggested the ministers set a timetable for the 
implementation of preferential trading arrangements. The joint 
press release indicated that trade concessions were exchanged 
on a list of 71 products. On 5-8 July 1977 the Tenth ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting was held in Singapore, with attention 
focussed mainly on the summit due to be held only one month 
1ater.
The Kuala Lumpur Summit
Prior to its commencement, Hussein Onn described the 
second summit as being intended to demonstrate the desire of 
ASEAN’s leaders to "eliminate, smooth out and identify any 
bottlenecks, obstacles, problems, doubts and fears" that might 
be hindering progress. During the opening session, he 
commented that it would be "a business summit" with its main 
emphasis on economic cooperation. It is evident that there 
were more than sufficient problems to keep the heads of 
government and their ministers and officials fully occupied. A 
Malaysian academic observed that the desire for economic 
cooperation was "as unexceptional as the fond hope for warm
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s u n n y  d a y s  a n d  c o o l  b r e e z y  n i g h t s .  S p e c i f i c  m o d a l i t i e s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  a r e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  and  c o n t e n t i o u s . "  He n o t e d  t h a t  
d e s p i t e  t h e  g e n e r a l  o p t i m i s m  a b o u t  t h e  s ummi t  t h e r e  was  "a 
n a g g i n g  s e n s e  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  a t  t h e  l a c k  o f  a c h i e v e m e n t  i n  
some a r e a s .  " H I -  T h i s  a p p e a r e d  t o  be  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  c a s e  f o r  
S i n g a p o r e  a n d  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s .  R a j a r a t n a m  i n f o r m e d  j o u r n a l i s t s  
j u s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  summi t  t h a t  f o u r  o f  t h e  f i v e  ASEAN 
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s  h a d  n o t  y e t  g o t  o f f  t h e  g r o u n d .  (On l y  
I n d o n e s i a ' s  p r o j e c t ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  h a v e  p r o c e e d e d  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  
ASEAN s p o n s o r s h i p ,  was u n d e r  w a y . )  He f e l t  i t  was  n e c e s s a r y  
f o r  t h e  h e a d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  r e t r i e v e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a s  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a t s  a n d  m i n i s t e r s  h a d  " t a l k e d  o v e r  t h e s e  t h i n g s  l o n g  
e n o u g h " . 1 1 2 .
R e l i a b l e  s o u r c e s  w e r e  c i t e d  a s  s t a t i n g  t h a t  a p a r t  f r o m  
e c o n o m i c  c o o p e r a t i o n  t h e  o t h e r  m a i n  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  d u r i n g  
s ummi t  p r e p a r a t i o n s  was  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  
ASEAN, e s p e c i a l l y  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  n umber  o f  c o m m i t t e e s ,  
c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  c e r t a i n  c o m m i t t e e s ,  a nd  
e n h a n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t .  A t t e m p t s ,  
b a c k e d  by  I n d o n e s i a ,  w e r e  r e p o r t e d  t o  be  i n  p r o g r e s s  t o  make 
t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  c o o r d i n a t i n g  body  f o r  ASEAN 
c o m m i t t e e s '  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  a n n u a l  b u d g e t .  
Romulo ,  on h i s  a r r i v a l  i n  K u a l a  Lumpur ,  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  a r e v i e w  
o f  ASEAN’s o r g a n i z a t i o n  h a d  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d  d u r i n g  f i v e  s e n i o r  
o f f i c i a l s  m e e t i n g s  i n  1976 a nd  1977 a n d  by  b o t h  t h e  N i n t h  and  
T e n t h  M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g s ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  "a  r e g r o u p i n g  o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  c o m m i t t e e s  w h i c h  w o u l d  be r e p o r t i n g  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  m e e t i n g s  o f  m i n i s t e r s . "  I n  a p p a r e n t  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p o s i t i o n ,  he  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t
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would merely "service" the various meetings of ministers and
their committees. The Philippines would be strongly opposed to 
any change which undermined "the rule of consensus", which 
ensured that decisions were "the fruits of mutual 
accommodation and were arrived at without 
reservations."113•
Problems aside, the Kuala Lumpur summit was heralded as 
another major step forward for ASEAN. Asiaweek magazine 
proclaimed that ASEAN had "taken some giant strides" in the 
preceding year "and, after a decade of slowly finding its 
feet, appears finally ready to break into a run." With regard 
to specific areas of cooperation the report noted that 
Indonesia and Malaysia were hesitant about trade 
liberalization and would be likely to seek a
middle-of-the-road approach, "signalling continued progress at 
a pace all members can afford". It was considered that the 
most crucial discussions would focus on the industrial 
projects, which it was thought had been selected with 
insufficient care.
Summit arrangements were equally as elaborate in Kuala 
Lumpur as they had been in Bali. More than one thousand people 
attended the opening ceremony on 4 August in the Nirwana 
Ballroom of the Kuala Lumpur Hilton, which was the summit 
venue. Five hundred foreign newsmen arrived to cover the 
proceedings. Fireworks displays, cultural shows and banquets 
were among the many events organized. The meeting of heads of 
government was preceded by a meeting of the foreign ministers 
on 1 August, which lasted only two hours instead of the
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scheduled two days, and by a much longer meeting of the 
economic ministers on 3 August, which some observers took to 
be symbolic of the increasing precedence of the economic 
ministers over their foreign ministerial colleagues.!^.
In his opening statement to the summit, Hussein Onn 
noted that the meeting would examine the progress of ASEAN 
cooperation since the Bali summit, and it would "demonstrate 
the viability of ASEAN cooperation and its steadfastness 
towards its goals." He appeared somewhat diffident, however, 
about ASEAN's performance. He noted that ASEAN did not lack 
critics, especially on the grounds that it was slow in showing 
results in economic cooperation. Such criticism "may well be 
true", which he said was why ASEAN leaders were meeting again 
so soon after Bali. Suharto placed considerable emphasis on 
the need for consensus. He stressed that the world would again 
focus its attention on ASEAN during its second summit meeting 
and would "watch our deliberations and resolutions". Clearly 
consensus was to be on Indonesia's terms. Suharto asserted 
that ASEAN's success should not be at the cost of any 
country's national interest. The benefits of ASEAN’s programs 
must be "equally shared", he argued, even though they "may 
appear to be insignificant and modest". It was unnecessary for 
ASEAN to take steps that "may look impressive and draw 
compliments from abroad", but which could be "damaging to one 
of us". He stressed the importance of cooperation in food and 
agriculture since "we must never forget that the life of the 
majority of ASEAN peoples will still be dependent on 
agriculture." Touching on organizational matters, Suharto 
supported the Indonesian view that the dynamism of ASEAN and
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its Increasing maturity required "an adequate compensation in 
the form of its organizational machinery".
Marcos appeared to take a relaxed view. With a touch of 
hyperbole, he remarked that the "ceremonials and beautiful 
women of Malaysia" had created an atmosphere "which cannot but 
produce success" for the summit. He felt caught up in "the 
euphoria of achievement". It was left to Lee Kuan Yew to take 
up Hussein Onn's misgivings and to voice a warning about the 
pace of ASEAN's progress. He addressed this task with 
admirable brevity and directness. "In Kuala Lumpur now", he 
asserted, "we have to decide whether we move forward, step 
sideways, or move backwards. For we cannot stand still." He 
noted that the economic ministers had failed to resolve the 
five industrial projects and had selected only 71 items for 
preferential trade. "Surely we can do better than this." He 
thought that international observers would take ASEAN "as 
seriously as we take ourselves" and that at the end of the 
summit "our success will be judged not by the speeches made, 
but by the agreements on concrete items, the bolts and nuts of 
economic cooperation."
As might be expected, the summit communique expressed 
the satisfaction of ASEAN leaders that member-countries had 
made "significant progress". They commended the economic 
ministers for accelerating the pace of economic cooperation 
and directed that this should be continued "with greater 
vigour". Actual achievements in the economic area included:
Agreement on a machinery for consultations and
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n e g o t i a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  p r i o r i t y  o f  s u p p l y  a nd  p u r c h a s e  
o f  r i c e  i n  c r i t i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  b a s e d  on t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  f i r s t  r e f u s a l ;
An e m e r g e n c y  s h a r i n g  s che me  f o r  p e t r o l e u m ;
S u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a Food  S e c u r i t y  R e s e r v e  
f o r  ASEAN, e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  r i c e ;
An n o u nc e m e n t  t h a t  a r e v i e w  o f  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d y  f o r  
I n d o n e s i a ' s  a m m o n i a - u r e a  p r o j e c t  s h o u l d  be  c o m p l e t e d  a s  
e a r l y  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  w i t h  a v i e w  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  b e i n g  
l a u n c h e d  by t h e  m i d d l e  o f  1978» and  t h a t  f e a s i b i l i t y  
s t u d i e s  on t h e  o t h e r  ASEAN i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s  w o u l d  
s o o n  be c o m p l e t e d ;
A d e c i s i o n  t h a t  p r e - f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d i e s  w o u l d  be 
c o m p l e t e d  e x p e d i t i o u s l y  f o r  p o s s i b l e  a d d i t i o n a l  ASEAN 
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s ,  n a m e l y  h e a v y  d u t y  r u b b e r  t y r e s ,  
m e t a l - w o r k i n g  m a c h i n e  t o o l s ,  n e w s p r i n t ,  e l e c t r o l y t i c  t i n  
p l a t i n g ,  TV p i c t u r e  t u b e s ,  f i s h e r i e s  a nd  p o t a s h ;  
D i r e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  A g r e e m e n t  on ASEAN 
P r e f e r e n t i a l  T r a d i n g  A r r a n g e m e n t s  s h o u l d  be  p r o m p t l y  a nd  
f u l l y  i m p l e m e n t e d  n o t  l a t e r  t h a n  1 J a n u a r y  1 9 78 ,  a nd  
t h a t  t r a d e  p r e f e r e n c e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be  i n t e n s i f i e d  
a n d  t h e  r e s u l t s  i m p l e m e n t e d  e x p e d i t i o u s l y ;  a n d  
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  an  ASEAN r e c i p r o c a l  c u r r e n c y  o r  " swap"  
a r r a n g e m e n t .
O t h e r  I s s u e s
(a )  S a b a h
A n o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur  s ummi t
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was  a p l e d g e  by Mar co s  t o  t a k e  s t e p s  t o  a b a n d o n  t h e  
P h i l i p p i n e s '  c l a i m  t o  S a b a h .  As e a r l y  a s  F e b r u a r y  1976 d u r i n g  
t h e  B a l i  s u m m i t ,  Mar cos  was  r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  i n f o r m a l l y  
a d v i s e d  M a l a y s i a  t h a t  he  i n t e n d e d  t o  d r o p  t h e  c l a i m .  
A p p a r e n t l y  m a k i n g  t h e  mo s t  o f  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  make a 
m a g n a n i m o u s  g e s t u r e ,  Mar co s  a n n o u n c e d  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  d r o p  
t h e  c l a i m  a t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  h i s  o p e n i n g  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  
s u m m i t ,  r e p o r t e d l y  t o  "a t h u n d e r o u s  o v a t i o n ” . He s t a t e d  t h a t  
a s  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  ASEAN r e q u i r e d  s a c r i f i c e  a n d  e a c h  n a t i o n  
m u s t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h a t  " p o o l  o f  s a c r i f i c e ” , h i s  g o v e r n m e n t  
w o u l d  " a s  a n  e a r n e s t  t o  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  ASEAN” t a k e  " d e f i n i t e  
s t e p s  t o  e l i m a t e  one  o f  t h e  b u r d e n s  o f  ASEAN t h e  c l a i m  o f  t h e  
P h i l i p p i n e s  R e p u b l i c  t o  S a b a h ” . M a r c o s  d e p a r t e d  K u a l a  Lumpur  
t o  s p e n d  a f ew d a y s  i n  Sa ba h  i t s e l f  w i t h  h i s  w i f e .  He 
d e s c r i b e d  h i s  v i s i t  a s  an a d m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  S a b a h  
t h a t  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  r e g a r d e d  i t  a s  p a r t  o f  M a l a y s i a ,  and  
p r o m i s e d  t o  " i n i t i a t e  t h e  s t e p s ” t o  d r o p  t h e  c l a i m  a nd  t o  
p r o s e c u t e  t h e  m a t t e r  u n t i l  t h i s  i r r i t a n t  i n  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
M a l a y s i a  was  r e m o v e d .  He c a u t i o n e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  he  e x p e c t e d  
t o  f a c e  some " h e a v y  a r t i l l e r y ” on h i s  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
P h i l i p p i n e s  a n d  t h a t  t h e  l e g a l  p r o c e s s  w o u l d  t a k e  "a  l i t t l e  
t i m e ” T h i s  p r o v e d  t o  be  an  u n d e r s t a t e m e n t .  At  t h e  t i m e
o f  w r i t i n g ,  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  s t i l l  h a s  n o t  f o r m a l l y  a b a n d o n e d  
t h e  S a b a h  c l a i m .
(b)  V i e t n a m
An a r e a  w h i c h  was  g i v e n  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  p u b l i c  
a t t e n t i o n  by ASEAN l e a d e r s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  t h e  two 
s u m m i t s  was  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  c o u n t r i e s
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o f  I n d o c h i n a  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  V i e t n a m .  D u r i n g  t h i s  same 
p e r i o d ,  C h i n a  won t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  ASEAN members  by i t s  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  s u p p o r t i v e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  a nd  
i t s  d e f e n c e  o f  ASEAN a g a i n s t  c r i t i c i s m  f r o m  b o t h  V i e t n a m  and  
t h e  USSR. V i e t n a m  r e m a i n e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  a v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  
b a c k g r o u n d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  ASEAN's d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  B a l i  s u m m i t ,  H a n o i ' s  c o n t i n u e d  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  ASEAN a t t r a c t e d  some r a t h e r  b l u n t  w a r n i n g s  f r o m  ASEAN 
s p o k e s m e n .  H o w e v e r ,  b o t h  s i d e s  s o o n  b e g a n  t o  show s i g n s  o f  
i n t e r e s t  i n  p a t c h i n g  up t h e i r  s t r a i n e d  r e l a t i o n s .  Bu t  t h i s  
w a r m i n g  o f  r e l a t i o n s  was  s o o n  i n t e r r u p t e d  o n c e  a g a i n  by an  
a l t e r c a t i o n  o v e r  a t e x t  s u b m i t t e d  by M a l a y s i a  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  
t h e  communique  o f  t h e  Colombo n o n - a l i g n e d  summi t  i n  A u g u s t  
197 6 .  M a l a y s i a  w i s h e d  t h e  s ummi t  t o  r e a f f i r m  t h e  1973 A l g i e r s  
s u m m i t ' s  e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur  D e c l a r a t i o n  on t h e  
Zone  o f  P e a c e ,  F r e e d o m  and  N e u t r a l i t y  i n  S o u t h e a s t .  (Hano i  h a d  
n o t  b e e n  r e p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  A l g i e r s  s u m m i t . )  A p p a r e n t l y  a t  
V i e t n a m ' s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  L a os  s u b m i t t e d  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t e x t  
m a k i n g  no m e n t i o n  o f  t h e  z o n e  p r o p o s a l  b u t  i n s i s t i n g  on t h e  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e s  a nd  d i s m a n t l i n g  o f  U . S .  
m i l i t a r y  b a s e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n a b l e  r e g i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s  t o  become 
" t r u l y  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  p a c i f i c  a nd  n e u t r a l " .  A V i e t n a m e s e  
s p o k e s m a n  s t a t e d  t h a t  V i e t n a m  d e c i d e d l y  d i d  n o t  t o l e r a t e  " an y  
s ch e me  t o  r e v i v e  a n o n e - t o o - b r i g h t  p a s t  o f  ASEAN a nd  t o  s e l l  
an  o u t m o d e d  a n d  b a n k r u p t  p o l i c y  o f  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n . " .
I n  a p r e s s  i n t e r v i e w  i n  m i d - 1 9 7 7 ,  h o w e v e r ,  D e p u t y  F o r e i g n  
M i n i s t e r  Ph a n  H i e n  " c l a r i f i e d "  V i e t n a m ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  
ASEAN. He s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  go o d  b i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  w o u l d  be 
"more  r e a s o n a b l e  a n d  r e a l i s t i c "  t h a n  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  ASEAN
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should be enlarged to Include other Southeast Asian states. He 
continued: "ASEAN has its own rules. Some of them might be 
acceptable to the others. Some would need to be changed; 
others eliminated. Basic new components would have to be 
introduced to meet the new situation in Southeast Asia in a 
new spirit. " •  Clearly, on this appraisal, there was 
little or no prospect of enticing Vietnam to associate itself 
in any formal way with ASEAN. As time passed Vietnam's 
criticisms of ASEAN again increased. Speaking to journalists 
after the Kuala Lumpur summit, Rajaratnam probably spoke for 
most other ASEAN leaders when he concluded that in handling 
its future relations with Vietnam ASEAN must accept that: "it 
will be sometimes cautious optimism, sometimes clouded 
optimism .... We must learn to live with this kind of 
atmosphere." He stated that ASEAN must continue to "turn the 
other cheek" when Vietnam went on the of fence. H®*
Post Mortem
Closing statements by the heads of government in Kuala 
Lumpur indicated their acceptance that given the need for 
consensus, limitations on future economic cooperation had to 
be accepted. Although Lee noted that private discussions had 
been "vexatious", he thought the summit would be remembered 
for having provided a "realistic assessment" of ASEAN’s 
progress and potential. "Free and informal" discussions 
between heads of government had elucidated why certain ASEAN 
objectives could not be achieved "as quickly as some of us 
would have wished". A pace of intra-ASEAN cooperation had to 
be accepted that was "more congenial to all of us, even though
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It may be less than what Is achievable If we all set out
sights higher." He added that in the longer term it would be 
discovered that in order to quicken the pace of economic 
cooperation with industrial countries, ASEAN would need to 
increase the pace of intra-regiona1 adjustments that would 
facilitate the inflow of capital, technology and skills.
"But", he concluded, "in the spirit of ASEAN consensus, we 
have agreed that we shall tackle these problems when we come 
to them." Hussein Onn thought that the summit had shown that 
ASEAN was now "more concerned with achievement than with 
rhetoric". He was satisfied that "in political and realistic 
terms" members had given their best to make the summit a 
success. Only Marcos failed to qualify his evaluation of the 
summit's achievements in the area of economic cooperation. He 
felt that a decade in the future those who looked back to 
determine the "turning point" for ASEAN would conclude that it 
had been the Kuala Lumpur summit.
The regional press gave the Kuala Lumpur summit a mixed 
verdict. The Far Eastern Economic Review took a rather 
negative view. It commented that the event was "good for 
public relations", but "on the shop-floor" the struggle to 
give the organization true economic meaning proved to be still 
"an uphill task". Despite "fanfare, brotherly rhetoric and 
expressions of satisfaction", plans for practical regional 
cooperation were "still on the drawing board". The five 
industrial projects appeared to have been chosen with too 
little forethought, and had been hampered by selfish market 
considerations, but now that they had been endorsed they 
seemed destined to be implemented "in one form or another". So
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far as trade cooperation was concerned, the Review observed 
that "Singaporeaphobia" continued to be a part of the 
Indonesian outlook.H9* Asiaweek was more generous. Noting 
that some Western observers had concluded the summit was "a 
non-event", it claimed that such an assessment was rejected by 
"those more familiar with Southeast Asian thinking". A "senior 
diplomat" was cited as saying that ASEAN had really only 
started growing since the end of the Indochina war, so for a 
two-year old it had come quite a way. He cautioned against too 
fast a growth "lest we are denied the chance to consolidate as 
we go along." On the matter of trade preferences, Adam Malik 
was reported to have said: "The needs of 140 million must take
precedence over those of 2 million." On the industrial 
projects, an "informed source" commented that with projects of 
this magnitude there were bound to be mistakes and there was 
nothing to be ashamed of if some did not get off the ground.
On the organizational issue, it was stated that Indonesia 
wanted the Secretary-General to have some executive powers but 
Singapore and Malaysia feared this "would make Indonesia too 
powerful in the Association", due to the location of the 
Secretariat in Jakarta and the Secretary-General being also an 
Indonesian.120. ASEAN Review commented that those who had 
expected the leaders to emerge with their "briefcases bulging 
with solid agreements" on economic cooperation inevitably were 
disappointed. Though ASEAN at ten years may not have been "an 
occasion for vigorous self-congratulation", it had been "a 
watershed of some sorts", and ASEAN members had reason to look 
ahead "with cautious hope for the baby that practically grew 
up by itself against all predictions".121.
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Many ASEAN e c o n o m i s t s  a p p e a r e d  d i s a p p o i n t e d  w i t h  t h e
o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  s u m m i t .  One a s s e r t e d  t h a t  a " g o l d e n  
o p p o r t u n i t y "  h a d  b e e n  m i s s e d  by t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  o p t  f o r  
a c c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d  t a r i f f  c u t s .  He a d d e d  t h a t  he  w o u l d  a p p r o a c h  
t h e  ASEAN i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s  " w i t h  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  c a u t i o n ,  
i f  n o t  e v e n  a l i t t l e  a p p r e h e n s i o n " ,  a n d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y  a p p r o a c h  he  " w o u l d  s h u n  i t  u n l e s s  v e r y  
c o n v i n c i n g  e c o n o m i c a l l y  v i a b l e  s p e c i a l  c a s e s  c a n  be  
p r e s e n t e d . "  He w a r n e d  t h a t  " t h e  e u p h o r i a  o f  r e g i o n a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n "  m u s t  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  h i g h e r  c o s t s  and  
p r i c e s  a nd  e r o d e  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s .  
A n o t h e r  e c o n o m i s t  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  s ummi t  h a d  " f a i l e d  t o  
p r o d u c e  a n y  s i g n i f i c a n t  b r e a k t h r o u g h s " ,  and  t h a t  t h e  a d o p t i o n  
o f  a " 1 o w e s t - c o m m o n - d e n o m i n a t o r  a p p r o a c h "  h a d  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  b e n e f i t s  o f  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  h a d  n o t  
m a t e r i a l i z e d . 1 2 2 .
A n o n - r e g i o n a l  a n a l y s t  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  s ummi t  h a d  
b e e n  a n  h i s t o r i c  m i l e s t o n e ,  " b u t  f o r  e s s e n t i a l l y  c o m m e m o r a t i v e  
r e a s o n s " .  L o o k i n g  b a c k  t o  t h e  B a l i  s u m m i t ,  w h i c h  h e  d e s c r i b e d  
a s  " t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  s h e e r  n e c e s s i t y  a nd  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
e v o l u t i o n " ,  h e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s  o f  B a l i  h a d  b e e n  
" s p e c i f i c  a n d  s p e c t a c u l a r " .  The a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d  h a d  
b e e n  d r a w n  t o  a n  a p p a r e n t l y  s u c c e s s f u l  e f f o r t  i n  r e g i o n a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n .  T h i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  was  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d u p l i c a t e .  B a l i  
h a d  f o r m u l a t e d  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  f u t u r e  p e r f o r m a n c e  w h i c h  s e e m e d  
" b e y o n d  t h e  r e a l i s t i c  r e a c h  o f  f a i t h f u l  f u n c t i o n a r i e s . "  The 
i d e a  was  c o n c e i v e d  t h a t  a s e c o n d  s ummi t  m i g h t  r e s t o r e  
" f o u n d e r i n g  momentum" .  Bu t  t h e  s i g h t s  h a d  b e e n  s e t  t o o  h i g h .
I t  p r o v e d  " i l l u s o r y  t o  a c h i e v e  w i t h i n  o ne  y e a r  w h a t  c o u l d  n o t
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be a c h i e v e d  d u r i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  l i f e  o f  ASEAN." The K u a l a  Lumpur  
s ummi t  was  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  r a t h e r  e x a c t i n g  o p i n i o n  o f  t h i s  
a n a l y s t ,  i n e v i t a b l y  m a r r e d  by t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c o n c r e t e  r e s u l t s  
i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h e  u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v e s  s e t  by t h e  B a l i  s u m m i t .  
ASEAN l e a d e r s  h a d  a t t e m p t e d  t o  d e f l a t e  p u b l i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  b u t  
few w e r e  p r e p a r e d  f o r  t h e  " s u b s e q u e n t  s u b s t a n t i v e  a n t i c l i m a x " .  
I t s  m a i n  s u c c e s s  was  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  a s  an  e x e r c i s e  i n  
i m a g e - b u i l d i n g . 1 2 3 .
T h e r e  w e r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  g r o u n d s  f o r  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n  
o f  b o t h  ASEAN a nd  o u t s i d e  o b s e r v e r s  t h a t  t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur  
s ummi t  h a d  b e e n  a t  b e s t  a l i m i t e d  s u c c e s s .  The B a l i  s ummi t  h a d  
a t  l e a s t  won some a p p r o v a l  b e c a u s e  i t  h a d  d i s p l a y e d  a new 
p u r p o s e  a n d  e n c o u r a g e d  a new b e g i n n i n g  f o r  ASEAN. I t  h a d  b e e n  
l e f t  t o  t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur  s ummi t  t o  i m p l e m e n t  t h e  a m b i t i o u s  
o b j e c t i v e s  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s p h e r e  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  d e c i d e d  u p o n  
i n  B a l i .  T h i s  p r o v e d  t o  be  more  d i f f i c u l t  t h a n  some may h a v e  
a n t i c i p a t e d .  S u m m i t r y  f a i l e d  t o  o v e r c o m e  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  One o f  t h e  m o s t  n o t e w o r t h y  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  
K u a l a  Lumpur  s ummi t  was  t h a t  i t  r e s u l t e d  i n  a c c e p t a n c e  by 
ASEAN members  o f  t h e  n e e d  f o r  r e a l i s m  a n d  c o n s e n s u s ,  a nd  t h e  
a v o i d a n c e  o f  o v e r - a m b i t i o u s  g o a l s  t h a t  c o n f i c t e d  w i t h  t h e  
p e r c e i v e d  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  some m e mb e r s .
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CHAPTER 6
DIALOGUE
The most striking achievement of the Kuala Lumpur summit 
did not arise from the internal deliberations of ASEAN 
members, but from the international recognition and stature 
received as a consequence of the homage paid to the 
Association by the attendance of non-ASEAN leaders at 
post-summit meetings. Althought the Bali summit had boosted 
ASEAN's image internationally, this was the first occasion on 
which it received major international acclaim. ASEAN's 
official dealings with other countries had commenced much 
earlier, however.
Early Contacts
Despite its slender record of achievement in many areas 
prior to the Bali summit, ASEAN drew some comfort from the 
fact that the early 1970s saw the beginning of its formal 
international contacts with several countries. Such contacts 
enhanced ASEAN's previously very low profile in world affairs 
and provided the opportunity for it to bargain for a more 
advantageous economic relationship with these countries.
The first group of countries to initiate discussions 
with ASEAN was the European Economic Community. Following 
contacts in Europe and in Southeast Asia in late 1971 and
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early 1972, ASEAN decided to establish a Special Coordinating
Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) to prepare the way for an early 
"dialogue" between ASEAN and the EEC. An ASEAN Brussels 
Committee (ABC) was also established in June 1972 to 
coordinate relations with the EEC. It was composed of 
member-countries' ambassadors to the EEC.
The first formal contact between ASEAN and the EEC 
occurred at a meeting between an ASEAN delegation and the 
Commission of the European Communities in Brussels in June
1972. The communique noted that discussion centred on trade 
problems.This evidently arose from a Memorandum that had 
been drafted by SCCAN. Having in mind the enlargement of the 
EEC to include the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and 
Ireland, and especially the prospect of loss of Commonwealth 
preferences previously granted by the UK, the Memorandum 
recommended that access be provided to ASEAN countries to 
compete in the EEC market on equal terms with EEC 
member-countries, associate members and other countries.2. A 
second ASEAN-EEC meeting was held in Bangkok in September
1973. The Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting noted the success 
of the Association in obtaining from the EEC "the recognition 
of ASEAN as one region and the preferential access of certain 
commodities into EEC markets".
The next important development in ASEAN-EEC relations 
was a visit by the EEC Commission Vice-President, Sir 
Christopher Soames, to Southeast Asia in September 1974 during 
which he met in Jakarta with the five trade ministers of the 
ASEAN countries. ASEAN pressed for further tafiff reductions
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and for Improvements In the cumulative rules of origin applied 
by the EEC to ASEAN imports, and proposed a number of projects
qfor EEC assistance.-'’ The major outcome of the Jakarta 
meeting was an agreement to set up a Joint Study Group (JSG) 
which would "serve as the mechanism through which to explore 
together all possible areas where cooperation could be 
broadened, intensified and diversified".^- The first meeting 
of the JSG was held in Brussels in June 1973. An ambitious 
work program was drawn up, largely at the initiative of the 
ASEAN delegation. It had to be admitted, however, that by 
mid-1975 ASEAN-EEC cooperation had made only limited 
progress.
The next major step taken by ASEAN to extend its 
international contacts was the approval by the Standing 
Committee in March 1973 of the establishment of an ASEAN 
Geneva Committee (AGC) to coordinate ASEAN's approach to the 
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Also, in January 1974 a 
delegation of Australian officials had an informal meeting 
with the ASEAN Secretaries-Genera1 in Bangkok to discuss 
possible economic cooperation. Australia offered to cooperate 
with ASEAN in economic and technical projects.^- The ASEAN 
Standing Committee approved this cooperation and during a 
visit by the Secretaries-General to Canberra in April the 
Australian Government announced a decision to provide A$5 
million for ASEAN economic projects.6- The communique of the 
Seventh Ministerial Meeting welcomed the outcome of "the 
ASEAN-Australian dialogue on economic cooperation". In 
November 1974 A$2.5 million was given by Australia to ASEAN 
for research on high-protein food production, particularly
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from soya beans. The communique of the Eighth Ministerial
Meeting expressed satisfaction with Australian assistance for 
projects related to the proper handling and storage of grains 
and the transport of livestock and other perishable 
foodstuffs.
The communique of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting also 
noted a report from the Secretaries-Genera1 on proposed 
assistance from New Zealand for ASEAN’s economic and social 
development. A formal dialogue with New Zealand had commenced 
in February 1975. Informal contacts between Canada and ASEAN 
commenced in December 1975 following an offer of assistance 
from Canada. The U.S. also approached ASEAN in January 1975 
suggesting consultations on economic matters.8*
ASEAN's formal contacts with Japan commenced on a less 
amicable basis. On the eve of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting 
Tun Ismail told the press that he would raise during the 
meeting the threat posed to natural rubber producers like 
Malaysia by Japan's synthetic rubber production.^- The 
communique stated that the ministers had considered the 
"indiscriminate expansion" of Japan's synthetic rubber 
industry and the acceleration of its exports, which they 
asserted posed "a serious threat" to the economies of ASEAN 
countries. They expressed "grave concern" and urged Japan to 
review its actions. Meetings of ASEAN Senior Officials 
resulted in the sending of two memoranda on this subject to 
Japan. In response to the second memorandum Japan agreed to 
direct talks. The first such talks were held in Tokyo in 
November 1973.10• Further joint meetings were held in Kuala
213
Lumpur  l n  F e b r u a r y  1974 and  a g a i n  i n  Tokyo  i n  Mar ch  1974 .  At 
t h e  S e v e n t h  M i n i s t e r i a l  M e e t i n g  h e l d  i n  May 1974 M a l i k  n o t e d  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  r e q u e s t  J a p a n e s e  
s y n t h e t i c  r u b b e r  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  a nd  e x p o r t e r s  t o  p l a n  t h e i r  
p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  e x p o r t s  i n  s u c h  a way a s  n o t  t o  h a r m  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  r u b b e r  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  ASEAN. 
J a p a n  r e p o r t e d l y  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  t y p e  o f  s y n t h e t i c  r u b b e r  t h a t  was  t h e  
c l o s e s t  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  n a t u r a l  r u b b e r ,  t o  p r o v i d e  t e c h n i c a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  i n  r e s e a r c h  on new u s e s  o f  n a t u r a l  r u b b e r  a nd  t o  
i n c r e a s e  i t s  own u s e  o f  n a t u r a l  r u b b e r . A S E A N  h a d  some 
c a u s e  t o  be  p l e a s e d ,  i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  a t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  i t s  
c o o r d i n a t e d  e f f o r t s .
I n  t h e  p o s t - V i e t n a m  War p e r i o d ,  ASEAN's a b i l i t y  t o  
p r o m o t e  a n  image  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  u n i t y  a nd  v i a b i l i t y ,  a nd  t o  
c o o r d i n a t e  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  r e g a r d  t o  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  
n o n - r e g i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  m e a n t  t h a t  i t  came i n c r e a s i n g l y  t o  t h e  
a t t e n t i o n  o f  m a j o r  W e s t e r n  c o u n t r i e s  who w e r e  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  
d e v e l o p  a f u t u r e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  n o n - c o m m u n i s t  S o u t h e a s t  
A s i a .  As ASEAN e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s e l f  a s  t h e  f o r e m o s t  r e g i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  i t s  member s  b e g a n  t o  d e v e l o p  a 
d e e p e r  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  
A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  h e i g h t e n e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a t u r e .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  i n t r a - A S E A N  c o o p e r a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c r e d i b i l i t y  h a d  a l w a y s  b e e n  s e e n  
a s  an  i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  i t  a p p e a r e d  t o  be  s e e n  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  a s  a t  l e a s t  a s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  t h e  i n t r i n s i c
b e n e f i t s  o f  s u c h  a c t i v i t i e s .
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B a l l
P r i o r  t o  t h e  B a l i  s u m m i t ,  a s e r i e s  o f  a p p a r e n t  m u t u a l  
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s  o f  a l m o s t  comi c  p r o p o r t i o n s  l e d  t o  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  t h e  s ummi t  o f  o t h e r  
h e a d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  I t  was  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  M a r c o s ,  Lee  and  
K u k r i t ,  w h i l e  i n  K u a l a  Lumpur  f o r  t h e  f u n e r a l  o f  Tun R az ak  i n  
J a n u a r y  197 6 ,  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  i n v i t e  t h e  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r s  o f  
A u s t r a l i a ,  New Z e a l a n d  a nd  J a p a n  t o  a t t e n d  t h e  s u m m i t .  J a p a n  
a n d  A u s t r a l i a  w e r e  r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  e x p r e s s e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  
a t t e n d i n g .  A u s t r a l i a n  s o u r c e s  s t a t e d  t h a t  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
M a l c o l m  F r a s e r  h a d  b e e n  s o u n d e d  o u t  by K u k r i t  w h i l e  he  a l s o  
was  i n  K u a l a  Lumpur  f o r  t h e  R a z a k  f u n e r a l .  I n d o n e s i a n  
o f f i c i a l s  e x p r e s s e d  s u r p r i s e  a t  t h e s e  r e p o r t s  s i n c e  t h e y  
u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e  s ummi t  was  i n t e n d e d  f o r  ASEAN l e a d e r s  
o n l y .  D e n i a l s  w e r e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  made t h a t  a ny  i n v i t a t i o n s  h a d  
b e e n  i s s u e d .  M a r c o s  s t a t e d  t h a t  he  h a d  n o t  h e a r d  o f  t h e  
p r o p o s a l .  He f e l t  t h a t  ASEAN s h o u l d  c o n s o l i d a t e  b e f o r e  s u c h  
m e e t i n g s  w e r e  h e l d .  H u s s e i n  Onn t h o u g h t  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  be 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  o t h e r  h e a d s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  
d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  B a l i  d i s c u s s i o n s .  M a l i k  c l a i m e d  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  
h a d  t a k e n  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  s e e k i n g  a n  i n v i t a t i o n  d u r i n g  a 
v i s i t  t o  J a k a r t a  by F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  Andrew P e a c o c k . 12.
The m a t t e r  was  r e f e r r e d  f o r  d e c i s i o n  t o  t h e  ASEAN 
f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  d u r i n g  t h e i r  m e e t i n g  i n  T h a i l a n d  i n  
e a r l y - F e b r u a r y  1 97 6 .  M a l i k  s t a t e d  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  h a d  i n v i t e d  
t h e  t h r e e  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r s  o f  J a p a n ,  A u s t r a l i a  a nd  New Z e a l a n d  
t o  v i s i t  J a k a r t a .  He s a i d  t h a t  he  was  p l e a s e d  t h a t  t h e y  w a n t e d  
t o  a t t e n d  t h e  s ummi t  a n d  i f  t h e  o t h e r  ASEAN members  a g r e e d
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Indonesia would extend the invitations. One report speculated 
that a compromise would be reached by the foreign ministers in 
which the three prime ministers would be invited to meet the 
ASEAN heads of government after the Bali summit.13- In the 
event, however, Thai Foreign Minister Chatichai conveyed to 
the diplomatic representatives of Australia and Japan the 
written decision of the ASEAN foreign ministers that 
invitations would not be issued in response to the "informal" 
approaches received from them. The ministers expressed their 
thanks but stated that a meeting after the Bali summit would 
be impossible because the ASEAN leaders would have to depart 
Bali immediately after the summit. The message also expressed 
"gratification at your Government's recognition of ASEAN as a 
collective and indigenous body and your desire to make a 
contribution to our joint efforts and undertakings in the 
economic field."14. Reports claimed that the ASEAN foreign 
ministers had been piqued at the way that Japan had used the 
press in lobbying for an invitation. Prime Minister Miki 
reportedly had also sent a top foreign ministry official to 
convey his desire to meet ASEAN leaders as soon as 
p o s s i b l e . F r a s e r  commented that he did not consider the 
decision not to issue an invitation as a rebuff. He said that 
Australia had put the view that "if an invitation were 
extended we would be honoured and we would try to accept if 
that were possible. But I was also aware of the sensitivity of 
ASEAN members about other countries. " •
It seems likely that, whatever other reasons may have 
influenced them, ASEAN leaders decided not to invite the 
leaders of other countries to Bali primarily because they
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wished to concentrate first on the promotion of intra-ASEAN 
cooperation. They were clearly not averse to the development 
of relations with the industrial countries of the West and 
Japan at a later stage.
Post-Bali
The ASEAN economic ministers agreed in March 1976 to 
"establish ASEAN machinery for dialogue with third countries 
or groups of countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
USA, Japan, West Asian countries, EEC and COMECON countries as 
well as other regional groupings or blocs." They also agreed 
to adopt joint approaches on world economic problems in 
international fora. During the remainder of 1976, ASEAN began 
to apply greater pressure to some dialogue countries in an 
attempt to obtain economic concessions. ASEAN was appreciative 
of Australia's project assistance but concerned that 
increasing levels of protection for Australian industry was 
damaging ASEAN's exports. In July ASEAN officials rejected an 
Australian proposal for the establishment of an 
ASEAN-Austra1ia Trade Committee. Instead they drew up a 
hard-hitting Memorandum recommending an ASEAN Canberra 
Committee which would be consulted before any increases in 
protectionist measures. The Memorandum was approved by the 
economic ministers. ^ • ASEAN representatives also continued 
to pressure the EEC for economic concessions, especially 
during the second meeting of the Joint Study Group in December 
1976. As well as trade concessions and project and advisory 
assistance, ASEAN sought industrial cooperation and the 
transfer of technology from the EEC.
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The notion of inviting the heads of government of Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand to a meeting to follow the second 
ASEAN summit appeared to crystallize in January 1977, at about 
the same time that agreement was reached on the holding of the 
summit itself. ASEAN members may have been influenced by the 
positive attitude shown by Fukuda, the new Japanese Prime 
Minister, towards the development of relations with ASEAN. At 
their informal meeting in February, the economic ministers 
noted that Fukuda had responded favourably to the idea of a 
meeting with the ASEAN heads of government and would be 
sending a foreign ministry official to the ASEAN capitals to 
prepare the groundwork. They also discussed the possibility of 
a Lome-type Convention between ASEAN and Japan, analagous to 
that under which African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
gained preferential access to EEC markets. This matter had 
been discussed with Fukuda by Indonesia's Minister of State 
for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs, Widjojo 
Nitisastro. He had also raised with Fukuda the possible 
financing by Japan of the first five ASEAN industrial 
pro jects.
The informal meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in 
February 1977 welcomed forthcoming dialogues with Japan and 
the U.S. It reaffirmed that ASEAN was ready to conduct similar 
dialogues "with all other countries, groups of countries, and 
international organizations." A formal dialogue with Japan, to 
be known as the ASEAN-Japan Forum, was institutionalized 
during a meeting in Jakarta on 23 March 1977. Earlier, on 3-4 
February, a formal ASEAN-Canada dialogue had also been
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commenced.
In mid-April 1977, Malaysia announced that it had been 
authorized by ASEAN members to invite the prime ministers of 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand to meet with the ASEAN heads 
of government immediately after the August summit. Though the 
three prime ministers were quick to accept the invitation 
there was evidence of some nervousness, at least on the part 
of Australia, that the summit would be used by ASEAN to 
increase pressure for economic concessions. Peacock was 
reportedly expected to seek assurances that the post-summit 
meetings would be a venue for "cooperation rather than 
confrontation".18• From Australia's viewpoint, these fears 
appeared to be justified by its experience during the 
ASEAN-Australia dialogue meeting, thereafter known as the 
ASEAN-Australia Forum, held in Surakarta in May.
Surakarta, ASEAN officials reiterated their unhappiness about 
rising protectionism in Australia and about growing trade 
deficits with Austra1ia.20. Australian government came
under increasing domestic pressure to accommodate ASEAN 
interests. In June 1977, Malaysia commenced delaying the issue 
of import permits for Australian goods. Similar delays had 
been commenced by the Philippines. Prior to his departure for 
the ASEAN economic ministers meeting that month, Datuk Hamzah 
said that he would raise the issue of Australia's "unhealthy 
trade practices" during the meeting and seek concerted ASEAN 
retaliatory measures against Australia's exports. In his 
opening address to the meeting, Lee Kuan Yew stated that in 
its dialogues with the EEC, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and the U.S., ASEAN must "press home the disruptive
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consequences of their protectionist tendencies on our people." 
He suggested that ASEAN's bargaining position would be 
strengthened "if we can coordinate our import policies to 
collectively close our consolidated markets to those who 
unreasonably and unilaterally shut off our exports." After the 
meeting Singapore's Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen disclosed 
that no agreement had been reached on concerted action against 
Australia for the moment. He said that there had been lengthy 
but inconclusive discussion on the matter during the meeting. 
The official report of the meeting indicated that each ASEAN 
member would draw up a list of products imported from 
Australia on which "possible countervailing measures" could be 
enforced. Lee Kuan Yew spoke of "considerable frustration and 
bitterness" in countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Malaysia that Australia - "a very wealthly continent, sparsely 
populated, with enormous natural resources not yet fully 
developed, with an industrial capacity commensurate with those 
resources" - should want to continue to protect 
labour-intensive industries.21•
Other developed countries fared much better by 
comparison in their relations with ASEAN during this period, 
but did not escape entirely from the newfound enthusiasm of 
some ASEAN spokesmen in exercising their economic muscle. 
During a visit to Japan Marcos informed his hosts that ASEAN 
wished to see greater effort from Japan to "correct our 
present imbalance in trade, channel investments into more 
desirable areas, upgrade official assistance and step up the 
transfer of technology to ASEAN countries." Using more robust 
language, a "prominent ASEAN official" was reported to have
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stated privately that the "time for soft speaking with the
Japanese is over. They have taken advantage of our gentle 
manner. It is time to give them some of their own medicine." 
Rajaratnam cautioned that if Japan did not concede that its 
"formidable" trade surplus with ASEAN should be reduced, then 
"it could lead to all sorts of political tensions and 
misunderstandings."22. Under pressure from ASEAN, the EEC 
also continued to improve the preferential access of Asian 
countries to its markets, to the extent that Lome Convention 
countries complained of the erosion of their own preferential 
treatment. In terms of tactics, however, influential voices in 
ASEAN continued to favour a moderate approach. Asked if ASEAN 
would apply pressure to Japan if it refused to liberalize its 
terms of trade and increase development assistance, Lee Kuan 
Yew replied that he thought that was the wrong approach. "If 
we begin to think in terms of retaliation, pressure or 
leverage even before we begin to talk, then we are off on the 
wrong foot." Nevertheless, the ASEAN economic ministers 
recommended in their report to the ASEAN heads of government 
that during the post-summit meeting with Fraser they should 
express serious concern over protectionist measures, urge 
Australia to liberalize trade barriers, and request better 
access for ASEAN products. They also formulated a long 
shopping list of requirements for the heads of government to 
present to Japan. With regard to New Zealand, the ministers 
recommended the development of a preferential economic 
relationship and that New Zealand be asked to phase out 
labour-intensive industries.
During the Tenth Ministerial Meeting in July, the
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f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  commended ASEAN f o r  t h e  p r o g r e s s  t h a t  h a d  
b e e n  made  i n  d i a l o g u e s  w i t h  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  M a l i k  n o t e d  t h a t  
t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  was b e i n g  t a k e n  "more  an d  more  s e r i o u s l y "  by 
t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s .  Romulo commented  t h a t  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
r e g a r d e d  ASEAN " w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  r e s p e c t " .  He a d d e d  t h a t  t h e  
t a s k  b e f o r e  ASEAN was t o  e n h a n c e  t h i s  f a v o u r a b l e  image  by 
i n c r e a s i n g  " t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  ASEAN a s  a s t r o n g ,  v i a b l e  and  
g r o w i n g  r e g i o n a l  a g g r u p e m e n t ."
K u a l a  Lumpur
As n o t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  i t  w as  w i d e l y  c o n s i d e r e d  a t  t h e  
t i m e  t h a t  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur  sum m it  
was n o t  t h e  m e e t i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  ASEAN l e a d e r s  on 4 an d  5 
A u g u s t  19 7 7 ,  an d  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  a t  b e s t  m o d e s t  p r o g r e s s  i n  
in t r a -A S E A N  c o o p e r a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  m e e t i n g s  on 6 - 8  
A u g u s t  w i t h  t h e  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r s  o f  J a p a n ,  A u s t r a l i a  a n d  New 
Z e a l a n d .  P o p u l a r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  sum m it  w i t h i n  ASEAN 
c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  r a t h e r  c l e v e r l y  by a c o v e r  d e s i g n  
f o r  A s i a w e e k  m a g a z i n e  w h i c h  was t i t l e d  "THE SUMMIT : ASEAN 
HOLDS THE ACES". I t  f e a t u r e d  t h e  f a c e s  o f  t h e  ASEAN l e a d e r s  on 
f i v e  a c e s  a n d  t h e  f a c e s  o f  F u k u d a ,  F r a s e r  an d  M uldoon  on t h r e e  
j o k e r  c a r d s .  Romulo r e m a r k e d  on h i s  a r r i v a l  p r i o r  t o  t h e  
sum m it  t h a t  he  t h o u g h t  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  B a l i  sum m it  w o u ld  be 
r e m e m b e r e d  f o r  i t s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  on t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  
o f  ASEAN, t h e  K u a l a  Lumpur sum m it  w o u ld  be  r e m e m b e r e d  " f o r  
d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h e  p o s i t i v e  s t a n c e  t h e  ASEAN m e m b e r - c o u n t r i e s  
h a v e  a d o p t e d  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  t h e i r  n e i g h b o u r s . "  I n  h i s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  
sum m it  S u h a r t o  s a i d  t h a t  he  was c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  t h e  p o s t - s u m m i t
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discussions would "bring about favourable results." He hoped 
that these dialogues and the forthcoming dialogue with the 
U.S., which was to commence in Manila in September 1977, would 
"produce tangible results within the shortest possible time". 
Hussein Onn looked forward to discussions "in the spirit of 
partnership and interdependence". Marcos was more blunt. He 
suggested that the time was propitious to urge the developed 
nations to "commit themselves to a firm policy of liberal 
trade instead of merely aid and to guarantee to us the 
purchasing power of our exports and assure us our markets for 
manufactures and semi-manufactures." Lee also was blunt. He 
noted that the upcoming talks with Japan could be "an 
important landmark on a road that could lead us to a more 
productive relationship." He warned, however, that they "could 
just as easily become a ceremonial ritual along an 
inconsequential road that will lead us nowhere." The outcome 
would depend, he predicted, on whether Japan took a long-term 
view and whether ASEAN was able to create the conditions which 
would make it advantageous for Japan to offer the concessions 
and assistance sought by ASEAN. Tanin merely commented that 
the meetings with Japan, Australia and New Zealand would 
provide an indication of "the growing recognition being 
accorded ASEAN as a viable and effective regional organization 
of international standing."
The summit communique issued on 5 August made clear the 
expectations of the ASEAN heads of government for the future 
development of their relations with Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and other developed countries. It urged the developed 
countries to take "urgent positive measures" to extend to
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ASEAN "an arrangement for the stabilisation of export earnings
derived from ASEAN commodity exports"; it viewed "with 
concern" the spread of protectionist tendencies in developed 
countries and called on them to "take immediate measures" to 
remove such protection; and it called on the developed 
countries to extend financial assistance to the ASEAN 
industrial projects "on the most favourable terms and 
conditions". With regard to Japan, the heads of government 
looked forward to an expansion of economic cooperation 
"particularly aimed at improving access to the Japanese 
market, stabilizing prices of and earnings from ASEAN export 
commodities, financing ASEAN industrial projects, and 
enhancing ASEAN agricultural and industrial development." 
Noting progress in projects with Australia, they stated that 
they would welcome closer ASEAN-Australia economic 
cooperation.
Prime Ministers Takeo Fukuda, Malcolm Fraser and Robert 
Muldoon were greeted in a series of airport welcome ceremonies 
upon their arrival in Kuala Lumpur on 6 August. Fukuda arrived 
with a delegation of 52, including Foreign Minister Hatoyama, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Sonoda and Minister of International 
Trade and Industry Tanaka, occupying several floors of the 
Regent Hotel. Fraser brought q delegation of 23, including 
Foreign Affairs Minister Peacock and Minister for Special 
Trade Negotiations Howard, and moved into the Equatorial 
Hotel. Muldoon checked into the Merlin Hotel with a delegation 
of nine.23. Proceedings commenced with an "informal" meeting 
on 6 August between the ASEAN heads of government and the 
three visitors. In a welcoming speech Hussein Onn expressed
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appreciation for the interest shown in ASEAN by Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand. He remarked upon ASEAN's unity of 
purpose, its collective determination and "our feeling of 
having achieved, step by step, what we have set out to do". 
Referring to the forthcoming discussions he expressed 
confidence that the results would be satisfactory to all 
concerned. He thought it would be "unreasonable to expect that 
there will be no problems or genuine differences of opinion", 
but suggested that these should not be allowed "to mar or 
weaken our long-standing friendship."
Separate meetings with the three prime ministers were to 
be held on the following two days. Expectations were running 
high. Asiaweek commented that after a long period when ASEAN 
had been looked upon "with condescension and apathy" it had 
won increasing respect at home and abroad. The post-summit 
meetings would mark ASEAN's "unmistakable arrival as a unique 
new force in international affairs". In Japan,- Western Europe 
and the United States, it was claimed, there was a belief 
"that the hour has arrived for the West to make an unequivocal 
economic commitment to the survival and stability of both 
ASEAN and the rest of the non-communist Third World." One by 
one, in the alphabetical order defined by protocol, the 
leaders of Australia, Japan and New Zealand would become "the 
first heads of government to negotiate with the leadership of 
the world's most dynamic new economic bloc." For all three, it 
was noted, the discussions could be "uncomfortable as well as 
historic". Whether they would be assured of a place in 
Southeast Asia's history books or only a chapter or a footnote 
"depends pretty much on them." Many ASEAN observers were said
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to believe that "nothing short of an Asian-style Marshall
Plan" was needed to win the race between communist insurgency
24and ASEAN development.
Clearly the most important post-summit meeting from the 
ASEAN perspective was that with Prime Minister Fukuda of 
Japan. The meeting had been preceded by extensive discussion 
and preparation between Japanese and ASEAN ministers and 
officials. Fukuda signalled at an early stage his desire to be 
as helpful to ASEAN as he felt possible. He adopted the 
position that he would be going to the meeting with ASEAN 
leaders with an open mind, ready to give very serious 
consideration to any proposals made, but he felt it 
inappropriate to come as "Santa Claus" with ready-packaged 
presents. Nevertheless, Fukuda appeared aware of the need to 
display generosity where possible in order to consolidate 
Japan's relationship with ASEAN. He found the invitation to 
the talks in Kuala Lumpur to be "very opportune and 
potentially epoch-making for Asia as a whole." He wanted to 
"make a great success of the meeting" and establish Japan as 
an "equal partner" and "true friend" of Southeast Asia. 
Japanese officials foreshadowed that after the ASEAN meeting, 
while visiting Manila, Fukuda would announce a set of 
principles governing Japan's relations with Southeast Asia, 
which were later dubbed "the Fukuda Doctrine".25.
The joint statement issued on 7 August at the conclusion 
of a three hour post-summit meeting with Fukuda recorded
that:
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Japan wished to assist ASEAN regional economic 
cooperation programs and to further strengthen the 
relations of interdependence between Japan and ASEAN: 
Japan recognized the need for a steady expansion of 
trade and undertook to facilitate improved ASEAN access 
to Japanese markets for manufactured and 
semi-manufactured and primary product exports;
Fukuda expressed his understanding of ASEAN's desire to 
establish a Stabex (Stabilization of Export Earnings) 
scheme and agreed to conduct a joint examination of the 
various problems involved;
Japan affirmed its readiness to extend assistance 
towards the realization of ASEAN industrial projects, 
provided that each project was established as an ASEAN 
project and that its feasibility was confirmed. Japan 
would "consider favourably" ASEAN's request for finance 
of one billion US dollars for these projects on 
concessional terms "to the extent possible";
Japan intended to more than double its Official 
Development Assistance in the next five years. Greater 
emphasis would be placed upon cooperation with ASEAN; 
ASEAN leaders stressed the importance of continued and 
intensified investment by the Japanese private sector. 
Fukuda expressed his willingness to encourage the 
Japanese private sector to participate in the 
development of ASEAN through investment and the transfer 
of technology;
Japan would participate actively and positively in 
existing international commodity agreements covering 
ASEAN commodities and would make best efforts for the
n n n  £* /
early conclusion of other commodity arrangements 
covering commodities of interest to ASEAN: 
both sides viewed with concern the spread of 
protectionist tendencies in developed countries and 
agreed on the urgent need to curb such protectionism; 
and
the ASEAN heads of government and the Prime Minister of 
Japan expressed their satisfaction that "a new era of 
cooperation and understanding" had been ushered in 
between ASEAN countries and Japan.
Reaction to Fukuda's position during the talks was not 
entirely uncritical. Lee Kuan Yew commented that had the ASEAN 
heads of government been able to reach "a different stage of 
consensus", the Japanese would not have got away with saying 
merely that they would give "favourable consideration" to 
financing of the ASEAN industrial projects. Evidently Fukuda 
had remarked that ASEAN and Japan were both in the same 
economic boat, to which Lee responded that "some of us are in 
first class and some of us in steerage." Musa Hitam also 
reacted cautiously to Fukuda's undertakings, noting that in 
the past Japan had adopted a hardline attitude on 
international commodity issues.26. Generally speaking, 
however, observers agreed that ASEAN’s talks with Fukuda had 
been successful. Lee concluded that the talks had been 
"constructive and stimulating". Romulo thought that the 
commitments made by Fukuda had been "far-reaching".2?• One 
commentator, noting that Fukuda1s impending arrival for the 
summit had been viewed with some misgivings by those who 
expected a "hard-headed, businesslike, even ungenerous
228
bargainer", concluded that he had in fact impressed all five 
ASEAN leaders with "his quiet, almost casual manner, with his 
concrete series of proposals, his open-minded reactions to 
ASEAN's counter-propositions, and his grasp of detail."
Another commentator thought that Fukuda "stole the show" and 
that the Kuala Lumpur summit would be remembered most for 
"drawing the economic barons of Japan into substantial 
involvement in the region's future."28.
The post-summit talks with Prime Minister Fraser were 
not nearly so well received. As one journalist put it, they 
"went down like a lead balloon". Prior to the summit it was 
reported that the Australian government had been given 
high-level assurances from ASEAN members that Fraser would not 
be embarrassed by continued sharp attacks on Australia's trade 
barriers during his meetings in Kuala Lumpur. Fraser also made 
it clear that Australia's economic problems would not permit 
any early major trade concessions. ASEAN officials were 
reported to be "frankly pessimistic" about the prospects for 
progress in the talks with Fraser. There was speculation that 
he could expect "a hot reception". Perhaps for this reason 
Australia reportedly "lobbied feverishly", but unsuccessfully, 
to have the three prime ministers talk to the ASEAN leaders as 
a group, rather than individually.29.
The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the 
post-summit meeting with Fraser was couched in polite terms.
It noted that this "historic meeting" had been "of the 
greatest value" in furthering bilateral ties. It recorded that 
Australia had been the first country to establish a formal
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relationship with ASEAN in 1974 (somewhat questionable in view
of prior exchanges with the EEC) and that it had been agreed 
that relationships between ASEAN and Australia were strong and 
constructive. Measures to enhance the quality and quantity of 
Australia's development assistance to ASEAN countries were 
announced, including a new commitment of A$10 million under 
the ASEAN-Australia Economic Cooperation Program and an 
undertaking to contribute to aspects of agreed ASEAN 
industrial projects. Australia undertook to sponsor an 
ASEAN/Australia Investment Seminar and to meet the cost of a 
Joint ASEAN/Australia Research Project whose aim would be to 
establish a sound basis of knowledge from which a long-term 
economic relationship would be developed. It was considered, 
according to the statement, that these initiatives would "give 
added impetus to the ASEAN/Australia relationship". On the 
sensitive trade issue, the statement noted that the ASEAN 
heads of government "while appreciating the domestic economic 
problems faced by Australia at the moment, expressed a strong 
wish to increase their share of trade with Australia." It was 
agreed that consultative mechanisms should be improved "to 
promote further a cooperative and constructive approach to the 
development of mutual trade relations" and that the foreign 
ministers would make "appropriate proposals". Similar 
observations to those in the Japan-ASEAN statement were made 
about cooperation in the commodity area and with regard to 
mutual concern about the spread of protectionist tendencies in 
developed countries.
Lee Kuan Yew stated that he thought the result of the 
meeting with Fraser had been "the best in the circumstances"
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since at the first of these meetings it was important that any 
recriminations should be avoided.• ASEAN leaders had 
adhered to their undertaking not to force a confrontation with 
Fraser, but in discussions at officials level there had 
apparently been some hard bargaining during negotiations on 
the joint statement, creating considerable ill-feeling on the 
ASEAN side. ASEAN officials reportedly stuck to their guns 
over their insistence on a firm commitment from Australia to 
undertake trade liberalization, and on a statement that 
Australia’s policies hindered ASEAN's exports. Australia would 
not accept either. Officials met until 4 am on the morning of 
the talks and resumed again at 8 am. "Sources" claimed that 
reference to Australia's protectionist trade policies was 
dropped from the joint statement on Fraser’s own insistence. 
Strong resentment was reported amongst ASEAN officials at what 
they considered the unreasonably defensive stand taken by 
Fraser and the Australian negotiating team, especially their 
refusal during the marathon negotiating sessions to accept any 
direct public criticism of Australia's protectionist policies. 
ASEAN officials noted later that both Japan and New Zealand 
had been more candid in admitting they had some restrictive 
measures in place and more diplomatic in stating that they 
intended to reduce protectionist barriers. Despite assurances 
to the contrary at government-to-government level, Malaysian 
trade officials said that they would continue to discourage 
Australian imports as the Australians had got away "scot free" 
from the post-summit meeting because Malaysia did not consider 
that as host it should press them unduly. The comment was made 
by "one observer" that Fraser's victory might prove to be a 
Pyrrhic one since, with regard to promised future trade
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concessions from Australia, ASEAN officials "might just grab 
the stick on which the carrot is dangled and use it to beat 
the daylights out of Australia."31* Disagreement continued 
after the meeting on the role of the proposed consultative 
body, whose purpose was to inform ASEAN countries of 
Australian trade policy developments.
While journalists concluded that Fraser had "showed 
little sympathy and won few friends" in Kuala Lumpur, New 
Zealand's Robert Muldoon had a much less difficult time of it, 
despite the similarity of his country's trade policies to 
those of Australia. Muldoon announced a proposed significant 
increase in development assistance to ASEAN countries. He also 
indicated a preparedness to implement and finance a number of 
measures designed to assist ASEAN exporters to obtain a 
greater share of the New Zealand market, despite New Zealand’s 
economic difficulties. He endorsed the ASEAN stand on 
commodity issues and on the spread of protectionism.
All in all, the post-summit talks went very well for 
ASEAN, especially in terms of the symbolic significance of the 
recognition accorded to ASEAN by the heads of government of 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. ASEAN's effectiveness as a 
vehicle for collective negotiations with other countries had 
been clearly demonstrated. Observers agreed that the presence 
of the other heads of government had given the summit "its 
biggest lift". The United States also acknowledged at the time 
of the summit that, as a State Department official reportedly 
put it, "ASEAN is an idea whose time has come."33- ASEAN 
Review declared triumphantly that although ASEAN's tenth
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anniversary might not be "an occasion for vigorous 
self-congratulation" in other respects, it would at least mark 
for the Association "the most visible sign of its recognition 
and acceptance by the world of diplomacy as one of the star 
actors on the global stage". This was especially due to the 
presence at the summit, as the "centrepiece of the spectacle", 
of the three invited prime ministers, "waiting in the anteroom 
of ASEAN diplomacy." "That, if nothing else," the magazine 
asserted, "makes the Summit a historic event in the progress 
of A S E A N " . • ASEAN leaders could take satisfaction from the 
fact that although with regard to its basic goals the 
Association may have failed to live up to the expectations of 
all, it had at least achieved a spectacular success in 
demonstrating its capacity to exercise international 
influence.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
Having now surveyed the aspirations and objectives that 
ASEAN's members developed for their Association during the 
course of its first ten years, and its record in achieving or 
failing to achieve them, it is appropriate to summarize and to 
evaluate ASEAN's performance during this period, focussing 
especially on its members' own views.
It must be recognised at the outset that the criteria by 
which it was considered that ASEAN's performance should be 
judged were subject to conflicting interpretations. There were 
divergent views amongst ASEAN participants and external 
commentators, and in some instances between these two groups, 
about the most important objectives for the Association, about 
the appropriate hierarchy for these objectives and about the 
degree of urgency with which they should be pursued. These 
divergences were evident from the time of ASEAN's formation, 
although their existence then and later was sometimes 
concealed at least partially by ASEAN's members due to their 
practice of decision-making by consensus. Rajaratnam on one 
occasion drew an analogy between the perceptions of ASEAN held 
by its members and the fiction writer's technique of 
portraying a key character through the eyes of a number of 
other personalities in the novel. The outcome was often to 
make that character more enigmatic than ever due to the
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different perspectives of those other personalities. In the 
same way, he suggested, ASEAN meant "many things to many 
people." Or as one academic put it: "Regionalism like beauty
may be said to exist in the eye of the beholder."1- On 
another occasion, while addressing the Tenth Ministerial 
Meeting, Rajaratnam apologized for not having given a balance 
sheet of ASEAN's performance during its first ten years 
"because I know that I can produce different and contradictory 
balance-sheets and all would be half-truths." One balance 
sheet, he noted, "could show that we could have done better 
than we did and that would be right", while another "could 
show that we had done better than what had been expected of 
five developing countries in the field of regional cooperation 
and that would be right too." It follows therefore that even 
for ASEAN's own members no single criteria for the 
Association's performance can be regarded as authoritative.
Achievements
While opinions varied as to the extent of ASEAN's 
accomplishments during its first decade, it is nevertheless 
striking that for the most part considerable satisfaction was 
expressed about the Association's performance by ASEAN's 
political leaders and government officials. For example, in 
his remarks at the Tenth Ministerial Meeting Romulo declared 
that ASEAN was now "here to stay". It was "alive and well" and 
had proved itself "a most effective instrument" for the 
pursuit of common objectives. Addressing the opening session 
of the Kuala Lumpur summit Hussein Onn noted that while the 
road towards the achievement of ASEAN's aims and purposes
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could not be expected to be smooth and easy, the Association 
had become "a viable, pragmatic and respected organization" 
and "a force that cannot lightly be brushed aside."
Many non-government commentators in the region shared 
this sense of satisfaction with ASEAN's achievements. One 
observed that the fact ASEAN had remained united up to the 
Bali summit, and had emerged from the summit as a vigorous 
regional grouping, was "somewhat of a miracle". Another noted 
that since the Bali summit ASEAN members had "nudged up the 
development of relations with their ASEAN fellow members and 
their cooperative efforts to bring about collective welfare to 
just about the top of the list" of their national foreign 
policy and economic priorities. The Far Eastern Economic 
Review described ASEAN as the only regional forum which was 
"a positive reality, a going concern, an organic international 
organization" to the extent that members were prepared to 
modify their assessment of their respective national interests 
"in the regional collective cause."2- Non-regional 
commentators also frequently praised ASEAN's accomplishments. 
One newspaper remarked that ASEAN, which had been "formed some 
years as essentially an economic talkfeast", had emerged as 
"the touchstone of political stability in the area." Another 
concluded that at end of its first ten years ASEAN had become 
"the pre-eminent regional organization in Asia". It had 
"contributed to regional stability and cultivated a sense of 
regional solidarity amongst its members, developed the mutual 
political confidence of its members, and promoted social and 
economic progress."3*
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Economic cooperation had been enshrined in the ASEAN 
Declaration as the organization's key aim. Other objectives 
were also important to ASEAN's founders, and over time they
were regarded as having increasing importance. The legitimacy 
of these other objectives was confirmed by the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord. Nevertheless, many ASEAN spokesmen continued to 
emphasize the primacy of economic cooperation. Malaysian 
spokesmen, perhaps fearful of the implications of any trend 
towards increased involvement in security affairs, were 
especially vocal on this point. Hussein Onn stressed to ASEAN 
economic ministers in March 1976 that the "central purpose" of 
ASEAN remained the advancement of the material well-being of 
Southeast Asian peoples through socio-economic cooperation. 
Others supported Malaysia's view. Upadit told the special 
meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in February 1977 that 
economic cooperation was "undoubtedly the strongest fibre in 
the fabric of ASEAN solidarity and cooperation". Romulo 
remarked to the Tenth Ministerial Meeting that: "The house of 
ASEAN has many mansions, but today economic development takes 
pride of place." The role of economic cooperation in 
underpinning political and security interests was often 
noted.
Though it was unanimously agreed that progress in the 
economic area had been painfully slow, ASEAN leaders pointed 
to the measures agreed at the Bali and Kuala Lumpur summits as 
proof that a beginning had been made in introducing more 
ambitious schemes to encourage intra-regiona1 economic 
cooperation. They also defended their modest achievements in 
this field during the Association's early years against
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criticisms that these achievements were insignificant, even
though they acknowledged that such cooperation had rarely gone 
beyond loosely coordinated measures designed primarily to 
assist national economic development. There was strong support 
also for the view that ASEAN could play a valuable role as a 
vehicle for collective bargaining with other countries on 
economic matters. Some even saw this as a more valuable role 
than the promotion of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. The 
presence of the heads of government of Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand at the Kuala Lumpur post-summit meetings and the 
pressure that ASEAN was able to place on them and on other 
developed countries with whom ASEAN had established formal 
dialogues, was sufficient testimony for most ASEAN 
participants to the beneficial role that the Association could 
play in the management of the external economic relations of 
its members.
A usually unstated but fundamental role played by ASEAN 
and endorsed by all its members was the preservation of 
amicable bilateral relations between them, or, in situations 
where such relations had broken down, the amelioration at 
least indirectly of the damaging effects of such disputes. 
ASEAN's leaders were well-pleased by the Association's success 
in this respect. From its inception ASEAN countries benefited 
from the moderating influence that their joint membership of 
the Association had on bilateral disputes. As early as 1972 
Lee Kuan Yew told the Fifth Ministerial Meeting that in his 
view the most valuable achievement of ASEAN had been the 
understanding and goodwill arising from the frequent meetings 
of the Association which had "helped to lubricate
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relationships which could otherwise have generated friction." 
Oemarjadi Njotowijono observed in 1974 that despite lack of 
progress in implementing large-scale projects, ASEAN leaders
were generally satisfied with the organization's progress 
because they "used a different yardstick", namely the 
organization's success in moderating bilateral disputes. They 
compared the present state of relations between Southeast 
Asian countries with the circumstances of 1967 and concluded 
that "in the fulfillment of this main function ASEAN has been 
a brilliant success." In a speech in the same year Rajaratnam 
admitted there had been "differences and even dissensions" 
between ASEAN members, but he asserted that "these have never 
been allowed, because of ASEAN, to get out of control or 
endanger the organization."^- Addressing other ASEAN leaders 
at the Kuala Lumpur summit Hussein Onn commented that because 
of the "rapport and sustained cooperation" within ASEAN the 
politics of confrontation had become past history. At the same 
meeting Marcos expressed the view, no doubt with the proposed 
dropping of the Sabah claim in mind, that "the most laudable 
achievement of this conference is, finally and at last, the 
transformation of this region that has been preoccupied with 
conflict, haunted by distrust and suspicion, into a region of 
cooperation and solidarity, beyond our most sanguine 
expectations." Others shared the view of ASEAN leaders that 
the most salient feature of the Association was, as a 
Malaysian academic put it, its success "in getting and keeping 
together the five nations". The New Straits Times commented 
that "the existence of ASEAN, and the full and frank 
intercourse at the highest levels it has made possible, have 
helped immeasurably in the building of regional consensus,
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have made it possible to nip in the bud issues which could 
threaten conflict, have facilitated the settlement of existing 
disputes" . ^ *
Since ASEAN's foundation political cooperation was a 
major focus of its activities. ASEAN's political objectives 
were formalized by the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. Many 
observers commented approvingly on ASEAN's accomplishments in 
this area. Members were able to coordinate their views on a 
number of political issues affecting the region. ASEAN's 
participants sometimes acknowledged that much of the 
Association's success had been in the political field. 
Cooperation in political matters was often much easier than in 
other areas given the frequent similarity in the political 
goals of ASEAN's members. Political cooperation was also a 
natural and almost unavoidable preoccupation for an 
organization whose key participants for many years were the 
foreign ministers and foreign ministry officials. ASEAN's 
members were, moreover, in some respects a natural political 
grouping, given that they comprised the majority of the 
non-communist countries in Southeast Asia. Many non-regional 
commentators asserted that ASEAN’s major accomplishments were 
in fact essentially political in nature. Despite the ASEAN 
Declaration's emphasis on economic, social and cultural 
objectives, one prominent analyst of ASEAN affairs concluded 
that it was "in essence" an organization which "aspires to a 
central role in the management of regional order". Another 
commentator also deduced that ASEAN's cooperation was 
essentially political in nature because "much of the 
activities have resulted from actions of political leaders
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concerned with creating a political climate conducive to more 
fruitful economic cooperation." A third non-regional observer, 
attempting to distinguish between the "image and reality" of 
ASEAN, came to the assessment that a balance sheet of ASEAN 
showed that its greatest success had been in the political and 
diplomatic field rather than in pursuit of its declared 
objectives in other areas. A fourth contended that "it was the 
political and diplomatic benefits of the association that led 
to its creation and permitted it to prosper. Indeed, political 
considerations determined the association's membership, 
defined the scope of its activities, and gave it its 
significance for each of its members .... It is appropriate, 
therefore, to speak of ASEAN not as an alliance, but as a 
political entente."6■
ASEAN's relative success in political cooperation 
entailed major benefits in several associated areas. Such 
cooperation enhanced its members' international influence and 
indirectly increased their security. These were conscious and 
very important objectives for ASEAN’s members. ASEAN's growing 
international influence at the end of its first decade was 
signified by the fact that any useful discussion of the 
foreign relations of the region could no longer focus 
primarily on the attitudes and activities of external major 
powers, as had often previously been the case, but now had to 
take into account as an important point of reference the 
individual and collective views of the indigenous states. With 
regard to security considerations, it has been argued by some 
observers that these were always of overriding importance in 
the minds of ASEAN leaders, and that the unity and solidarity
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displayed by them was primarily the result of a shared strong 
perception of external threat, first from China and later from
7Vietnam. Statements by ASEAN's participants sometimes lent 
support to this view. For example, Rajaratnam at the Ninth 
Ministerial Meeting countered the view that ASEAN did not 
bring great benefits by reminding the Association's critics 
that "without ASEAN and as isolated individual states we are 
far more vulnerable and helpless."
Shortcomings
Despite the evident satisfaction of ASEAN's members with 
the organization's overall achievements, they were not 
complacent. They were well aware of the Association's 
shortcomings and of the continued criticism levelled against 
it from both outside and within the region. Indeed, members 
themselves were all individually dissatisfied with particular 
aspects of ASEAN's policies or performance. Non-regional 
commentators were quick to point out, especially during 
ASEAN's first eight years, that it had not made major progress 
towards fulfilling the goals of the ASEAN Declaration. One 
writer described those years as having been characterized by a 
"somnolent, ineffective state of suspended animation". Others 
commented that ASEAN was "long on talk and short on action", 
"distinguished by resolutions rather than than by resolve", 
"long on vague ideals and short on concrete achievement". They 
concluded that during this period ASEAN's performance had been 
"lacklustre and disappointing", that it had "essentially 
marked time", and that its main achievement had been "a 
compilation of less than impressive, not to say trivial.
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projects."®- The Straits Times also noted just before the 
Bali summit that a frequent observation about ASEAN was that 
it had achieved success "by simply doing nothing important". 
For eight years it "inched forward rather than leapt through 
the pages of history ... spending most of the time 
consolidating major concepts rather than projects and 
alternating between optimism and despair."5- ASEAN generally 
secured much higher praise following the Bali and Kuala Lumpur 
summits; but many analysts, especially from outside the 
region, still expressed disappointment with the pace of its 
deve1opment.
Many of ASEAN's participants were themselves frustrated 
and exasperated by its slow progress. Ali Moertopo remarked 
following the Bali summit that it had to be admitted "that the 
tangible results of ASEAN cooperation have been few so far. 
and that much of the criticism directed to the Association, 
even the most severe and the most intemperate,' cannot easily 
be dismissed." Rajaratnam noted following the Kuala Lumpur 
summit that there were those who saw ASEAN as "a commendable 
charade", its notable achievements being "a lot of pious 
resolutions and a great deal of rhetoric signifying nothing." 
He observed on the eve of the summit that ASEAN's achievements 
had fallen short of the expectations of those who were 
enthusiastic about the Association. "For the last ten years", 
he said, "we have become very proficient in finger exercises, 
but we have not yet played the sonata on the piano."1®-
Those within and outside ASEAN who expressed 
disappointment with its achievements often appeared to believe
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that the real benefits of cooperation within the organization
would only be realized when its activities, especially within 
the economic sphere, reached a higher level of cooperative 
endeavour. Especially after the communist victories in 
Indochina in 1975, both ASEAN's members and external critics 
increasingly called for the Association to demonstrate its 
viability by showing its ability to move into more difficult 
areas of economic cooperation. Because economic cooperation 
was given so much emphasis by ASEAN it came to be seen as the 
key criteria by which the progress of the Association should 
be judged. Unfortunately, this also became one of the areas of 
cooperation in which it appeared to be most difficult to 
achieve substantial progress. The growing influence of 
advocates of regional economic cooperation was demonstrated by 
their success in commiting ASEAN to attempts at expanded 
intra-ASEAN economic cooperation following the Bali and Kuala 
Lumpur summits. But this was not accomplished easily and was 
not on a sufficient scale to satisfy those who believed that 
ASEAN's future success depended on more extensive integration 
of its economic and political activities.
It is clear that many of ASEAN's participants saw a 
bright future for the Association through the expansion of 
integrative activities. The Philippines appeared to be 
particularly wedded to this view. Romulo hoped for the 
development of a "Southeast Asian Community" which would 
"achieve a certain level of a super-national body." Marcos 
noted in October 1976 that ASEAN had developed the beginnings 
of "a regional economic community, through which all the 
member-states can undertake cooperative effort in their
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national and regional development programs and work towards 
broadening the complementarity of their respective economies." 
He urged that "the integration of ASEAN must come as a 
priority." A leading Filipino businessman also applauded 
progress after the Bali summit towards the creation of an 
"ASEAN Economic Community".H • Singapore, which had perhaps 
most to gain economically from the integration of ASEAN 
economies, was also a persistent supporter of measures towards 
the creation of a more integrated regional economy. One 
Singaporean academic went so far as to suggested that there 
was an "obvious need for a supranational or regional 
industrial development authority to coordinate national 
industrial development plans and to identify projects which 
can only be promoted on a regional level and by direct 
government participation. .  other ASEAN countries also had 
many adovocates of greater integration, especially economists 
who saw considerable potential in the integrative economic 
measures which had been recommended by the U.N. study team. A 
Malaysian economist, for example, observed that it had been 
correctly stated that "if the countries of this region could 
agree to some form of integration and harmonization of 
policies they will become a viable entity of 250 million 
people with an abundance of resources."^- Non-ASEAN critics 
also saw it as a failing that the Association had not 
developed a greater degree of integration, comparing it 
sometimes unfavourably in this respect with other regional 
organizations such as the EEC. The Far Eastern Economic 
Review commented that although 1976 had been a "watershed 
year" for ASEAN, it "was not the decisive turning point 
towards political community and economic integration that it
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might have been." ASEAN had, it added, "failed to realize the
promise outlined in a U.N. report it had earlier 
commissioned". In organizational terms, both ASEAN's members
and outside commentators often lamented that ASEAN had failed 
to set up supra-national regional institutions to encourage 
the development of a regional outlook. Some foreign observers 
pointed to "the need to create a regional institution or 
institutions which will in turn create an echelon of those 
with a vested interest in regional solutions".^ .
Advocates of regional integration usually backed up 
their arguments with the view that ASEAN's progress had been 
excessively inhibited by the preponderant influence of 
national interests over regional interests in the 
organization's decision-making processes. Musa Hitam on one 
occasion expressed this view forcefully with the observation 
that there was a need to think more in terms of "supra ASEAN 
nationalism", to think "not in terms of having to give away 
concessions, but actually making our contribution to the 
overall mutual development of all the five member-countries." 
He asserted there could never be any real progress "if we are 
to allow ourselves to be continually bogged down by narrow 
nationalism". Or as a Bangkok Post editorial put it: "Unless 
the attitudes of the various governments are basically changed 
from the narrower and selfish aspects of nationalism towards 
the long-range benefits of regionalism for all people in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN will continue to stagnate".15- There 
clearly had been several instances when some ASEAN members had 
resisted ambitious economic cooperation measures proposed by 
other ASEAN countries. Most frequently these cases had seen
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Indonesia pitted against Singapore, the latter being supported 
usually by the Philippines and often by Thailand also. A 
Japanese observer concluded that progress towards economic
integration in ASEAN had been extremely slow "mainly because 
of a mutual distrust and persistent fear among the ASEAN 
member-countries of more economically advanced 
member-countries dominating the other partner countries and 
retarding the pace of economic development of the 
latter."16-
There were other areas also in which some of ASEAN's 
participants expressed disappointment with the Association's 
performance. Although ASEAN had indeed played a very useful 
role in ameliorating bilateral disputes, bilateral tensions 
persisted and were a major limiting factor on ASEAN's 
performance. A factor in Indonesia's lukewarm interest in 
expanded regional economic cooperation was probably its 
continuing antipathy towards Singapore. This antipathy had 
been aggravated by Singapore's abstention on the U.N. 
resolution condemning Indonesia's military actions in Timor 
during the latter half of 1975. Malik noted caustically that 
it seemed that Singapore was afraid that it would share the 
same fate as East Timor.17- Strains also continued in 
relations between Singapore and Malaysia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand and even to some degree 
between Indonesia and Malaysia.1®-
There were also areas of ASEAN's cooperation in the 
political field where some of ASEAN's members were 
dissatisfied with the policies adopted by the organization. A
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notable example was Malaysia's private disappointment with the
failure of other ASEAN members to endorse more active measures 
to promote the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality proposal 
and to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards Vietnam. Other 
ASEAN members appeared to become increasingly opposed to the 
idea of including the Indochina states in ASEAN at some future 
stage. Malaysian leaders nevertheless repeatedly stated their 
believe that the interests of the states of ASEAN and 
Indochina were "ultimately convergent" and stressed the common 
destiny of all nations in Southeast Asia. As a "non-military, 
non-ideological and non-antagonistic" organization Malaysia 
considered that ASEAN could meet "the common requirements" of 
all Southeast Asian countries. It pledged itself to "strive 
relentlessly for a truly Southeast Asian ASEAN".19- In the 
face of Vietnam's continued criticism of ASEAN, most ASEAN 
members preferred to see the future of Southeast Asia in terms 
of peaceful competition and cooperation between two separate 
groupings. They appeared to reject the notion that ASEAN might 
disband in order that a new regional organization could be 
established to include both communist and non-communist states 
of Southeast Asia.20-
In addition, there were evidently some members of ASEAN 
who were disappointed that the Association did not move 
towards a greater role in promoting the security interests of 
its members. At various times, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines appeared to favour increased cooperation in this 
area. Proposals of this kind were generally resisted most 
strongly by Malaysia and Singapore. ASEAN’s failure to make a 
major impact in the area of social and cultural cooperation
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was a l s o  c r i t i c i z e d  by a number  o f  i t s  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a nd  by 
f o r e i g n  c o m m e n t a t o r s . 21 •  H u s s e i n  Onn l e n t  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e s e  
c r i t i c s  a t  t h e  B a l i  summi t  w h e r e  he r e m a r k e d  t h a t  ASEAN
c o o p e r a t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  s t o p  a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  a nd  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  l e v e l .  He f e l t  t h a t  i t  was  " t i m e  t o  e n c o u r a g e  
more  p e o p l e - t o - p e o p l e  c o n t a c t  a nd  t o  g i v e  ASEAN a g r e a t e r  
s e n s e  o f  c o mmu n i t y  . . .  t h r o u g h  i n t e n s i f i e d  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n . "
N a t i o n a l i s m  v e r s u s  R e g i o n a l i s m
S u c h  c r i t i c i s m s  a s  t h o s e  o u t l i n e d  a b o v e  d i d  n o t  go 
u n c h a l l e n g e d  by ASEAN's s p o k e s m e n ,  h o w e v e r .  They  u s e d  a 
v a r i e t y  o f  a r g u m e n t s  t o  d e f e n d  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  a c h i e v e m e n t s  
a nd  p e r f o r m a n c e .  I n  r e p l y  t o  t h o s e  who i n s i s t e d  t h a t  ASEAN's 
p e r f o r m a n c e  s h o u l d  be m e a s u r e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  p r o g r e s s  
t o w a r d s  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  t h e y  a s s e r t e d ,  
c o r r e c t l y ,  t h a t  ASEAN’s f o u n d e r s  h a d  n e v e r  e n v i s a g e d  t h a t  i t  
s h o u l d  become a s u p r a - n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  They  saw ASEAN 
r a t h e r  a s  p r i m a r i l y  a means  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  m e m b e r - c o u n t r i e s .  R i t h a u d d e e n ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  p r o t e s t e d :  "Most  p e o p l e  do n o t  r e a l i z e  t h a t  ASEAN i s  
n o t  a s u p r a - n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a n d  i t  i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t h a t  
t h i s  w i l l  be  c h a n g e d . " 2 2 .  a n  I n d o n e s i a n  a c a d e m i c  p u t  i t ,  
e v e n  t h o u g h  many i n  ASEAN c o n c e d e d  t h a t  i t  was  " t o o  o f t e n  t h e  
c a s e  t h a t  r e g i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  f o r c e d  t o  g i v e  way 
t o  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m e mb e rs "  o f  ASEAN, t h e s e  same 
p e o p l e  a l s o  b e l i e v e d  t h a t :  " N e i t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  n o r  
e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  a r e a l i s t i c  t a r g e t . "  T he y  e m p h a s i z e d  
t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n  s t a t e  was  s t i l l  t h e  p r i m a r y  u n i t  o f  l o y a l t y  i n
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Southeast Asia and that this was unlikely to change, Indonesia 
was probably the strongest advocate of this point of view. 
Another Indonesian analyst suggested that given the fact that 
most ASEAN countries were still grappling with the problems of 
nation-building it seemed "over-ambitious to project yet 
another new idea - that of regional indentity". The 
Indonesian Times stressed that ASEAN was "not a federation of 
states", and that there should be no discussion of national 
interest giving way to regional as this could lead to "a 
conflicting deadlock". "The art of the game", the newspaper 
stated, was "to let the sovereign interests of the member 
states as they are." The notion that a single nation must 
concede to the will of the majority could not be applied. When 
Malik was asked in an interview in 1971 when ASEAN would reach 
a point where its members would be asked to surrender elements 
of national sovereignty he responded that that would not be 
necessary if ASEAN's affairs were well organized.23.
Other ASEAN members, some of whom saw integration - at 
least at a relatively modest level - as a long-term 
possibility, either agreed with or were compelled to acquiesce 
to the Indonesian viewpoint. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Fifth 
Ministerial Meeting in 1972, acknowledged that "for the 
present" ASEAN did "not aim at integrating a regional 
economy". Rather, ASEAN's main aim was "to strengthen and 
consolidate domestic economies". Even after the Bali and Kuala 
Lumpur summits, when ASEAN did commit itself to a modest 
degree of economic integration, members talked in terms of the 
harmonization of national and regional interests rather than 
of the latter taking precedence over the former. As a
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Singaporean economist commented, ASEAN economic cooperation 
"however desirable and important, is no substitute for 
national effort to look after the welfare of its people".
Regional efforts could be "no more than a supplement to 
national endeavour". A Malaysian economist observed that it 
was "wishful thinking to expect that ASEAN leaders would be 
willing to compromise the national objectives for some 
uncertain regional benefit." He noted that there was always a 
tension between national and regional interests and suggested 
that a practical approach should emphasize common denominators 
and strive for an equal distribution of benefits.24.
Hussein Onn also addressed this matter during his speeches to 
both the Bali and Kuala Lumpur summits. In Bali he stated that 
ASEAN continued to exist "because it does not demand from us 
what we cannot give." ASEAN cooperation succeeded, he claimed, 
"because such cooperation is freely extended, arising out of 
the experience that in specific instances of cooperation, our 
separate individual interests are advanced even as our common 
regional interest is served." In Kuala Lumpur he called for 
preservation of "the basic equation and balance between 
national and regional interests that have been ASEAN’s 
cornerstone since its inception".
Consensus
During the course of ASEAN's first decade its members 
came to accept that the fundamental principle governing 
collective decision-making should be that of consensus. As 
Romulo expressed it on one occasion: "The philosophy of action 
in ASEAN has always been, and I presume for all time, a
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commonality of interests rooted in a consensus arrived at
through consultation, in which no member exceeds another in
25influence or weight." ' This principle ensured that where a 
member believed that a particular national interest would be 
affected unacceptably by a collective decision then it would 
have the ability to prevent that decision being taken, 
although there was often considerable pressure on members to 
give way on a particular issue for the sake of the regional 
interest, and there were instances where members were indeed 
willing to sacrifice some part of their national interest for 
the sake of the regional interest. Rajaratnam claimed on one 
occasion following the Bali summit that: "Far more than people 
realize ASEAN has succeeded in compelling its members to 
balance national interests with the imperatives of collective 
interests. ASEAN solidarity is both directed and 
institutionalized. Many routine problems which before ASEAN 
would have been discussed and disposed of in purely national 
terms are now increasingly discussed and resolved in ASEAN 
terms." Clearly there were also many instances in which 
collective deliberations did not lead to the regional interest 
predominating over the national interest. However, whatever 
the outcome in particular cases, ASEAN's members accepted that 
the consensus principle was necessary to safeguard the 
national interests of member-oountries. As Hussein Onn 
explained at the Bali summit, ASEAN sought "not to harm but to 
harmonize" the interests of all its members.
Some observers drew attention to the fact that 
consensus, rather than majority decision-making, had led to 
ASEAN becoming an organization in which progress was in many
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instances determined by the "lowest common denominator", 
resulting in the stifling of new initiatives and the lowering
o  f:of expectations. ' On occasion, ASEAN members themselves 
bewailed these consequences of the consensus style. However, 
they continued to defend the need for consensus on the grounds 
that it was the only practical basis on which to proceed and 
essential to the organization's continued viability. An 
Indonesian analyst, Lie Tek Tjeng, explained: "If someone 
commands and others have to obey, I am afraid ASEAN will not 
work. In a democracy, we talk about majority rule, but in this 
case, I wonder if we may have to reverse it, and go for 
minimum requirements that are acceptable to all. I think then 
we can be more realistic." A Malaysian journalist commented 
that what made "the cement" of ASEAN's modest progress in 
commencing new cooperative activities "stick hard and fast" 
was the fact that it concentrated only on those areas in which 
agreement was seen to be possible.27. This is a persuasive 
argument. If decisions had been taken in circumstances where a 
member felt that its own national interests had been ignored, 
this would have been destructive to ASEAN's solidarity and 
likely to undermine support for the organization.
Members also defended the consensus approach on the 
basis that in the process of arriving at a decision differing 
viewpoints were often resolved, or at least a greater 
understanding of conflicting views resulted. Romulo noted that 
one of the benefits of the consensus method was "the show of 
solidarity, and the rewards therefor, out of giving way to the 
enthusiasms and passions of others in a collegial forum .... 
this is a Southeast Asian manner of coping with seemingly
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irreconcilable differences." Similarly, Rajaratnam commented 
that consensus was often forged "through the modification and 
adjustment of what were initially irreconcilable 
viewpoints . 1128 .
Another way in which the consensus approach worked in 
ASEAN's favour was that it minimized the degree of conflict 
within the organization arising from bilateral tensions and 
from the disparity in size of particular members. A notable 
achievement was the ability of ASEAN to accommodate the 
interests of such enormously dissimilar members as, for 
example, Indonesia and Singapore.
A number of commentators expressed the view at various 
stages in ASEAN’s development that Indonesia, by virtue of its 
size, resources and memories of empire, might "see itself, if 
not as the leader of Southeast Asia, as primus inter pares 
within ASEAN", or that it would seek "a position of regional 
primacy." One journalist referred to a "basic dichotomy" 
within ASEAN between Indonesia "which believes it is large and 
strong enough to go it alone if necessary" and four smaller 
nations "which feel much more keenly that the survival of each 
relates to the survival of all."29. some observers had 
assumed at the time of ASEAN's formation that Indonesia would 
use the Association to assert its own position in the region. 
This view appeared to be given some substance by remarks by 
Adam Malik. Shortly after ASEAN's formation he was reported to 
have warned big countries such as Japan not to try to 
influence ASEAN to suit their own interests since Indonesia, 
as the big nation in ASEAN, would hit back. He also reportedly
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remarked that "it is natural that the bigger magnet draws the 
o nsmaller ones." This drew a reply from Thanat Khoman who 
stated that no "big brothers" were wanted in ASEAN and that 
"the fundamental philosophy of ASEAN is equal 
partnership."31- Occasionally, other ASEAN participants also 
expressed some apprehension about Indonesian ambitions for 
regional influence, and it is certainly true that there were 
very few major decisions taken by ASEAN which did not accord 
with Indonesia's preferences.
The record of Indonesia's involvement in ASEAN 
indicates, however, that on most occasions it accepted the 
equal status of other members. It did not seek to dominate the 
Association or to impose its views aggressively upon the other 
members. Lie Tek Tjeng argued that Indonesia could not dictate 
what other members of ASEAN should do because if it did so 
"the very spirit of ASEAN would be dead." He added that 
Indonesia would not forego trying "to build a consensus 
whenever there is a problem which calls for a common 
stand."33- Suharto himself stressed at the Bali summit that 
ASEAN members took common decisions and "cooperate as partners 
on an equal footing." This, he believed, constituted "the 
principal strength of our Association." Indonesia's status as 
the unofficial "first amongst equals" in ASEAN derived 
essentially from an unspoken deference on the part of other 
ASEAN members, based on their recognition of Indonesia's 
considerably larger size and population. The fortunate 
coincidence of Indonesia's alphabetical precedence over other 
ASEAN members, and ASEAN's practice of rotating its meetings 
according to alphabetical order, subtly endorsed Indonesia's
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status. All ASEAN members preferred In the main, however, to 
share In the Association's joint achievements rather than to 
view it primarily as a means to the fulfillment of narrower 
national goals. Ghazali Shafie observed on one occasion that 
to discuss foreign policy without talking about national 
interests was "like discussing love without mentioning sex - 
which may be elevating but hardly realistic." But he asserted 
a higher common interest in joint efforts to promote the 
stability and progress of the region.33-
Even Singapore was able to play an important role in 
ASEAN quite out of proportion to its miniscule size and 
population relative to other members. Singapore might also 
have been handicapped by the fact that it was the only 
economically-advanced, semi-industrialized, non-agricultural 
country in the group, and also the only member with a 
predominantly Chinese populat ion.34. These circumstances did 
indeed lead to some difficulty for Singapore, complicated 
further by its tendency towards outspoken bluntness in its 
dealings with the rest of the world - a tendency perhaps 
itself created by its concern that its interests should not be 
overlooked. Thanat Khoman commented at the time of the Kuala 
Lumpur summit that the smallest ASEAN member was "perhaps the 
most advanced industrially and perhaps the most aggressive in 
pushing its demands. So it tends to create suspicion. It tends 
to make the other partners beware of not allowing the smallest 
to dominate the others economically."3 -^ Singapore 
benefited, however, from its treatment as an equal within 
ASEAN and won respect, even if sometimes grudgingly, for its
articulate contribution to the ASEAN debate and its defence of
259
ASEAN's interests. Singapore came to identify its interests 
strongly with those of the Association.
Gradual ism
A further argument employed by ASEAN members against the 
organization’s critics, and a natural consequence of the 
emphasis on consensus, was that a cautious, evolutionary 
approach to ASEAN's development was likely to lead to surer 
gains in the long term. This approach came under question 
during the periods leading to the Bali and Kuala Lumpur 
summits. However, by the close of the Association's first 
decade, caution was enshrined alongside consensus as another 
fundamental principle of ASEAN's mode of operation, advocated 
warmly by some and accepted reluctantly by others. Adam Malik, 
for example, argued that efforts to strengthen ASEAN had "only 
naturally gone through a slow motion " because regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia was "only a new venture". It 
took quite a long time, he reasoned, "to harmonize the 
national interest of each member state with the regional 
interest as a whole". Philippines Secretary of Industry 
Vicente Paterno explained to a conference in mid-1977 that 
ASEAN had "adopted the philosophy of step-by-step progress ... 
the idea that it is more prudent at this initial stage of 
development of our regional aggrupation to set directions for 
our voyage of cooperation, and to plot the paths that we will 
take from one step to the next but not commit ourselves to 
long-term plans .... As mutual understanding increases, 
perceptions become more universally shared, ASEAN cooperation 
can take larger steps and programs of longer range can be
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confidently announced.“36- Suharto, at the Bali summit, 
noted that there may be some who wondered what were ASEAN's 
concrete achievements and who felt that it could move at a 
faster pace. He stressed to these people that “regional 
cooperation takes time before it can move forward with greater 
rapidity." On the same occasion Hussein Onn remarked that 
ASEAN had “always made haste slowly, not because we are not 
moved by dreams of what is desirable, but because we are only 
too aware of what is sustainable." The New Straits Times, at 
the conclusion of the Kuala Lumpur summit, asserted that those 
who demeaned the achievements of ASEAN “misunderstand the 
nature of regional integration, the speed with which national 
interests can be harmonized with regional interests and the 
conditions necessary for supranational ism to be built up. They 
lack an understanding of the obstacles to economic 
cooperation". A Malaysian official addressing a symposium in 
October 1977 observed that any appraisal of ASEAN's 
achievements would depend on the yardstick which was used: “If 
we had set our expectation too high, especially in the 
economic fields, we would certainly be disappointed. On the 
other hand if the successes were to be measured against the 
failures of past history, I am sure one cannot deny that we 
have made great strides in all fields“.37-
Even Rajaratnam conceded that ASEAN’s “Mini Minor" 
performance may have been a matter where there had been no 
choice because: “If it had gone any faster the organization 
could have cracked up under the strain as did earlier attempts 
at regional cooperation." He suggested to the informal foreign 
ministers meeting in February 1977 that the shaping of
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regional cooperation was "less like forging steel and more
like delicate filigree work" since an essential precondition 
for regional cooperation between five sovereign states with 
different interests, different social, economic and political 
styles, and different historical antecedents was "the creation 
of confidence and mutual trust between the partners, the 
emergence of a conviction that such differences of views and 
interests as may manifest themselves from time to time are of 
less consequence than a deep awareness of our collective 
interests." Such a conviction of overriding collective 
interest, he warned, "cannot be created overnight." In a 
speech in October 1977 Rajaratnam noted there were different 
perceptions as to the desirable pace of regional cooperation. 
Some felt ASEAN should move faster, but others, he noted, "on 
equally valid grounds", cautioned a somewhat slower pace.38- 
Lee Kuan Yew's resignation at the conclusion of the Kuala 
Lumpur summit to a slower pace of cooperation in areas such as 
trade liberalization has been noted previously.
Many observers reacted sympathetically to ASEAN's view 
that caution was advisable, rather than forcing the pace of 
regional cooperation. One noted that ASEAN had preferred "a 
cautious and slow advance, lest a more forceful pace should 
bring into the open latent intra-organizational conflicts with 
a capacity to destroy the Association and therefore expose the 
members individually to the more dangerous international 
environment." Another suggested that given the circumstances 
of ASEAN's birth it was inevitable that its development "had 
to be cautious, slow, and relatively unproductive of exciting 
results." Because ASEAN's founders were determined that it
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would not fail as previous schemes had done, they 
"intentionally chose cautious optimism, pragmatism and modesty 
of purpose as the guiding principles in their common approach 
to regionalism." The same approach was sustained during the 
later years of ASEAN's development, it was argued, because of 
the continuing "socio-economic heterogeneity and political 
diversity of Southeast Asia". These circumstances meant that 
it was "extremely unlikely that the pace could have been 
faster, or that it would have produced better results even if 
it could."39.
ASEAN's emphasis on a cautious approach had the 
additional tactical advantage that it enabled it to placate 
those who wished to see it progress to higher levels of 
cooperation with the argument that such goals were not seen as 
undesirable in principle, merely that they would only be 
achieved in the longer term. ASEAN could therefore ask its 
critics, both within and outside the organization, to suspend 
judgement until a later date. Hussein Onn in a speech in April 
1976 claimed that in the context of regional cooperation ten 
years was "a relatively short time in the life of an 
organization such as ASEAN in which to judge its success or 
otherwise." When Marcos was asked during the Bali summit if 
ASEAN would move towards an economic community he was able to 
reply: "We are moving gradually and slowly towards it". Asked 
about the possibility of an ASEAN common market Upadit could 
reply that this was what ASEAN was "heading for". "But", he 
added, "one has to proceed very cautiously and patiently. In 
this connection, one should not expect a spectacular overnight 
result which is not possible. We still have to learn a lot and
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we have to accumulate experiences."
The Habit of Cooperation
A further corollary of ASEAN's emphasis on consensus and 
on a cautious approach to the pursuit of new cooperative 
activities was that when faced with the charge that ASEAN had 
made few tangible achievements, ASEAN's spokesmen frequently 
fell back also on the argument that the organization's chief 
accomplishments had been in the field of intangibles. Survival 
itself was seen as a major accomplishment. A regional 
correspondent noted that ASEAN's first decade had passed "and, 
against tremendous odds, ASEAN is intact." He recalled that 
when ASEAN was established "there were many sceptics (and I 
was one among them) who felt it would go the way of many 
previous attempts at regional cooperation."^- ASEAN's 
spokesmen emphasized, however, that the organization had 
achieved more in the area of intangibles than mere survival. 
They pointed especially to the entrenchment of "the habit of 
cooperation" between members as the most important achievement 
of ASEAN's early years. In this way they sought to rebut the 
accusation that ASEAN's progress before the Bali summit had 
been insignificant. As early as 1972 Ghazali Shafie asserted 
that although ASEAN had not been as successful in economic 
cooperation as some "critical and impatient observers" would 
like, it had made progress in achieving "a greater and growing 
community of interest between the member-countries of ASEAN 
... above all there has developed a healthy habit of 
cooperation, which promises well for the future development of 
the region as an organized and integrated entity." In 1974 Tun
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Razak commented that ASEAN had "made some progress in 
establishing among us a genuine and growing habit of thinking 
and working together in regional terms."42' At the Bali 
summit Suharto identified one of ASEAN's most obvious and 
important achievements as "the deepening of mutual 
understanding, friendship and cooperation among us". This he 
felt would constitute "the basic strength of our Association 
in facing the challenges in the future." The Bali summit 
communique expressed satisfaction with ASEAN's progress since 
1967 "especially in fostering the spirit of cooperation and 
solidarity among member states." This spirit of cooperation, 
derived in part from the growing familiarity of ASEAN leaders 
and officials with their counterparts in other 
member-countries, came to be dubbed as "the ASEAN spirit". In 
a speech in April 1977 Hussein Onn stated that perhaps the 
greatest achievement of ASEAN during its first ten years was 
the development of this ASEAN spirit amongst its members, 
which he defined as "a spirit of understanding, tolerance, 
mutual respect and solidarity."43-
Observers readily acknowledged that the habit of 
cooperation had become firmly established, even though it did 
not always lead to unanimity or to tangible results. Somsakdi 
Xuto in 1971 noted the emergence of a growing number of 
government officials responsible for regional cooperation 
activities whom he labelled "regional cooperation 
practicioners". Frequent close contacts between members of 
this group had led to a deep commitment to the promotion of 
regional cooperation. By 1973 he believed that the habit of 
consultation between ASEAN members on all matters of common
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interest had become normal. Another observer, writing at about
the same time, concurred that there were within ASEAN 
"innumerable small but increasing contacts, formal and 
informal, between governments, other institutions, and 
peoples, which might cumulatively result in the reduction of 
the relative significance of the untramelled individuality of 
single governments, by developing new and resilient common 
interests and activities between peoples, and perhaps 
inculcating and nourishing new practical senses of regional 
community." Another commentator, writing after the Kuala 
Lumpur summit, believed that perhaps ASEAN's greatest asset 
was its "spirit of cooperation" which he thought was, like 
nationalism, a psychological dimension that did not lead to 
easy quantification, but was the cement that helped to 
associate national and regional interests.44•
Reqiona1 ism
ASEAN's spokesmen frequently argued that the "habit of 
cooperation" and the "ASEAN spirit" had led also to a basic 
commitment by its members to "regionalism", as a guiding 
principle in their relations with each other and with the rest 
of the world. Hussein Onn remarked at the Bali summit that the 
development of a community of regional interests was 
"necessarily a slow process", but "in ten short years" ASEAN 
had succeeded in "transforming radically the climate of 
alienation into a climate of cooperation". ASEAN countries had 
become "true neighbours, more conscious of our common destiny, 
more aware of our shared traditions and histories and more 
determined to work together towards higher levels of
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cooperation." He claimed at the Kuala Lumpur summit that all 
ASEAN members had come to regard regionalism "as the 
cornerstone of their foreign policies." Rajaratnam told his 
colleagues at the Tenth Ministerial Meeting that a point worth 
bearing in mind was that ten years ago ASEAN members were 
"seperate entities going their different ways". Now there was 
"a developing conviction that not only are its over 200 
million people members of a regional community but also that 
they could better meet the uncertainties and challenges of the 
future through collective effort." On another occasion, after 
commenting on the frequency of ASEAN meetings, Rajaratnam 
acknowledged that these meetings were "often inconclusive", 
but the point he said he wished to stress was that "over the 
years, perhaps without some of us realizing it, an ASEAN, 
regional approach to problems has crept into our 
thinking."45.
Non-regional commentators appeared generally to agree 
that ASEAN had had considerable success in cultivating a 
feeling of regional consciousness amongst its members. One of 
these noted after the Bali summit that there had developed "a 
sense of shared central view among the member governments of 
ASEAN which permeates their joint endeavours, however limited 
they may be. This shared central view arises from the measure 
of common identity among the five member governments in terms 
of social and economic priorities as well as their prevailing
external associations."46.
Socialization
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ASEAN1s members defended the Association against the
charge that its influence was confined to a small elite of 
politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. They argued that the 
"socialization" of ASEAN was already taking place. Rajaratnam 
claimed as early as 1975 that the "ASEAN spirit" had 
"percolated, if in a somewhat vague way, to grassroot levels." 
He believed that the concept of ASEAN had gained "popular 
approval as a worthwhile aspiration", and that there was "no 
serious agitation for the abandonment of ASEAN" within 
member-countries.
In 1977 ASEAN officials produced a publication to 
commemorate ASEAN's first ten years which listed 27 private 
organizations affiliated with ASEAN ranging from the 
Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry and 
the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization to the ASEAN Trade 
Union Council, the ASEAN Federation of Women, the Committee 
for ASEAN Youth Cooperation, the ASEAN Pediatric Federation 
and the ASEAN Council of Museums.47- Events such as an ASEAN 
film festival and an ASEAN orchid exhibition were held with 
increasing frequency. The Confederation of ASEAN Journalists 
held its first meeting in June 1976 and in the same month a 
Federation of ASEAN Newspaper Publishers was established. A 
number of projects were in train in the fields of 
transportation, telecommunications, civil aviation, 
meteorology, energy and shipping. The ASEAN Federation of 
Shippers' Councils, established in May 1976, was urged to take 
measures to mitigate the adverse effects of increases in 
freight rates by the international shipping conferences. 
Formation of an ASEAN-based shipping conference and the
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development of an ASEAN containerization program were 
discussed. An ASEAN contingency plan for maritime 
oil-pollution control was adopted. A project to establish a
Submarine Communications Cable Network to link all ASEAN 
countries was commenced. An ASEAN Regional Satellite System 
was discussed. An ASEAN Banking Council was established in 
August 1976. Studies continued on the possible establishment 
of an ASEAN clearing union. New activities were devised to 
involve women and youth in ASEAN affairs. An ASEAN Declaration 
of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs and an 
ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters 
were signed. The Committee on Food and Agriculture conducted 
studies on the supply and demand for food and strategic 
agricultural products, fisheries resource management, forestry 
resource conservation, the supply and demand for animal feed, 
and the desirability of buffer stocks. The economic ministers 
agreed to the issue of ASEAN commemorative stamps. ASEAN 
Labour Ministers held their second formal meeting in May 1977. 
A "special" meeting had been held in May 1976 which adopted a 
common stance on international labour issues. ASEAN Ministers 
Responsible for Social Welfare and Ministers for Information 
convened their first joint meetings in July 1977 during which 
they reportedly formulated policy guidelines for future 
cooperation.
It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the 
success of these endeavours. There were undoubtedly many 
shortcomings as well as achievements. They are listed here 
merely to illustrate the growing diversity and breadth of 
ASEAN's activities. The claims of ASEAN's participants that by
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the end of its first decade the Association's activities had 
reached a broad cross-section of the populace in their 
countries seemed to be largely justified.
Interdependence
A further important theme in the discussion of 
regionalism within ASEAN was that members had come to consider 
that, in view of their mutual dependence, regional cooperation 
was "an imperative." Romulo at the Ninth Ministerial Meeting 
declared that in the ASEAN region cooperation was "inevitable. 
Indeed, in the context of today's realities, we have no 
alternative. A growing interdependence and the need for a 
shield against external political and economic pressures leave 
us no choice." Paterno also saw "no better alternative" to 
ASEAN and expressed the opinion that ASEAN would succeed 
"because the member-countries believe it must."48- 
Rajaratnam stated at the February 1977 informal foreign 
ministers meeting that after ten years members of ASEAN 
"cannot conceive of a future without ASEAN because it has so 
permeated our national life that without it each of us would 
feel far less secure than we are today. Had there been no 
ASEAN we who belong to it would have been far less successful 
than we have been in coping wi.th the dramatic and turbulent 
changes that took place in our region in recent years." He 
said that he mentioned this "as a corrective to the 
disappointment we and our friends are from time to time 
inclined to express over the slow progress made by ASEAN in
the past ten years.
External Comparisons
A final argument employed by ASEAN's defenders was that, 
whatever it shortcomings, it had at least performed a good 
deal better than most other regional groupings. This was a 
particular theme of Rajaratnam's public statements. He 
conceded that many of the criticisms made about ASEAN might be 
correct but he thought that they also lacked understanding 
because by the standards employed by these critics 
"practically all international organizations dedicated to 
fostering cooperation between nations had pretty sorry 
records". He admitted that ASEAN was "no less addicted than 
any other organization to passing pious resolutions."
Southeast Asians like other countries were "partial to 
rhetoric" and their rhetoric was at least equal to other 
countries in its "articulation and resonance". He claimed, 
however, that the United Nations had been the source of far 
more dangerous rhetoric and of more pious resolutions than 
ASEAN had produced in its first ten years.49* ASEAN was, 
moreover, as he told the Ninth Ministerial Meeting, "the only 
working and coherent regional association of states not merely 
in Southeast Asia but Asia as well."
Rajaratnam, and other ASEAN spokesmen, resisted 
comparison of ASEAN's achievements with those of the EEC. He 
thought ASEAN should be judged by Third World standards. He 
argued at the informal foreign ministers meeting in February 
1977 that Western Europe had required "two World Wars and, 
earlier still, decades of internecine relations before the 
rationality of a European Economic Community gained
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acceptance." Musa Hltam also lamented that there was 
"unfortunately a tendency to want to compare the achievements 
or as the critics put it "lack of progress' of ASEAN with the
European Economic Community consciously or unconsciously."
Such critics, he believed, ignored the different preconditions 
for regional cooperation in Europe and in Southeast Asia. 
Europeanism had been "a ground swell emerging from the masses 
desiring unity in the face of certain threats", whereas ASEAN 
was "essentially a concept being propagated by the leadership" 
of member-countries against the pressure of intense 
nationalism. Unlike ASEAN, Western Europe had a basic 
industrial base and an already vigorous intra-regiona1 trading 
pattern. After the war it had benefited from large-scale 
assistance under the Marshall Plan. In any case, Musa 
continued, the EEC was "an experiment frought with problems" 
which was best considered as providing a useful case study of 
the pitfalls to avoid rather than as a model for regional 
cooperation. Rithauddeen pointed out that the Treaty of Rome 
envisaged a much higher degree of economic and political 
integration than had the ASEAN Declaration. Such views were 
echoed by a number of other ASEAN nationals. One thought that 
a moment's reflection would indicate that it was patently 
unreasonable to compare ASEAN to the EEC since this would be 
like "asking a ten-year-old why he does not have the physical 
coordination and worldly wisdom of a thirty-year-old." Another 
contended that a "really successful organized interdependence 
among nations of the same region, not excluding the European 
common market, has yet to be demonstrated."50-
* * *
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The views outlined above provide a basis on which to 
evaluate ASEAN's performance during its formative first decade
according to the criteria laid down both formally and 
informally by ASEAN's members themselves. Clearly in terms of 
its ultimate or ideal objectives the Association's performance 
during this period had been at best a mixed result. It had 
failed to extend its membership to all of Southeast Asia; its 
aspiration to have the region recognized as a zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality had not been realized; its tentative 
measures towards economic integration had been attenuated by 
the perceived constraints of national interest; many of its 
participants were disappointed with the pace and extent of 
cooperative activities. But when the objective obstacles to 
ASEAN's development during this period are taken into account 
and also the cautious, consensus approach which the 
organization adopted, its claim to modest success does not 
appear unwarranted. Generally, ASEAN participants expressed 
satisfaction with the Association's achievements. When one 
contemplates the state of affairs between members in the years 
prior to its inception and the recognition and approval that 
ASEAN was accorded by other nations and by the majority of 
independent observers at the conclusion of its first ten 
years, this mood of satisfaction does not appear entirely 
unjustified.
ASEAN's evolution during its first decade set the 
pattern in many ways for its subsequent development. The 
trends of the first decade were in many respects confirmed and 
continued during the second. ASEAN has still a long way to go
273
to realize many of its objectives, especially in developing 
its relationship with the states of Indochina. Vietnam's 
occupation of Cambodia at the end of 1978 ensured that
progress in that direction was limited for several years. 
Rajaratnam expressed at ASEAN's Tenth Ministerial Meeting the 
hope that at its Twentieth Meeting the organization would 
"have as its backdrop a truly ASEAN community - thriving, 
united and accepted by others as a major factor in world 
economics and politics." ASEAN has not fully realized this 
aspiration. On the other hand, neither has it fallen victim to 
the alternative which Rajaratnam hoped would be avoided, 
namely "a gradual reversion of the five member states into 
separate communities each going its own different ways." While 
ASEAN can be credited with major achievements, both in its own 
eyes and those of the world, the challenge it will continue to 
face will be not just to survive, which it seems sure to do, 
but to progress further towards its long-term objectives.
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